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Abstract 
This doctoral research studies the deeper drivers of innovation, productivity and 
growth as well as the interlinkages between these three aspects. The thesis is 
organized as follows: 
Chapter 1 places the motivation of this research within the context of the wider 
body of research in the fields of economics of innovation, productivity and 
growth. It sets out the main aspirations of this research, followed by a brief 
outline of the research. 
Chapter 2 explores a wider set of innovation drivers driving firm growth, 
combining analysis of formal R&D processes promoted by growth theories 
alongside informal R&D linkages emphasized by national systems of innovation 
(NSI). The main goal is to distinguish primary drivers from secondary drivers, by 
examining the differences in key forces driving firm revenue levels versus those 
driving firm revenue growth. This hypothesis is tested through a dataset of 27 
European economies over the period of 1996-2010, controlling also for 
globalization and industrial organizational drivers. Findings reveal that informal 
R&D linkages appear to be the primary drivers needed to establish firm revenue 
levels, while formal R&D investment is needed as a secondary driver to spur firm 
revenue growth. 
Chapter 3 delves into the structural drivers of productivity.  Using an adaptation 
of the economic development framework, the Lewis model, this study proposes 
that country level labour productivity may be driven structurally by the 
movement of resources from smaller firm to larger firm-size structures. To 
enable this analysis, a new database is built up at sector level for the 32 
European economies between 2000-2012. The contribution of firm-sizes to 
country productivity is measured through isolating classifications of small, 
medium and large firms, alongside control variables capturing growth theory 
drivers, globalization, credit conditions and monetary lending policies. Large 
firms are indeed found to be the most significant firm structure shaping country 
labour productivity. 
iii 
Chapter 4 examines whether firm independence, previously not considered 
critical for firm growth, may indeed be an important criterion to enable scale up 
of innovative firms into successful frontier large firms. To shed light on the role 
of independence, the study examines the drivers of firm growth and the policy 
tools used to support firm growth – with innovative independent firms separately 
assessed from overall innovative firms. Using firm level dataset for all UK sectors 
between 2006-2016, policy tax and financing tools supporting start-up, growth 
and merger activity are examined alongside growth theory drivers, globalization 
and monetary lending policy. The empirical analysis reveals that independent 
firms reap much higher growth, with age of independence delivering a bonus 
growth dividend. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this thesis, listing the limitations 
of the analysis alongside future potential areas of research. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
‘Stay Hungry, stay foolish’ Steve Jobs (Commencement speech, Stanford, 2005) 
A reminder to me to stay true to my outside-the-box training, learned while 
working in research in frontier edge technology - and now my attempt to apply 
it also within academic research.  
All economies, be they advanced or developing, seek long term sustainable 
growth to deliver an improving quality of life. The key to sustainable growth has 
long since been acknowledged as innovation. Yet, innovation does not deliver 
growth directly, it acts upon growth through raising productivity. The oncoming 
era of automation and artificial intelligence pose challenges and opportunities 
for both the advanced and developing economies, with the race on to see which 
economies will be ahead of this curve in the transition – and how smoothly. Once 
again innovation has been brought to the fore as a deliverer of growth in this 
race, raising the importance of understanding the intricacies of the interwound 
fields of innovation, productivity and growth. 
The importance of innovation and its role in economic growth is not new. It can 
be traced back as early as Adam Smith (1776), who recognized that 
improvements in technology played an important part in raising worker 
productivity. After Smith, however there was a period of silence on the role of 
innovation in economic analysis, till the arrival of the Austrian economist, 
Joseph Schumpeter, with his influential book “The Theory of Economic 
Development’ published in German (1911) and later in English (1934). However, 
Soete et al. (2010) give List the credit of being the first economist who 
advocated the role of the state in creating long-term policies to support 
industries, emphasizing the importance of interconnectedness of institutional 
science with technology in industries (List, 1841). Following List, Schumpeter, 
often acknowledged as the ‘father of the field of innovation’ (Hall & Rosenberg, 
2010), expanded on Lists’ importance to the role innovation by focussing on two 
main themes in his book (1911). Firstly, that innovation lay at the heart of 
economic development and growth. Secondly, innovation did not just happen, 
they were created through heroic efforts by entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 1934). 
More so, Schumpeter homed in on the importance of understanding and 
analysing role of firm-structures in developing innovation (Schumpeter J. , 
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1942). By placing innovation at the heart of the growth process, Schumpeter in 
essence began a long road of study into innovation and its central connection 
with growth. 
The seminal paper linking the role of innovation as the long-term driver for 
sustainable growth is attributed to Robert Solow (1957), who attributed 
innovation or technological change as the only driver to overcome diminishing 
returns of factors of production. This paper was ‘a shot heard around the world 
that transformed the study of technological change into something more than an 
obscure sideshow’ (Scherer, 1999). Solow’s paper sparked a flurry of research 
into growth, specially the role of human capital in overcoming diminishing 
returns (Schultz, 1961; Lucas, 1986). However, innovation – which had been 
promoted as a specific point of focus by Schumpeter- remained still an 
exogeneous variable, delivered as if it were by manna of heaven. It was not until 
Romer’s seminal paper (1986) that innovation or technology was made 
endogenous to growth. Romer proposed that innovation in industry required 
profit-orientated activity to deliver two distinct components: products that 
could be patented excluding rival firms and knowledge, which is essentially a 
public good. Alongside this period of growth theories sparked by Solows’ seminal 
paper (1957) leading to Romer’s insights into the role of innovation within 
growth, the field of evolutionary economics – studies of innovation systems- had 
also experienced a spurt of interest and developed in tandem. 
In contrast to growth theories, which concentrate on explaining an output based 
on inputs, National Innovation Systems (NSI) focus on the process connecting the 
inputs and outputs. According to Soete et al (2010), the historical foundations of 
evolutionary economic stream of thought can essentially be traced back to List 
(1841), who advocated the support to develop systems of innovation, focussed at 
institutional and country level. These innovation systems, which were alluded to 
over the early 20th century (Schumpeter, 1939; Rostow, 1952; Kuznets, 1965), 
were developed further in seminal papers by evolutionary economists 
highlighting the informal role of R&D linkages or tacit knowledge in National 
innovation systems (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Freeman, 1987). These papers 
emphasized linkages between institutions and industry alongside importance of 
diffusion and skill development and led to a spate of studies on innovation 
systems (Dosi & Nelson, 1994; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993; 
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Freeman & Soete, 1997), sometimes known as the field of economics of 
innovation (Verspagen & Werker, 2003).  Not only does NSI theory probe into the 
networks and alignments between the public and private sector, it also includes 
the emphasis on importance of basic sciences, diffusion of knowledge and skilled 
workers. In particular, NSI systems differentiated themselves from growth 
theories by allowing introductions of innovation to be accompanied by initially 
diverging directions of productivity (Broadberry & Jong, 2000). This somewhat 
broader approach to the innovation process was complementary to growth 
theory, adding important understanding to the process of development of 
innovation. The link of innovation to growth via productivity is however not 
rooted in NSI, instead it can best be found through linking development 
economics understanding with growth theory.  
A seminal paper in development economics was Lewis’s economic development 
model, which proposed country growth could be linked to accumulation of 
capital (Lewis, 1954). Adding to this was the influential work of Amsden (2001), 
analysing newly industrializing economies explaining mechanisms of moving 
knowledge-based assets from lower skilled sectors towards higher skilled or 
higher productive sectors. However, it was Gollin (2014) reviewing the Lewis 
model, who adapted the interpretation of the Lewis model to relate productivity 
to growth. Building upon the insights in development economics, Gollin (ibid) 
proposed that productivity caused by the reallocation of resources from lower 
productive sectors towards higher productive sectors was the key to growth, not 
capital accumulation as suggested by Lewis. While Gollins’ revised interpretation 
of Lewis model provides a model linking growth to productivity, the model does 
not make any connection with innovation or firm structures. Despite the oft-
repeated insight that innovation is the key to higher productivity, overcoming 
diminishing returns as proposed originally by Solow (1957). Indeed, while these 
three disciplines of national innovation systems rooted in evolutionary 
economics, growth theory rooted in neoclassical economics and development 
economics offer very fundamental insights – yet, they remain quite apart. 
It is this very gap that the thesis aims to bridge. Drawing together insights from 
these three close yet disparate fields, to find a way to interconnect fundamental 
concepts on growth: innovation, productivity and growth. In order to do this, a 
fundamental thread runs through all three papers in this thesis – the importance 
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of the firm in all these three areas. The principle ‘vehicle’ of innovation as 
proposed by Schumpeter, who was preoccupied with the role of the firm size in 
the field of innovation (Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1942). To enable this 
interconnection of innovation, productivity and growth, the thesis breaks up the 
research into three areas. 
Firstly, to enable this, the thesis starts by broadening the analysis of innovation 
by including growth theory alongside national innovation systems. Following in 
the footsteps of scholars working on economics of innovation in the ‘invisible 
college’ (Verpsagen & Werker, 2003), with an ‘evolutionary’ paradigm working 
alongside the more traditional paradigm analysts (Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). This 
thesis however proposes combining the two paradigms, rather than working 
alongside the traditional paradigm.  Following the seminal work by Lundvall et 
al. (Jensen et al.,2007) who indeed combine these two paradigms, this thesis 
examines not only the combined effect of these two paradigms – it seeks to find 
an order to these influences. Differentiating primary drivers, those needed to 
initially build innovation, and secondary drivers, those used to spur innovation 
growth. To avoid using TFP, labelled ‘a measure of our ignorance’ (Abramovitz, 
1956), as growth accounting has pitfalls associated with the increasing difficulty 
to untangle capital from intangible investments (Hulten et al, 2006), the 
research used direct innovation survey data. Maintaining Schumpeter’s focus on 
firms, the analysis differentiates these drivers for firm-size classes: small, 
medium and large. Thus, identifying the innovation drivers most needed per size 
class. In essence, this is the foundational research setting an understanding of 
drivers of innovation combining two paradigms, while also laying the groundwork 
for understanding the importance of structures in the arena of innovation. 
Secondly, drawing on development economics’ Lewis model, the thesis aims to 
connect innovation’s importance of firm structures with country labour 
productivity.  Influenced strongly by economic development thinking of Lewis 
(1954), Gollin (2014) and Amsden (2001), all of whom in slightly differing ways 
explain the mechanisms of moving knowledge-based assets from lower skilled 
sectors towards higher skilled or higher productive sectors. These higher skilled 
sectors are associated with higher innovation, which in the long-term generate 
the higher productivity and growth for economies. Deviating from the norm of 
considering hindrances to factors of production rooted in neoclassical 
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perspective, as cause of lower productivity – this research explores how firm-
structures which channel resources, influences productivity through proposing an 
adaptation of the Lewis model. This thesis examines through the proposed 
adapted Leis model whether movement across firm structures, not sectors, could 
offer important insights to explain country labour productivity. Thereby drawing 
concepts of innovation into the area of growth and productivity, as productivity 
is recognized as the sustainable long-term driver of country growth Gollin 
(2014).   
Lastly, proceeding further on Schumpeter’s focus of the firm as ‘the vehicle’ of 
innovation, this research assesses what drives growth of the firm itself. Tackling 
one of the very concrete problems hindering growth in the UK economy – scale 
up of firms. Drawing from evolutionary thought on the influencing role of state 
policies on innovation, this research aspires to draw as many as possible of the 
firm-growth policies together, ranging from tax, financing, merger & acquisition 
supporting policies through to monetary policy. Assimilating an overall view of 
their realistic influence on the ground through using actual firm data.  
Combining this analysis with factors of production rooted in neoclassical 
analysis, alongside variables capturing aspects rooted in systems of innovation.  
However, this amalgamation goes further. It draws on understanding rooted in 
business history of economics and research in finance, management and 
enterprise literature. These offer valuable insights, which essentially allow the 
final leap. The leap involving a factor, not rooted in either stream of thought, 
but debated in economic history – a very prevalent issue on the ground in firms. 
That of firm independence. Firm independence as measured in this study, is 
understood to indicate that the firm is not owned by another business or 
financial firm, as such it has not been acquired or merged by another firm with 
controlling shares above 25%. The reason firm independence is of interest is the 
debate between some economic business historians claim that firms appear to 
grow sustainably through organic growth, which appears to contradict 
management literature, which consider acquisition as a path of sustainable 
growth for firms. While this may not be hard and fast rule, it is interesting to 
examine whether this characteristic does have any impact on firm growth ,as 
suggested by business historians. The research revelations are surprising. 
Independence appears to enable firms to reap more from factors of production, 
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while also delivering an age-related independence bonus-dividend. Firm 
independence appears to have a strong influence on growth, not yet captured in 
neoclassical thought nor in evolutionary systems. Leaving the possibility open for 
new models to be perhaps developed, offering deeper insights into firm growth.  
This thesis has thus tried to connect the analyses of innovation, productivity and 
growth, through merging insights across disciplines ranging from evolutionary 
economics, growth theory, development economics and business history. That 
path seems to have delivered new insights on the interconnectedness, as well as 
offering deeper understanding of structural determinants. Yet, it seems only to 
be a beginning. It offers insights of what can be gained from merging the field of 
‘economics of innovation’ towards a field of ‘economics of innovation, 
productivity and growth’. It would appear that far more can be interlaced, 
which could help this paradigm of thought to grow and evolve further.  
Despite the new insights yielded in this thesis on innovation, productivity and 
growth, there are quite a few research topics addressed in this thesis that leave 
avenues for future research. At its core, the foundational research chapter while 
shedding light upon the broader set of innovation drivers, only throws indicative 
light upon the possible mechanism through which these innovation drivers 
influence firms’ primary and secondary drivers. Detailed research into the 
various threads would reveal the deeper mechanisms, allowing policy analysis to 
be tuned accordingly. Similarly, the research on the adapted Lewis model which 
draws firm structures into productivity analysis, enables examination of 
importance of firm structures influence on productivity of an economy. 
However, in terms of sectoral composition it was only indicative of which sectors 
contribute to growth through employment or through higher productivity. Future 
research to explore the manner of contribution of sectors to economies, would 
help device policies to tailor policy to the problem – distinguishing between 
employment versus productivity. The last research piece of this thesis on scale 
up of firms, while shedding light on the value of firm independence, leaves 
questions on the role of the innovator unanswered. Future research, perhaps in 
close collaboration between historical analysis and economics of innovation, may 
help unveil the critical role of culture or innovator mind-set to find answers to 
those queries.   
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In essence, this thesis has tried to address some of the gaps that exist both in 
evolutionary stream on empirical analysis on concrete problems (Soete et al., 
2010), as well as limitations in neoclassical analysis of analysing innovation at 
country, sector and firm level ( (Dosi & Nelson, 2010). According to Soete et 
al.(2010) , empirical analysis of concrete problems offering concrete policy 
advice is a much needed next step for evolutionary economic steam of thought. 
Soete et al. (2010) observe that the challenges of globalisation and the spread of 
innovation across services and industry sectors causing shifts in the role of R&D 
and interconnections with institutions, requires evolutionary economic thought 
to move towards empirical approach to retain relevance. More specifically, it 
should move towards policy analysis of concrete problem. This thesis hopes to 
add towards filling the void as mentioned by Soete et al. (2010), as well as 
making steps towards overcoming some of the neoclassical limitations raised by 
Dosi & Nelson (2010). I hope this thesis is indeed one small step in that 
direction.  
Last but not least, my own experiences in innovation on the ground, have left 
me convinced and strongly supportive of Soete et al.’s (2010) stance – that 
innovation policy analysis has to tackle concrete problems. Allowing not only this 
field to remain relevant– but principally also in order to grow.  
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Chapter 2 Where NSI meets Growth Theory - 
‘Where do informal R&D processes fit alongside 
formal R&D investment?’ 
2.1 Abstract 
This chapter explores a wider set of innovation drivers driving firm growth, 
combining analysis of formal R&D processes promoted by growth theories 
alongside informal R&D linkages emphasized by national innovation systems 
(NSI). Although both R&D aspects are well researched for their importance 
towards innovation, this study proposes that there is an order to this 
contribution. The informal R&D process of linkages works on building the 
foundational levels of innovation, while R&D investment appears to spur 
additional growth of these innovation levels. Thus, informal R&D processes such 
as linkages and tacit knowledge constitute the primary driver, while formal R&D 
processes such as R&D investment acts as a secondary driver.  
The main goal of this study is to distinguish primary drivers from secondary 
drivers, by examining the differences in key forces driving firm revenue levels 
versus those driving firm revenue growth. This hypothesis is tested through a 
dataset of 27 European economies over the period of 1996-2010, controlling also 
for globalization and industrial organizational drivers. Findings reveal that 
informal R&D linkages appear to be the primary drivers needed to establish firm 
revenue levels, while formal R&D investment is needed as a secondary driver to 
spur firm revenue growth. 
Furthermore, the findings reveal that drivers for small and medium (SMEs) firms 
including both skilled human capital and linkages with academia, are significant. 
Additionally, linkages with government institutions were found relevant for 
medium size firms, reflecting the contribution of organisations like the 
Fraunhofer institutes in Germany on innovation.  
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2.2 Introduction 
Economies across the world seek policies to stimulate sustainable growth and 
improve productivities. Ever since Solow demonstrated that technology 
contributed more than capital towards long-term growth (Solow, 1956), the 
countries have focused on innovation as a basis for growth. Since then, the 
responsive policy focus has predominantly been driven by an emphasis on R&D 
investment. While policy response has been dominated by a focus on R&D 
investment, historical analysis of innovation across the two industrial revolutions 
draws emphasis towards another aspect – the role of collaboration (Mokyr, 
2010). According to Mokyr, the key to economic growth in the west such as UK’s 
innovative reign as the first Industrial nation and Germany’s dominance in 
chemicals in the second Industrial revolution, can be found in the “international 
cooperative agenda for useful knowledge” (ibid). Perhaps, policy focus may not 
only have missed capturing the wider drivers of innovation; more importantly it 
may have overlooked the most critical of drivers.  
Understanding the drivers of innovation not only helps tailor policy to support 
innovation delivering long-term growth in an economy; moreover, economies in 
the vanguard of innovation appear to dominate globally, outpacing others in 
growth. The US, the world’s dominant economy, can be considered as the 
‘cutting-edge global technology leader’ in the global arena (Wessner, 2011). 
Among European economies, the European Union Innovation scoreboard (EIS) 
ranks Germany alongside Sweden, Denmark and Finland as the Innovation leaders 
above other European economies (European Commission, 2013). Indeed, 
Germany’s strength in technical machinery allows it to be portrayed as the 
‘world supplier and equipper’ of systems and production technology (Wessner, 
2011). Obtaining a better understanding of the drivers of innovation may help 
explain why some economies outpace others in innovation and how, as Mokyr 
observed, it may have shaped dominance of historical economic powers.  
What are then the wider set of innovation drivers and importantly which are 
primary drivers acting on innovation levels versus secondary drivers acting on 
innovation growth? Moreover, do current R&D policy targets represent a 
sufficient response for driving innovation? Mokyr’s historical analysis of 
innovation (Mokyr, 2010) seems to suggest that the drivers of innovation are 
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complex, requiring more than just a focus on R&D investment. This view has also 
long been promoted by evolutionary economists (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Freeman,1987; Lundvall, 1992), who emphasise the informal role of R&D 
linkages or tacit knowledge in national innovation systems (NSI). This paper 
aspires to answer the first part of the query through using a wider context of 
analysis, which incorporates drivers of innovation found in growth theories, 
evolutionary economic theories and industrial organization theories. Through 
bridging the search for innovation across theories, this paper hopes to deliver a 
wider set of drivers, but critically also providing comparison, enabling in turn 
the order of selection of the most crucial drivers. The second part of the query 
is taken up in the conclusion, based on the findings of the analysis. 
Building upon significant body of work assessing the diverse roles of informal and 
formal R&D processes on innovation, this paper adds to this debate through two 
dimensions. Firstly, it aims to differentiate between the contribution of a 
primary and secondary driver role, between informal R&D linkages and formal 
R&D process, as captured by R&D investment, R&D linkages exemplifying an NSI 
approach and R&D investment rooted in growth theories. This expands on the 
work of Jensen et al. (2007), who investigate the isolated and combined effect 
of R&D linkages and R&D investment on innovation, through differentiating the 
order of the contribution of informal R&D linkages and R&D investment on 
innovation. The second dimension is that the paper expands the combination 
beyond national systems of innovation (NSI) and growth theories to including 
drivers from industrial organization and globalisation which influence the 
innovation process.  
Apart from the significant work on assessing the formal and informal role of R&D 
on innovation, there is an abundance of studies analysing the determinants of 
innovation rooted in assessing Schumpeterian concepts or drivers from growth 
theories. Growth theories, with technology considered either exogenous to 
systems as in neoclassical growth theories1 or technology endogenous to growth2. 
                                         
1  Growth theory models such as (Solow, 1956), (Mankiew, Romer and Wiel , 1992), (Lewis, 1954), 
alongside growth determinnat studies (Bosworth and Collins, 2003), (Easterly and Levine 2001) (Klenow 
and Rodrigues, 1997).  
2 Endogenous growth models as developed by (Arrow, 1962), (Romer 1990), (Romer 1993), (Matsumaya, 
1992), recently added by (Aghion & Howitt, 2006) 
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In fact, Mairesse and Mohnen reviewing innovation determinant studies, 
observed that studies have tended to concentrate on the analysis of 
contributions of market concentration, firm size, impact of technology push and 
pull on demand, foreign ownership and impact of R&D effort on Innovation 
(Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010). In contrast, Cohen reviewing innovation studies over 
the last fifty years, found the focus of industrial organization studies moved 
away over 50 years ago from market concentration and firm size, towards a 
focus on more fundamental determinants3 such as firm-level or industry 
characteristics, explaining industry differences and problems of appropriability 
(Cohen W. , 2010).  Nonetheless, Mairesse and Mohnen observe that despite 
these numerous determinants studies, the process of innovation is far from 
clear, with a great portion of innovation remaining unexplained (Mairesse & 
Mohnen, 2010). Supporting that aspect, Hall et al. (2010) observe that R&D may 
explain as little as 20-30 percent of the innovation process. Thus, by bridging the 
analysis in this study across theories, this study aims to not only bring in a wider 
set of innovation drivers – it aspires to shed a little more light on the actual 
innovation process. 
Previous studies have not only left a large portion of the innovation process 
unexplained; according to Cohen (2010), they have also suffered from the 
drawback of lack of direct innovation data and perhaps most seriously, from the 
absence of an innovation measure itself. Total factor of productivity (TFP) an oft 
used measure of innovation obtained through growth accounting, was very early 
on characterised by Abramovitz as a ‘measure of our Ignorance’ (Abramovitz, 
1956). While growth accounting techniques have developed a lot since then, the 
fact that capital has become more inter-twined with productivity has essentially 
made the separation of influence of innovation from capital through growth 
accounting even more difficult (Hulten C. , 2010), making the capture of as 
technology in TFP through growth accounting more problematic. More so, growth 
accounting is essentially based on a production function approach rooted in 
growth theories, whereas this study aims to take a wider approach incorporating 
growth theories as well as the informal role of R&D linkages or tacit knowledge 
                                         
3 Pioneered by Schmookler (Schmookler 1962) , Arrow (Arrow 1962), Nelson (Nelson, 1959), Griliches 
(Griliches, 1979), Rosenberg (Rosenberg, 1974), Mansfield (Mansfield 1968) and Scherer (Scherer, 
1980).  
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in national innovation systems (NSI). This suggests seeking an alternative 
measure to TFP for capturing innovation. 
This leads to the choice by many scholars of another measure of innovation, 
patents. The weaknesses, however, associated with the use of patents as a 
measure of innovation have also been highlighted earlier on by Griliches and 
Pakes (Pakes & Griliches, 1980)), supported by findings of Achs and Audretsch 
(Achs & Audretsch, 1988). Given these challenges, the innovation manual 
(Eurostat, 1997) advocated the choice of measuring outputs of innovation, where 
invention has been commercialized into an output, a concept used in Community 
Innovation Surveys (CIS). Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) find that Community 
Innovation Surveys provide studies with access to both direct innovation data 
and a reliable innovation measure, enabling cross comparisons (Mairesse & 
Mohnen, 2010). Through choosing to use both innovation data and innovation 
measure from CIS for this analysis, this study hopes to avoid some of the earlier 
drawbacks associated with use of indirect data or the absence of a specific 
innovation measure. 
Additional to calling for an avoidance of these pitfalls, Cohen pointed out ‘a 
major lacuna in the understanding of drivers of innovation’, is the lack of 
awareness of the contribution of innovation from the service sector (Cohen, 
2010). This study goes a step further and looks at all innovative sectors, be they 
service or industry, as defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and development in their move to help standardize innovation terminology 
(OECD, Innovation Manual, 2005). Such a wider incorporation of sectors, 
essentially also assessing the contributions of innovation importantly taking 
place in design and engineering, is again one more step in the direction towards 
improving our understanding of innovation through a wider approach 
Thus, with the aspiration of shedding greater light on the innovation process 
through finding a wider set of drivers and adding robustness through use of 
direct innovation data as a direct innovation measure, this study focuses on 27 
OECD countries using EU CIS survey data to perform a country level panel data 
innovation driver analysis covering a period from 1996-2010. For this analysis, 
the unit of analysis is at aggregated innovative core sector level for each of the 
27 EU economies - with the aggregation capturing innovation across both 
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industry and services, avoiding the pitfall of restricting innovation to industry 
only sectors.  
Following on from the empirical section, this study offers insights into the 
mechanisms through which these drivers could exert influence on the innovation 
process illustrated through German context, given Germany’s strong standing 
across drivers and innovation.  
Although the drivers in this study are sourced from across a slightly wider set of 
theories than previous cross-theory studies, the results support earlier findings 
of those theories: significance was found for industry linkages with academic 
institutions and importance of public funding for industry, along with supplier 
linkages and skilled human capital. The linkages were measured through CIS 
innovation surveys, based on firms rating the working relationship with the 
respective body as the most valuable cooperation influencing their innovations. 
Interpreted through the workings in Germany, these drivers influence innovation 
through mechanisms enhancing commercialization of research, reduction of 
funding gaps and promotion of longer-term decision-making. Though surprisingly, 
R&D investment is not found to be significant as a primary driver for innovation, 
it is found significant as a secondary driver working on innovation growth. This 
seems to signify that it requires the foundations of innovation to be laid by the 
wider set of primary drivers and uses them to thereupon build innovation 
growth. This differentiation may be an important insight for policymaking, by 
calling into question the current focus on R&D investment, which seems to be a 
secondary driver, and asking whether innovation may not be better served if 
greater focus is brought to bear also upon the use of a wider set of primary 
drivers to lay the foundations of innovation in the first place.  
The analysis concludes with a reversal of Schumpeter’s Hypothesis: instead of 
using firm-size as a driver, it differentiates the drivers for varied firm sizes. The 
results indicate that skilled human capital and linkages to academia remain key 
in driving innovation for SMEs, with the added significance of linkages with 
government institutions for medium sized firms.  The loss of significance of 
public funding or supplier collaborations as drivers for small and medium size 
firms invites further research. A last, but perhaps not insignificant aspect, is 
that large firms appear to dictate a substantial portion of innovation measure. 
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While SMEs may be called the hidden growth champions of Germany, their share 
of innovation turnover is by virtue of their size limited. Hence in the long run, 
economies or indeed sectors may be inhibited in innovation as a consequence of 
a reduced share of presence of large firms.  
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short 
background covering an overview of the Innovation studies and their findings on 
determinants, accompanied with a brief outline of the theories governing the 
various studies and their respective drivers. Section 3 describes the model and 
data. Section 4 interprets the mechanisms of influence of these drivers using 
insights gained from the Germany economy, with Section 5 listing the empirical 
results. The concluding section 6 offers insights from the empirical results into 
the innovation process, along with listing of some possible implications for policy 
makers. 
2.3 Brief Overview of theories and Innovation studies 
 The dominant theories influencing growth and innovation 
and their consequent specific innovation drivers 
Before we proceed to the overview of innovation determinant studies, it may be 
helpful to briefly outline the prevalent dominant theories and their 
accompanying influence on innovation. As this study’s main contribution centres 
on the importance of selecting drivers sourced across a wider range of theories 
rather than proving the theories themselves, this section provides only a very 
preliminary sketch of these theories. The reader wishing to pursue these 
theories in greater detail may access the listed references to obtain a more in-
depth understanding of these theories.   
It is perhaps also important to clarify that these theories are not innovation 
specific theories; instead they are the prevalent theories regarding growth, 
trade and industrial organization.  Indeed, these are areas in an economy that, 
in some way or another, are critically dependent upon the path of innovation. 
Hence, they tend to include some determinants or influences pertaining 
specifically to innovation. Aspects of these theories that influence innovation 
are incorporated in this study as a set of innovation drivers originating from that 
theory, with each set of drivers thus representative of a particular theory, as 
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illustrated in Figure 2.1. Thus, keeping in mind that the theories itself have a 
wider composition pertaining to other areas of influence, the following theories 
will be considered for their influence on innovation: Growth theory; National 
innovation systems; Cluster theory; and Globalization. Though this selection can 
by no means be considered to cover the entire range of theories touching upon 
innovation, their selection is dictated by the prevalent dominance of these 
theories in influencing various innovation studies. 
Let us start with growth theory. At its very simplest, growth theory may be 
understood as a set of models and theories that attempt to interpret the process 
of growth in economies, accommodating various combinations of factors of 
production in their models.4 Solow, in developing a growth model, with 
technology exogenous to it, illustrated that the factors of production such as 
physical and human capital are limited in their contribution to growth and long-
run sustainable growth may only achieved by virtue of technology (Solow, 1956). 
In exogenous growth systems, technology increasing productivity through an 
upward shift of the production function and endogenous growth systems 
maintaining an increasing-returns to scale through knowledge capital5. Although 
growth models have continued to develop, some with technology exogenous and 
others with technology endogenous to them, the main assertion of Solow’s 
remains relevant even today: technology or innovation still appears to drive 
long-term growth.  
While the development of growth models has led to varied sets of drivers, 
including the distinction of tangible from intangible capital (Hulten, Corrado, & 
Scihel, 2006), growth theory drivers essentially originate from the supply or 
input side of the process, with varying emphasis on the degree of contribution of 
human and physical capital in delivering growth and innovation. The inherent 
assumption is that the introduction of innovation is accompanied by productivity 
increases.  
                                         
4 A good overview of growth models may be found in (Jones, 2002) , as well as (Thirlwall, 2002)  
5 Some overviews of exogenous and endogenous growth theories may be found in (Broadberry & Jong, 
2000), (Winter, 1994), (Jones, 2002) (Meier, Rauch, 2005) 
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As the focus of this study remains on innovation, the drivers selected from 
growth theory for this research have been restricted to those influencing 
innovation, i.e. skilled human capital and R&D investment, including external 
outsourcing of R&D. Given the restriction of data availability, this smaller subset 
of drivers pertinent to innovation, is considered for the remainder of this 
research as appropriately representative of growth theory drivers influencing 
innovation.  
In contrast to growth theories, which concentrate on explaining an output based 
on inputs, National Innovation systems focus on the process connecting the 
inputs and outputs. Developed by evolutionary economists, the National 
Innovation Systems (NSI) approach emphasizes linkages between institutions and 
industry alongside importance of diffusion and skill development (Schumpeter, 
1939; Rostow, 1952; Kuznets, 1965; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nelson & 
Rosenberg,1993).  Not only does NSI theory probe into the networks and 
alignments between the public and private sector, it also includes the emphasis 
on importance of basic sciences, diffusion of knowledge and skilled workers. It 
also differentiates itself from growth theories in allowing introductions of 
innovation to be accompanied by initially diverging directions of productivity, 
with productivity initially reducing at introductions of innovation and only rising 
after period of diffusion (Broadberry & Jong, 2000). This somewhat broader 
approach to the innovation process may be viewed as defining the groundwork 
through which innovation could flourish within the boundaries of a nation state6. 
The selection of NSI drivers impacting the process of innovation for this research 
have been restricted to those available in CIS data: linkages between industry, 
public institutions and educational sector, representing alignment between 
industry, academia and government institutions and commercialization of 
research; as well as a measure of the influence of skilled human capital, as well 
as a measure of contribution of firm access to public funding on innovation.  
Whereas growth theory and NSI deal with the supply side or process aspect of 
innovation, Cluster theory has a different angle of contribution to innovation, 
rooted in its origins in cities and industrial organization (Marshall, 1920; Arrow, 
1962). While Marshall (1920) emphasized the decrease in labour and input costs 
                                         
6 Explanation of National Innovation systems have been documented by the OECD (OECD, 1997)   
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to firm co-location, Hotelling (1929) emphasized co-location as a competitive 
advantage for profitable business locations. Jacobs (1969) promoted the idea 
that city size and diversity lead to industrial agglomeration, a concept also 
recognized earlier by Marshall (1920). These concepts of co-location received 
greater traction across the policy world, when Porter related the advantages of 
industrial conglomeration and localization towards spurring of competitive 
advantage of nations (Porter M. , 1990). Indeed there is an abundance of studies 
in agglomeration, a review of which was conducted by Rosenthal & Strange 
(2004), however for this study we focus on the cluster concept promoted by 
Porter (1990) as it influenced industrial agglomeration.  
While not without critique7, this resurgence of cluster theory has influenced 
policy widely, both at international and national forum-levels. It combines 
drivers from growth theory and NSI to bring emphasis on skilled human capital, 
as well as infrastructure and importance of institutions. While it emphasizes 
institutions, it differs from NSI that it focuses on the expertise and not the 
relationships of institutions within the innovative networks. Instead, the key 
emphasis of relationships for industry is directed towards supplier and clients, 
based on geographic proximity and the influence of home markets. Competitive 
advantage is based on inter-firm rivalry within the domestic markets. As before 
due to data limitations, the drivers representative of cluster theory for this 
research have been restricted to skilled human capital, supplier linkages 
measured through collaborations and home market focus of enterprises.  
                                         
7 Some recent critique of Porters work may be found in (Martin & Sunley, 2003) (Taylor, 2010) (Swords, 
2013). 
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Figure 2.1: The different innovation drivers associated with Growth theory, NSI, Cluster 
theory and Globalization, source (author) 
 
In comparison to the above brief overview of dominant theories influencing 
innovation, globalization may perhaps not be labeled as a theory. Rather it can 
be described as an aspect of trade, which has shaped innovation through the 
diffusion of knowledge and enabled transfer of technology across national 
boundaries, a consequence of multinational enterprise cooperation with local 
Chapter 2  19 
organizations (Frankel & Romer, 1999; Feyrer, 2009). Though globalization and 
trade may not always have been beneficial for growth8 or for fuelling innovation, 
its impact on innovation through global competitive pressures and wider skill-
base draw focus on globalization as a driver of innovation in its own right 
(Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Bailey & Gersbach, 1995; Scherer, 1992). Thus, 
within the boundaries of this research and data availability, to determine 
whether it is a primary driver, the importance assigned by innovative enterprises 
on global markets is considered a driver representative of globalization influence 
on innovation.  
The above thus lists the theories influencing innovation, whose drivers pertinent 
to innovation will be explored empirically further on in this study. However, 
there is another theory that has considerably influenced innovation studies – that 
of Schumpeter’s Hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1942)9. It basically 
evaluates the contribution of firm-size and market concentration as drivers on 
innovation. Although has there been considerable research about these two 
aspects as drivers10 of innovation, this study seeks to actually refine the 
Hypothesis. Instead of viewing firm-size as a driver, it seeks to differentiate the 
drivers for varied firm sizes, as there is a growing preoccupation in the policy 
world that stimulation of small and medium firms (SMEs) may be important for 
growth and innovation in economies (Wessner, 2011). 
The above remains a very rough outline of theories, describing the main 
direction of thought of dominant theories influencing innovation and a simplified 
selection due to data limitation, of the related drivers influencing innovation. 
Within these boundaries, the empirical analysis that follows in section 4, reviews 
the contributions of these drivers, representative of these theories on 
innovation. Before however exploring the empirical analysis, however, the next 
section lists previous research on determinants of innovation.  
                                         
8 Wacziarg and Welsch found that though average affects of trade on growth are positive, certain economies 
did not benefit and local context may be important to consider, while reviewing impact of globalization 
and trade (Wacziarg & Welsch, 2008)  
9 Schumpeter started the debate on whether large size firms and monopoly was good for innovation, as it to 
an extent reduced the appropriability problem versus the potential of smaller and medium firms being 
more innovative and nimble in research (Schumpeter, 1934) (Schumpeter, 1942).  
10 See Cohen who lists the large extent of studies in this area (Cohen, 2010) 
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 Innovation Determinant studies 
As mentioned earlier, although there has been an abundance of studies into 
aspects of innovation, puzzlingly a large part of the innovation process remains 
largely unexplained. Mairesse and Mohnen observe reviewing innovation 
determinant studies, observe that the predominant focus in analysis has been 
around some key aspects, such as market concentration, firms size, technology 
push-pull effects on demand, foreign ownership and influence of R&D efforts 
(Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010). In contrast, Cohen reviewing industrial organization 
studies on innovation, found that there has been movement away over the last 
50 years from Schumpeter’s Hypothesis on firm-size and market concentration, 
towards a broader research agenda delving into the deeper impacts, such as firm 
level and industry characteristics, alongside technology and appropriability 
issues (Cohen W. , 2010). Cohen attributes this broader movement away from 
Schumpeterian hypothesis to pioneers such as Schmookler (1962), Arrow (1962), 
Nelson(1959), Griliches (1979), Rosenberg (1974) , Mansfield (1968) and Scherer 
(1980). According to Cohen’s review, the evaluation of firm level characteristics 
includes appraising influence of attributes such as cash flow, user needs, 
marketing, various management and governance methods and product 
diversification on innovation, whereas industry characteristics focus on the 
innovation differences in industries covering impacts on demand through income 
and price elasticity, market size, technological opportunities impacted by 
collaborations with suppliers and universities, along with connections to basic 
sciences and role of public scientific institutions. Notwithstanding this variation 
in their viewpoints, both the studies of Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) and Cohen 
(2010) acknowledge that despite the extensive studies the process of innovation 
remains largely unexplained.  
This lack of understanding of the innovation process is further underscored by 
Hall et al. (2010), who observe that despite the concentrated focus in innovation 
studies on R&D, R&D explains only 20-30 percent of the innovation process. It 
appears that despite this promulgation of studies into these wider drivers and 
aspects of innovation, ‘there is considerable distance to go’ in terms of 
explaining innovation, as succinctly put by Cohen (Cohen, 2010. P.194). This 
study seeks therefore, not to further increase the depth of study into the same 
aspects, but instead it considers the option of going across various theories, 
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evaluating their combined effect on innovation, aiming in the process to explain 
a somewhat larger share of the innovation process. 
While this is indeed not the first of innovation determinant studies going across 
theories, there are not many studies that have attempted a similar approach to 
innovation analysis. Achs and Audretsch combined growth theory elements 
alongside Schumpeter’s Hypothesis to deliver important insights, when they 
evaluated innovation determinants at firm level within US (Achs & Audretsch, 
1988). Though they found a monotonic relationship between firm-size and R&D, 
they found no significant effect of firm size on innovation and found importance 
of market concentration (but not firm dominance) important for innovation. 
Their study was however limited in comparability, as it was based on a specific 
US business administration data. Romijn and Albadejo went quite a bit further 
and combined aspects of cluster theory, NSI and growth theory when exploring 
firm level innovation in for a particular UK region (Romijn & Albadejo, 2002). 
Using experimental measures of innovation, they found support for most of their 
drivers, except that intra-firm networking, customer proximity or geographic 
proximity were not found to be significant. They also yielded important insights 
on the significant bearing of previous inter-firm and inter-personnel relationships 
and experiences on future collaborations and the process of innovation. Their 
study again lacked ease of comparability, as it was based on a specific 
innovation survey.  
In a similar vein of innovation studies going across theories, but enabling 
comparability across countries, Furman, Porter and Stern (2002) again explore 
similar comparisons of theories but enhance the analysis through use of panel 
data looking across 17 OECD countries and time period between 1973 and 1996. 
Their results attribute the greater share of innovation to a growth theory 
attribute of R&D investment and an attribute of all three theories - skilled 
human capital - with certain aspects of NSI also finding significance, though with 
lesser impact. Their study is however limited by the use of patents as an 
innovation measure and the lack of innovation specific data. Mairesse and 
Mohnen explore an experimental version of a growth accounting technique to 
determine innovation, using cross-country analysis of 7 OECD countries (Mairesse 
& Mohnen, 2002). Using a combination of drivers from cluster theory, 
Schumpeters Hypothesis of firm size, industry characteristics and R&D effort, 
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they find significance for R&D effort and industry characteristic. This analysis 
provides a valuable alternative approach towards innovation analysis and also 
uses direct innovation data, providing further reliability of results. They 
however, critically miss out on skilled human capital contribution, a key driver 
found across most theories, and so run the risk of capturing contributions of 
skilled human capital in their other drivers.  
Continuing to combine across theories for innovation determinants, but at firm 
level analysis, Bhattacharya and Bloch use cross-theory analysis for a firm level 
Australia survey-specific study (Bhattacharya & Bloch, 2004). Reviewing drivers 
across theories such as Schumpeter’s hypothesis of firm size and market 
concentration, growth theory attribute of R&D investment, globalization drivers 
of trade, as well as firm-characteristics of profits, their findings attribute the 
largest significance to R&D investment, with less but still significance for 
Schumpeter’s hypothesis. This analysis adds value through adding globalization 
as an additional aspect to cross-theory studies., which helps broaden the 
analysis, but has limitations of cross-country comparison due to the use of 
Australian-specific survey data from Australian Bureau of Statistics. However, 
the larger limitation is caused due to the absence of skilled human capital, a 
vital driver across theories, its absence risking an incorrect significance 
attribution to other drivers.  Jong and Vermeulen combine aspects of linkages, 
which include management leadership, education and experience, linkages to 
universities and cluster aspects of intra-firm working for a Netherlands-specific 
firm-level study (Jong & Vermeulen, 2006). Their results find significance for all 
except education. Their analysis offers insights into deeper aspects of type of 
skills of management, employee connections and intra-firm influence. Their 
study, though, again suffers from the absence of skilled human capital, a key 
driver across theories, along with absence of R&D investment, a driver usually 
included. Furthermore, the use of country specific survey data makes 
comparison across countries of similar drivers more difficult. Valuable as the 
insights are from these studies, especially as they highlight the potential 
strengths of various combined approaches, as enumerated above they each 
suffer from certain shortcomings.  
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Table 2.1 Summary oversight of literature review , source (author) 
Summary of literature 
overview 
 
Papers reviewing a set of 
studies 
• Review of Innovation determinant studies 
(Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010)  
• Review of Industrial organization studies 
(Cohen, 2010) 
• Review of literature measuring returns 
on R&D (Hall et al, 2010) 
 
 
Papers going across 
theories - that enable 
comparison across 
countries  
 
• Combining cluster theory, growth theory 
and aspects of NSI, Panel data looking 
across 17 OECD countries and time 
period between 1973 and 1996 (Furman 
et al, 2002) – find R&D investment, 
skilled human capital and certain aspects 
of NSI. Shortcoming - use of Patents 
• Combining across cluster theory, 
Schumpeters Hypothesis of firm size, 
industry characteristics and R&D effort, 
cross-country analysis of 7 OECD 
countries (Mairesse & Mohnen, 2002). 
Findings - R&D effort and industry 
characteristics, shortcoming – miss out 
on skilled human capital 
 
 
Papers going across 
theories – country 
specific, but at firm level 
analysis  
 
• Combining aspects of growth theory and 
Schumpeterian hypothesis for US (Achs & 
Audretsch, 1988). Found a monotonic 
relationship between firm-size and R&D. 
Shor-coming, not comparable, as specific 
study 
• Combining aspects of cluster theory, NSI 
and growth theory for UK  (Romijn & 
Albadejo, 2002). Found support for most 
of their drivers, except that intra-firm 
networking, customer proximity or 
geographic proximity were not found to 
be significant. Shortcoming – not 
comparable, as specific survey 
• Combining theories across Schumpeter’s 
hypothesis of firm size and market 
concentration, growth theory, 
globalization, as well as firm-
characteristics of profits - at firm level 
analysis Australia survey-specific study 
(Bhattacharya & Bloch, 2004). Find 
significance to R&D investment and 
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Schumpeter’s hypothesis. Shortcoming – 
no skilled human capital  
 
• Combining aspects of linkages of 
innovation systems as well as 
management aspects and cluster theory 
for a Netherlands-specific firm-level 
study (Jong & Vermeulen, 2006). Find 
significance for all except education. 
Shortcoming – no skilled human capital  
 
 
Indeed, this brief overview summarized in Table 2.1, only reaffirms Cohen’s 
observation that part of the problem with innovation studies is either the use of 
indirect innovation data or an absence of a specific innovation measure or the 
lack of use of historical insights to supplement explanations of empirical 
research (Cohen, 2010).. Nonetheless, they have pioneered an approach that has 
much merit and it is in their footsteps that this study hopes to proceed further, 
aiming to add value through avoiding the weaknesses highlighted by Cohen as 
well as going a bit wider across theories for drivers. Our nest section will outline 
the choice of models and the drivers associated with it, before proceeding to the 
empirical analysis in section 5. 
2.4 Model and data 
 Model  
Having considered both the prevalent dominant theories influencing innovation 
and their relevant drivers for innovation, the model evaluating the contribution 
of these drivers on innovation can now be built. As pointed out earlier, the 
significance of contribution of this model is based on a few simple premises. 
Firstly, it combines the drivers from a spectrum of theories spanning growth 
theory, evolutionary theory, cluster theory and impacts of globalization. 
Secondly, this study refines Schumpeter’s hypothesis which seeks to identify the 
firm-sizes driving innovation, instead this paper reverses this thought process – 
initially seeking to define innovation drivers for all firms and then differentiating 
the drivers specific to firm-size: small, medium and large firms. Thirdly, it uses 
direct innovation firm data and a corresponding innovation measure to increase 
the relevance of drivers specific to innovation. Lastly, the unit of analysis is at 
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aggregated innovative core sector level for each of the 27 EU economies - with 
the aggregation capturing innovation across both industry and services, avoiding 
the pitfall of restricting innovation to industry only sectors.  
Based on above mentioned premises, the model is listed in equation 1 : 
INNOVATIONi,t = b0  + a (innovation drivers of Growth theory) i,t + b (innovation 
drivers of national innovation systems) i,t + d ( innovation drivers of Cluster 
theory) i,t + h (drivers of globalization) i,t + g (country-specific effects) i,t + µi,t                     
(1) 
Where i – identifies the aggregated innovative core sector level for each EU 
economy and t – identifies year  
Previous innovation studies have varied model specifications, differing between 
log-log form or linear combinations, based on differing innovation measures 
(Cohen W. , 2010). Based on the choice of innovation measure and to avoid 
capturing any of the variables from combining across theories, this model 
proposes a linear combination of drivers. Essentially, assuming the drivers’ 
contribution is additive on innovation, not multiplicative with each other. While 
this may be a simplified and conservative estimation of the drivers’ separate 
influences, it avoids overlooking contributions by possibly non-multiplicative 
drivers. Hence, the above model uses a linear form to assess the various 
influences of these individual drivers originating from various theories on 
innovation. 
Representing the theories by their driver contributions, the analysis can be 
rewritten, as specified in equation (2).  
INNOVATIONi,t = b0  + b1(Skilled human capital and Investment) i,t + b2(Skilled 
human capital, public funding, linkages to universities and linkages to 
government institutions ) i,t + b3 (Skilled human capital, linkages with suppliers 
and home market focus) i,t + b4 (enterprises focused on international markets) i,t 
+ g5 (country-specific effects) i,t + µi,t                     (2) 
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Innovation measure is represented by firm turnover of innovative firms, with 
classification of innovative firms based on innovation in product, process, 
marketing or organizational aspects (Eurostat, 1997; EUROSTAT CIS, 2013).  
As skilled human capital is common to several, its influence needs to be only 
evaluated once. Hence, the final shape of the equation is shown in equation (3): 
INNOVATIONi,t = b0  + b1(Skilled human capital) i,t + [b2 (R&D Investment ) i,t+ b3 
(R&D external) i,t+ b4 (R&D internal) i,t ] + [b5(public funding) i,t +b6 (linkages to 
universities ) i,t + b7(linkages to government institutions) i,t} + [b8(linkages with 
suppliers) i,t +b9(home market focus) i,t] + [b10 (enterprises focused on 
international markets) i,t] + g6 (country-specific effects) i,t + µi,t                     (3) 
Including, time effects, the equation is listed in (4), with the square brackets 
denoting the separate variables representing drivers for growth theory, NSI, 
cluster theory and globalization respectively, as listed in Table 2.2: 
INNOVATIONi,t = b0  + b1(Skilled human capital) i,t + [b2 (R&D Investment ) i,t+ b3 
(R&D external) i,t  + b4 (R&D internal) i,t] + [b5(public funding) i,t +b6 (linkages to 
universities ) i,t + b7(linkages to government institutions) i,t} + [b8(linkages with 
suppliers) i,t +b9(home market focus) i,t] + [b10 (enterprises focused on 
international markets) i,t] + g6 (country-specific effects) i,t + b7 (time dummies) i,t 
+ µi,t                     (4) 
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Table 2.2 : List of drivers used in model, associated with main strands of theories 
influencing innovation, source (author) 
The theories specific to 
drivers 
The drivers associated with the innovation 
theory 
Driver common to 3 of 4 
strands 
• Skilled human capital 
Additional drivers specific 
to growth theories 
• R&D investment (including acquisition of 
external knowledge and capital) 
• Enterprises engaged in Internal R&D 
• Enterprises sourcing external R&D  
Additional driver specific 
to National Innovation 
system 
• Access to public funding for enterprises 
with some form of state support 
• Linkages between industry and 
academia, supporting commercialization 
of research  
• Linkages between industry and 
government institutions and laboratories 
Additional drivers specific 
to Cluster theory 
• Linkages between industry and suppliers, 
aligning research and upstream suppliers 
• Enterprises with Home market focus, 
home influences shaping innovation  
Globalization • Enterprises focused on international 
markets 
 
 Sources of data and definition of key measures and terms 
Having defined the model, it is important to explain the sources of data and the 
definitions of some measures of variables, as that also forms an important 
aspect of contribution for this research. As highlighted in the overview of 
previous innovation determinant studies, amongst the various challenges facing 
cross-country innovation studies, there are possibly two key issues: firstly, 
access to data that actually reflects innovation; and, secondly, the choice of an 
accurate and comparable measure of innovation across varied national 
innovation systems. To attempt to bridge these two gaps, based upon previous 
research into the reliance of innovation data (Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010; 
Johansson & Loof, 2009), this research turned to Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) data in order to access direct innovation data and a direct innovation 
measure. 
Innovation database: CIS innovation data is specific innovation data collected 
across EU economies, providing a source of direct measures for most of the 
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innovation variables used in this research. This facilitates a specific measure of 
innovation through turnover of classified innovative firms along with other 
variables associated with innovation, as well as avoids the inaccuracies that may 
accompany the use of general economic variables when applied as proxies for 
specific innovation issues. The European Commission initiated the first CIS direct 
innovation data for Europe in ’93 with a pilot community innovation survey (CIS) 
(EUROSTAT CIS, 2013). This was further developed to form the basis of CIS 
innovation data, leading to the first official CIS survey in ’96 and thereafter to 
the availability of innovation data every two years, with the last available data 
for 2010. This survey provides data for varied types of indicators related to 
innovation: products, processes, marketing and organizational and has been 
closely developed following the guidelines in the Oslo manual (Eurostat, 1997). 
While not without criticism, as it mixes quantitative and qualitative measures 
(Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010), with the qualitative measures being vulnerable to 
certain amount of subjectivity, this research is based upon the quantitative 
measures available in this data.  
Innovation measure: In this study, the dependent variable is the revenue or 
turnover of innovative firms. This choice of innovation measure needs some 
elaboration, as Kuznets mentioned as early as in 1962 that ‘the lack of 
meaningful measures of innovation input and output remain great obstacles to 
understanding the role of innovation in economic progress’ (Kuznets, 1962) and 
continues be a challenge (Achs & Audretch, 1988; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). 
The characterization of TFP as ‘a measure of ignorance” (Abramovitz, 1956), 
underscored by the challenge of separating capital from the increasingly inter-
twined capital with innovation (Hulten C. , 2010) highlights the weakness of use 
of TFP as a measure of innovation.  Similarly, the use of patents as a measure of 
innovation has also been questioned by Griliches and Pakes (Pakes & Griliches, 
1980)), supported by findings of Achs and Audretsch (Achs & Audretsch, 1988). 
The use of R&D expenditure or R&D intensity, another used measure for 
innovation, was specified by the Oslo manual, as ‘one of the range of input 
activities that generate innovation’ (Eurostat, 1997; OECD, 2018, p 46). The Oslo 
manual goes on to identify that ‘innovation needs to be implemented… 
distinguishing it from invention’ (OECD, 2018, p 47), seeming to underscore that 
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innovation should be measured based on output or successful translation of 
input.  
Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) following that line of thought suggest that firm 
revenue of an innovative firms could be an output measure which successfully 
measures innovation, capturing the translation of an invention or R&D input into 
gain. As Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) classify firms as innovative or not 
and measure revenue, these surveys provide studies with access to direct 
innovation data and various reliable innovation measures, enabling cross 
comparisons (Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010). A firm is considered innovative, if it has 
incorporated innovative products or processes within the last 3 years, in 
accordance with definitions of innovation as listed in the Oslo manual (Eurostat, 
1997; OECD, 2005). Although, the revenue measure has similar disadvantages of 
measures associated with survey errors, though it appears to reflect reasonable 
accuracy based on comparisons with sales and balance sheets of firms 
(Johansson & Loof, 2009; Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010).  
While CIS surveys provide total revenue of innovative and non-innovative firms, 
they also try to identify the percentage of turnover of firms relevant to new 
innovations introduced over 3 years prior to surveys. However, in the 
harmonized and anonymized datasets provided by the EU, with requisite firm 
classifications and sector identification, this separation of turnover related to 
innovation is not available. Given the differing focus of various innovation 
studies using CIS datasets, innovation measures have varied ranging from a 
dichotomous binary variable identifying a firm as innovative or not, to various 
usages of quantitative data (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). This study chose not to 
use a dichotomous variable instead choosing firm revenue, as this variable could 
offer insights regarding growth and firm classification.  
Albeit, this choice is accompanied by the limitation that this innovation measure 
does not separately identify the exact contribution of the innovation towards 
overall revenue. Nonetheless, it was felt that this variable could offer more 
insights than a purely dichotomous binary variable distinguishing a firm from 
being innovative or non-innovative, while reflecting as much as possible of 
actual innovation within firms. Henceforth, the dependent variable in the model 
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is firm revenue of innovative firms, with firms being classified innovative based 
on CIS definition.  
Understanding of Innovation and innovative firms itself: As innovation is a 
widely used term, it is also perhaps best to define the boundaries of this term 
for this research. Innovation or innovative firms, as used by this research are in 
accordance with the classifications of CIS, which are aligned with definitions in 
the Oslo manual (Eurostat, 1997; OECD, 2005). According to the Oslo manual, 
innovation is interpreted as either a new or significantly improved set of goods 
and services brought by a firm to the market. Innovative firms are thus defined 
as those introducing a new process or product, be it new to the market or only 
new to the firm, in line with the Oslo manual definition of innovation. This 
differentiation of innovation from invention, with innovation being the activity 
that actually is translated to profit in the market, echoes Schumpeter’s 
interpretation of innovation. In his view, innovations took place only when 
inventions were accompanied by entrepreneurship: ‘… As long as they 
[inventions] are not carried into practice, inventions are economically 
irrelevant’ (Schumpeter, 1961, pp 88-89).  Hall and Rosenberg (2010) also define 
similar concepts of innovation, encompassing technical change in both products 
as well as organization.  
Core-innovative sectors: Another key aspect of this research is the width of 
sectors analysed for innovation, incorporating both service and industry sectors, 
as innovation in current day digital economies bridges both categories. This 
research seeks to overcome previous restrictions of innovation studies to 
industry sectors only, which Cohen (2010) found contributed to the weaknesses 
of previous innovation studies (Cohen W. , 2010). Hence, this study seeks to 
include all ‘core-innovative’ sectors as defined in CIS data11, including both 
                                         
11 These core-innovative sectors of an economy thus follow the classification as specified by CIS (Eurostat, 
2013). According to CIS, the core innovative sectors classified within industry are mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning and water supply; while services include 
wholesale trade, except motor vehicles, transportation and storage, publishing activities, computer 
programming and related consultancies, information’s services, financial and insurance services, architectural 
and engineering activities, technical testing and analysis. The actual activity classification is according to 
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services and industry. CIS defines these core innovative sectors to include both 
manufacturing and services ranging from B till M 71 sectors. The possible 
importance of extending this innovation research to all ‘core innovative sectors’ 
across both services and industry is not to be underestimated.  This extension is 
necessary to capture analysis of technical frontier firms, classified varyingly 
under R&D, computer or information services, which are delivering design 
solutions but not necessarily manufacturing them. To restrict studies of 
innovation to manufacturing industries risks missing innovative firms in new 
emerging sectors and thus not capturing the essential drivers in the ever-
changing landscape of innovation. Hall and Rosenberg underscore the 
importance of this wider concept of innovation to  ‘encompass research carried 
out in universities and industrial and government labs … or [even just] which 
Romer (Romer P. , 1990) labelled as new ideas’ (Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). 
According to Hall and Rosenberg (ibid), this wider understanding of innovation 
evolved with time to reflect the importance of productivity and welfare-
enhancing technical change emanating across sectors.  
Firm-sizes: As this research uses firm sizes to distinguish turnover for small and 
medium firms (SMEs) from large firms and this definition differs across 
continents, it is also worthwhile to define the basis for this differentiation. The 
classification of firm sizes in CIS innovation data follows the recommendations of 
European Commission (Commission, 2003), defining small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) as having less than 250 employees and an annual turnover of 
up to 50 million Euros. It is though worth noting that the differentiation in CIS 
data between small, medium and large is based only on employee numbers, with 
small firms having 10-49 employees, medium firms having 50-249 employees and 
large firms having above 250 employees.  
Skilled human capital: Data on skilled human capital was not available in CIS 
and has been sourced from another data set, also provided by Eurostat, the 
Human Resources in Science and Technology (HRST) database (EUROSTAT HRST, 
                                         
NACE system of classification, a “statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community” (Eurostat, 2008) 
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2012). This database measures the stock and flows of human resources across 
the EU and is based on European labour force surveys and 
UNESCO/OECD/Eurostat questionnaires. This dataset provides a measure of the 
scientists and engineers in employment in the economy across all sectors, not 
only innovative sectors. However, as scientists and engineers can be assumed 
work in innovative sectors, this measure may still be considered relevant. While 
this is also only a partial measurement of the innovative skill force in an 
economy, in the absence of further detailed skilled human capital working in 
economies, this is used as a variable to proxy the skill base of innovative human 
capital. 
Definitions of CIS variables: Though the variables in CIS have matured and 
developed in the CIS surveys in order to allow greater accuracy and 
differentiation of data over the years between 1996 and 2010, this study has 
attempted to choose the variables across the years closely aligned to their initial 
starting point in 1996 to try to minimize discrepancies. Most of these variables 
assumed the definitions in 2000, which are listed still as the definitions in 2010. 
Total innovation expenditure (R&D investment):  In 1996, this is defined as 
total innovation expenditure. By 2010, this is explicitly defined as total 
innovation expenditure, capturing R&D investment, as well as costs for 
acquisition of external knowledge and capital. 
Enterprises sourcing external R&D: There is no data in 1996 or 1998, 2000 
onwards it is defined as innovative enterprises engaged in external R&D 
activities. 
Enterprises engaged in internal R&D: In 1996, this was obtained as innovative 
enterprises with R&D expenditure. In 2010, this variable represents innovative 
enterprises engaged in in-house R&D activities. 
Access to public funding for enterprises with some form of state support: In 
1996, this is defined as innovative enterprises supported by government. In 2010 
this represents the innovative enterprises that receive any form of public 
funding.  
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Linkages between industry and academia, supporting commercialization of 
research: Linkages between academia and industry are considered a critical 
linkage in national innovation systems. In 1996, CIS defined this as innovative 
enterprises with universities or other higher education institutes as partners. By 
2010 this represents innovative enterprises co-operating with universities or 
other higher education institutes.  
Linkages between industry and government institutions and laboratories: 
This linkage captures external R&D collaboration for firms in national innovation 
systems. CIS defined this in1996 as innovative enterprises with government or 
private non-profit research institutes as partners. By 2010 this represents 
innovative enterprises co-operating with government or public research 
institutes. 
Linkages between industry and suppliers, aligning research and upstream 
suppliers: Perhaps also a critical linkage, as an important linkage in national 
innovation systems as well as cluster theory, CIS defined this in 1996 as 
innovative enterprises with suppliers as partners in equipment, materials, 
components and software. By 2010 this represents innovative enterprises co-
operating with suppliers of equipment, materials, components and software. 
Linkages between industry and any form of development partners: In 1996, 
this is defined as innovative enterprises with any form of innovative cooperation. 
By 2010 this represents innovative enterprises engaged in any type of innovative 
cooperation.  
Enterprises with Home market: In 1996 this was classified as innovative 
enterprises with no exports. By 2010 this had matured into a variety of classes 
with the study restricting the variable to innovative enterprises that sell goods 
and/or services in the national markets. 
Enterprises focused on international markets: In 1996 this was classified as 
innovative enterprises with exports. By 2010, the variable chosen for this class is 
defined as innovative enterprises that sell goods and/or services to other EU, 
EFTA and EU candidate countries. To avoid overlaps, this study chose not to add 
further classes of exports to different regions, as it could be the same 
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enterprises with further expansions of exports. While this may reduce the total 
level of innovative firms with exports and may err on the side of conservative 
estimates, it attempts to capture the first level of exports for firms – through 
their expansion in the closest regions outside their national borders.  
In the above listed variables (except for investment and revenue variables), the 
study lists the number of firms making these choices and not the aggregate 
turnover, as it is not available for such measures, unfortunately a limitation of 
CIS survey data. Basically, these variables are dichotomous qualitative variables 
indicating use or not of the wider aspects of National innovation systems.  
This study hopes to explore the importance of these above linkages, enabling 
some prioritisation of these linkages for innovation, differentiated for firm-size 
classes. 
 Interpretation of the coefficients of drivers: 
As the model is a linear model of innovation, the regression will yield 
coefficients for each driver, which may need to be clarified, as they will 
represent the proportional ratio of change in output per unit change of the 
particular driver. These are outlined below: 
Dependent variable (all firm-sizes): The dependent variable, innovation output 
is measured in quadrillion (million billion) Euros to enable readable coefficients 
in regression tables, is the average turnover of all innovative firms.  
Dependent variable (small/medium/large): The dependent variable, innovation 
output measured in quadrillion (million billion) Euros, is the average turnover of 
small/medium/large firm-sizes. 
Skilled human capital proportional ratio: This parameter would relate 
innovation output (measured in quadrillion of Euros) per number of scientists 
and engineers representing skilled human capital unit (measured in the 1000’s). 
Hence unit for parameter would be billions of Euro innovation output per 1000’s 
engineers/scientists. 
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R&D investment proportional ratio: This parameter would relate innovation 
output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per R&D investment unit, represented 
by total innovation expenditure (measured in millions of Euros). Hence unit for 
parameter would be billions of Euro output per millions of Euro R&D investment. 
Internal R&D proportional ratio: This parameter would relate innovation 
output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per number of firms engaged in 
internal R&D unit (measured in 1000’s). Hence units would be billions of Euro 
output per 1000’s of firms engaged in internal R&D. 
External R&D proportional ratio: This parameter would relate innovation 
output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per number of firms sourcing R&D 
externally unit (measured in 1000’s). Hence units would be billions of Euro 
output per 1000’s of firms sourcing R&D externally. 
Public funding proportional ratio: This parameter would relate innovation 
output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per number of firms with access to 
public funding unit (measured in 1000’s). Hence unit for parameter would be 
billions of Euro output per 1000’s of firms with public funding. 
Linkages between industry and academia proportional ratio: This parameter 
would relate innovation output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per number 
of firms with cooperation between industry and academia unit (measured in 
1000’s). Hence unit for parameter would be billions of Euro output per 1000’s of 
firms with linkages to academia. 
Linkages between industry and government institutions proportional ratio: 
This parameter would relate innovation output (measured in quadrillions of 
Euros) per number of firms with cooperation between industry and government 
institutions unit (measured in 1000’s). Hence unit for parameter would be 
billions of Euro output per 1000’s of firms with linkages to government 
institutions. 
Linkages between industry and suppliers proportional ratio: This parameter 
would relate innovation output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per number 
of firms with cooperation between industry and suppliers unit (measured in 
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1000’s). Hence units would be billions of Euro output per 1000’s of firms with 
linkages to suppliers. 
Linkages between industry and any form of development partner’s 
proportional ratio: This parameter would relate innovation output (measured in 
quadrillions of Euros) per number of firms with any form of external 
collaborations (measured in 1000’s). Hence unit for parameter would be billions 
of Euro output per 1000’s of firms with any collaboration. 
Home market proportional ratio: This parameter would relate innovation 
output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per number of firms with sales focus 
on domestic markets (measured in 1000’s). Hence unit for parameter would be 
billions of Euro output per 1000’s of firms focused on domestic markets. 
International market proportional ratio: This parameter would relate 
innovation output (measured in quadrillions of Euros) per number of firms with 
sales focus on international markets (measured in 1000’s). Hence unit for 
parameter would be billions of Euro output per1000’s of firms focused on 
international markets. 
Having outlined the basic definitions, sources of data and interpretation of 
coefficients, the next section describes the model and lists the empirical results 
for this study.  
2.5 Empirical Analysis 
 A panel-data analysis of innovation and its drivers  
The empirical analysis is based on the model described in equation 4 in section 3 
and the drivers enumerated in Table 2.2, the possible mechanisms of influence 
for those drivers on innovation as proposed in the above section.  Proceeding 
now to the empirical analysis, the regression is based initially on two Eurostat 
data sets, CIS and HRST, which cover 27 countries across the EU over the period 
1996-2010. Reiterating the earlier equation 4 below, which is used for the 
regression: 
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INNOVATIONi,t = b0  + b1(Skilled human capital) i,t + [b2 (R&D Investment ) i,t+ b3 
(R&D external) i,t  +b4 (R&D internal) i,t]] + [b5(public funding) i,t +b6 (linkages to 
universities ) i,t + b7(linkages to government institutions) i,t} + [b8(linkages with 
suppliers) i,t +b9(home market focus) i,t] + [b10 (enterprises focused on 
international markets) i,t] + g6 (country-specific effects) i,t + b7 (time dummies) i,t 
+ µi,t                     (4) 
For the regressions, panel datasets covering 27 countries are used, which offer 
the advantage of capturing both cross-sectional as well as time-series data, 
while minimizing impact of omitted variables in regressions (Hsiao, 2005). Given 
this advantage of panel data sets, nonetheless the regression estimation has to 
be careful to avoid country specific and sector specific effects, as they could 
distort regression results.  Hence, based on the panel data sets selected for this 
study, this study found Fixed effect (FEM) estimation to be the most appropriate 
econometric analytical tool of choice to remove country specific effects from 
across the 27 country data, as FEM removes time invariant mean effects from 
the correlation of regressor with explanatory variables (ibid).  
The regression results for equation 4 are listed in Table 2.3 for period ’96-2010 
covering 27 European countries. Innovative firm turnover as defined earlier as 
the innovation measure, is used as the dependent variable on the L.H.S. Columns 
numbered (1) – (5) list the various regressions independently initially for each 
theory as listed in Table 2.3 and then the combined regression of all drivers – the 
model for our research. Consequently column (1) lists the regression with only 
the independent drivers from growth theories on R.H.S.; column (2) lists results 
for NSI drivers only on R.H.S; column (3) shows results for cluster theory drivers 
only; column (4) lists globalization only drivers; with column (5) depicting results 
due to the combined effect of drivers, as proposed by this theory in equation 
(2). However, these initial separate regressions for each separate theory from 
column 1-4 may suffer from problem of omitted variable regressions, as we 
exclude combining these theories which this research considers jointly 
significant. As such, the result and consequent insights of the initial regression 
results from column 1-4 should be treated with caution.  
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Table 2.3:Regression results for initially step-wise theories and their drivers, lastly with 
combined drivers in accordance with proposed model, with dependent variable – annual 
innovative turnover of firms in quadrillion Euros 
Strands 
of 
theories: 
  
(Period 
1996-2010) 
(1) Growth 
theories 
(2) Nat. 
Innov. 
Systems 
(3) 
Cluster 
Theory 
(4) 
Globali-
zation 
(5) All 
combine
d – as 
per 
model 
(5) 
Previous 
combined – 
as per 
model 
  Observatio
ns 
109 100 103 107 89 90 
 No. of 
groups 
30 29 28 29 27 27 
 Obs per 
group:  
 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.6,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.4,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.7,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 
3.7,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 
3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
Common 
driver 
No. of 
Scientists/
Engineers 
(Skilled 
human 
capital) 
2.04*** 
[0.34] 
1.49*** 
[0.32] 
3.29*** 
[0.40] 
3.22*** 
[0.31] 
1.82*** 
[0.53] 
2.83*** 
[0.05] 
Drivers 
specific 
to growth 
Theories 
Total 
Innovation 
Expenditur
e (R&D 
investment
) 
.000013 
 [0.000012] 
   0.000022 
 
[0.00001
5] 
-0.000012 
 [0.000014] 
 Enterprises 
with 
internal 
R&D 
-0.039 
 [0.027] 
   -0.12 
*** 
0.03 
 
 Enterprises 
with 
external 
R&D 
0.11 * 
[0.056] 
   0.23 
*** 
[0.06] 
0.037 
 [0.049] 
Drivers 
specific 
to NSI 
Enterprises 
with  
public 
funding 
 0.081*** 
[0.019] 
  0.075 
*** 
[0.02] 
0.07 
*** 
[0.022] 
 Enterprises 
with any 
collaborati
on 
 -0.062 * 
[0.032] 
  -0.2  
*** 
[0.045] 
-0.22  
*** 
[0.050] 
 Enterprises 
with govt. 
Insti. 
Collaborati
on 
 0.123 
[0.15] 
  -0.32 
**  
[0.16] 
-0.068 
[0.16] 
 Enterprises 
with 
University 
collaborati
on 
  0.145* 
[0.08] 
  0.44 
*** 
[0.086] 
0.25 
*** 
[0.08] 
Cluster 
Theory 
Enterprises 
focused on 
National 
markets 
  -0.003 
 [0.008] 
 0.009 
[0.017] 
0.025 
 [0.019] 
 Enterprises 
with 
Supplier 
collaborati
on 
  -0.048 
[0.038] 
 0.138 
** 
[0.06] 
0.15  
** 
[0.069] 
Globaliza
tion 
 
Enterprises 
focused on  
Internation
al markets 
   -0.02  
** 
[0.009] 
-0.014 
[0.025] 
-0.045 
*  
[0.027] 
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Strands 
of 
theories: 
  
(Period 
1996-2010) 
(1) Growth 
theories 
(2) Nat. 
Innov. 
Systems 
(3) 
Cluster 
Theory 
(4) 
Globali-
zation 
(5) All 
combine
d – as 
per 
model 
(5) 
Previous 
combined – 
as per 
model 
Constant constant -4.87e+02*** -
3.91e+02*** 
-6.11e+02 
 *** 
-
5.84e+0
2 *** 
-
4.8e+02*
** 
-5.9e+02*** 
 Corr(µi, Xb) -0.9493 -0.8844 -0.9568 -0.9476 -0.9441 -0.9212 
 F-test that 
all µI = 0; 
 Prob > F 
0.0128 0.0003 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
 R2 within  = 
0.5135 
between = 
0.9455 
overall = 
0.9018 
within  = 
0.6828 
between = 
0.9387 
overall =  
0.9080 
within  = 
0.6171 
between 
= 0.8924 
overall =  
0.8471 
within  
=0.6278  
betwee
n 
=0.8802 
overall 
= 0.8385 
Within 
=0.8658 
between 
= 0.9464 
overall =  
0.9219 
Within 
=0.8220 
between = 
0.8793 
overall =  
0.8540 
Note: p-values: *** denoting significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * 10% significance. 
Std.errors are in square brackets. Data sources are CIS and HRST databases 
Table 2.3, shows these combined drivers with time dummies. The regressions 
provide for some interesting results, which are explored briefly further below.  
Before we interpret results, it is also important to note that the correlation 
coefficient for µI and Xb for both regressions is reasonably high, affirming that 
use of fixed effects estimation is justified. Also, the probability for F-test in all 
regressions shows that all variables are jointly significant. 
 Initial analysis of innovation drivers separately by theory 
Growth theories innovation drivers regression only: The regression with 
innovation drivers only associated with growth theory, as listed in column (1), is 
unexpected and quite surprising. R&D investment and internal engagement of 
R&D both do not appear to be significant, while external sourcing of R&D is 
significant and positive. The positive and significant external R&D driver may 
reflect that it may be positive for firms to outsource R&D work, reducing the 
burden of costs of carrying internal R&D effort. This advantage seems to 
outweigh the possible loss of internal technology development associated with 
outsourcing of R&D, which appears to be more closely linked with growth of 
firms, such as from medium to large, rather than innovation fundamentals itself.  
Keeping in mind that drivers may differ for growth in firm-sizes from innovation 
drivers, human capital is also seen as significant and positive, thus seeming to 
affirm the importance of skilled human capital also as a key driver for 
innovation. If this result is valid, then it provides some support for endogenous 
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growth theory in terms of innovation, but negates the importance of R&D 
investment, which includes capital and knowledge acquisition, as a main driver 
for innovation. Removing skilled human capital from this regression immediately 
assigns significance to both these R&D drivers, indicating that absence of skilled 
human capital in innovation regressions may assign mistaken significance to 
other drivers.  
NSI innovation drivers regression only: The regression of innovation drivers 
part of National Innovation Systems as listed in column (2), appears to negate 
the importance of linkages with government institutions. Indeed cooperation in 
general, appears to generate a negative contribution for innovation. Instead, 
positive contribution towards innovation is specific to industry linkages with 
universities and to firms access to public funding, thus affirming importance of 
certain linkages within NSI for innovation, along with signifying importance of 
public funding for firms for innovation.  
Cluster theory innovation drivers regression only: Column (3) lists the 
contributions from cluster theory, surprisingly also only finding significance for 
skilled human capital. Home market focus and supplier cooperation do not 
appear significant.  
Globalization as an innovation driver regression only: The results of column 
(4) show the regression results for globalization as an innovation driver along 
with skilled human capital. Again, unexpectedly international market focus, 
though significant is negative towards innovation, thus, seeming to indicate that 
export may not be an essential driver for innovation on its own.  
Before moving onto the analysis of combined drivers, the proposed model of this 
research, it suffices to say that some of these results are unexpected. While 
empirical errors may never be totally ruled out, it may be that the use of a 
wider set of innovation drivers based on direct innovation data reduces both a 
possible problem of omitted variables as well as reduces errors from usage of 
indirect proxies, providing a result more accurately representative of the actual 
determinants of innovation.   
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 Analysis of combined innovation drivers, the proposed 
model for this research:  
Combined innovation drivers regression: The model as proposed by this 
research, incorporating drivers from across the theories, as listed in column (5) 
in Table 2.3 is also displayed in column (1), Table 2.4. The results reveal quite a 
few intriguing differences from the previous separate regressions: while R&D 
investment remains insignificant and external R&D investment stays significant, 
internal R&D which was negative earlier now turns significant. The government 
linkage variables turn significant, but they also become negative. Additionally, 
international markets turn insignificant though remaining negative, in contrast 
to supplier linkages, which turns significant and positive. The rest of the results 
remain similar. To understand the results of this combined driver regression, the 
next subsections offers insights and explanations for each of the drivers used in 
this model, interpreting R&D investment last as it requires more detailed 
investigation. Indeed, to make sense of the absence of significance of R&D 
investment as a primary driver of innovation, further regressions are performed 
and listed in Table 2.4. These regressions are listed in column (2-4) check for 
specification error: column (2) examines an oft used model without human 
capital and column (3) evaluates if R&D could have a non-linear component. 
Thereafter, out of concerns of collinearity, two mirroring variables home market 
and international market are interchangeably removed in column (4) and (5) and 
accordingly assessed. 
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Table 2.4:Regression results for combined drivers in accordance with proposed model in 
column 1, with additional regressions column 2-4 for further checks on model specification 
and column (5) listing regression on innovation growth, with time dummies. 
Dependent variable for column 1 -4: annual innovative turnover of firms in quadrillion Euros 
 
Strands of 
theories: 
  
(Period 
1996-2010) 
(1) Proposed 
model, as 
per paper – 
with 
variables 
from merged 
theories 
(2) Without 
human 
capital – an 
oft missed 
variable in 
prior 
analyses 
(3) An 
additional 
non-linear 
R&D -to check 
for 
specification 
error 
(4) Reduced 
collinearity 
(1) – no 
home 
market and 
no internal 
R&D 
(5) Reduced 
collinearity 
robustness 
check - with 
home market, 
but no 
international 
market 
  Observation
s 
89 91 89 90 90 
 No. of 
groups 
27 28 27 27 27 
 Obs per 
group:  
 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 
1,  
avg = 
3.2,  
max = 
5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
Common 
driver 
No. of 
Scientists/E
ngineers 
(Skilled 
human 
capital) 
0.182   
*** 
[0.53] 
 1.64   
*** 
[0.54] 
2.50  
*** 
[0.48] 
2.49   
*** 
[0.5] 
Drivers 
specific to 
growth 
Theories 
Total 
Innovation 
Expenditur
e (R&D 
investment) 
.000021 
 [.000015] 
.0000
52   
*** 
[.0000
13] 
.000004 
 [.000019] 
.000001 
 [.000011] 
0.00000092 
 [0.000012] 
 (Total 
Innovation 
Expenditur
e)Ù2 
  3.02e-13 
 [1.96e-13] 
  
 Enterprises 
with 
internal 
R&D 
-0.12 
*** 
[0.03] 
-0.16 
*** 
[.0000
15] 
-0.12 
*** 
[0.029] 
  
 Enterprises 
with 
external 
R&D 
0.23 
*** 
[0.06] 
0.34 
*** 
[0.059
] 
0.23 
***  
[0.06] 
0.018 
  
[0.05] 
-0.002 
  
[0.044] 
Drivers 
specific to 
NSI 
Enterprises 
with public 
funding 
0.076 
*** 
[0.02] 
0.084 
*** 
[0.02] 
0.093 
*** 
[0.022] 
0.085 
*** 
[0.019] 
0.093 
*** 
[0.017] 
 Enterprises 
with any 
collaboratio
n 
-0.196  
*** 
[0.045] 
-0.20  
*** 
[0.049
] 
-0.158 
*** 
[0.051] 
-0.229  
*** 
[0.051] 
-0.223  
*** 
[0.051] 
 Enterprises 
with govt. 
Insti. 
Collaborati
on 
-0.315 
**  
[0.155] 
-0.28  
 * 
[0.168
] 
-0.35 
**  
[0.155] 
-0.094 
  
[0.162] 
-0.085 
  
[0.164] 
 Enterprises 
with 
University 
collaboratio
n 
0.443 
 *** 
[0.085] 
0.56 
*** 
[0.084
] 
0.408 
*** 
[0.087] 
0.255 
*** 
[0.255] 
0.232 
*** 
[0.08] 
  
 
 
 
 
     
Cluster 
Theory 
Enterprises 
focused on 
National 
markets 
0.009 
[0.016] 
-0.02 
[0.016
] 
-0.013 
 [0.02] 
 -0.003 
 [0.008] 
 Enterprises 
with 
Supplier 
collaboratio
n 
0.14 
** 
[0.06] 
0.148 
*** 
[0.067
] 
0.116 
* 
[0.062] 
0.165 
** 
[0.069] 
0.157  
** 
[0.07] 
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Globalizati
on 
 
Enterprises 
focused on  
Internation
al markets 
-0.014 
 [0.026] 
0.026 
[0.025
] 
0.007 
[0.029] 
-0.012  
[0.012] 
 
Constant constant -4.8e+02  
*** 
-
2.6e+
02  
 ** 
-4.6e+02  
 *** 
-5.62e+02  
 *** 
-5.52e+02 
 *** 
 Corr(µi, Xb) -0.9441  -0.9505 -0.9412 -0.9371 
 F-test that 
all µI = 0; 
 Prob > F 
0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
 R2 Within 
=0.8658 
between = 
0.9464 
overall =  
0.9219 
 Within 
=0.8719 
between = 
0.9445 
overall =  
0.9175 
Within =0.8159 
between = 
0.9146 
overall =  0.8861 
Within 
=0.8128 
between = 
0.9102 
overall =  
0.8816 
       
       
       
       
Note: p-values: *** denoting significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * 10% significance. 
Std.errors in square brackets. Data sources are CIS and HRST databases.. 
Overall, these results are interesting yet surprising - the lack of significance for 
R&D expenditure, the negative significance of internal R&D, the lack of 
significance of domestic market focus – balanced against strong positive 
significance of skilled human capital, public funding, collaboration with suppliers 
and linkages with universities. These results are explained further below, but 
detailed analysis to explore how these drivers vary for firm-sizes, is explored in 
sub-section 2.5.7 as well as a separate sub-section 2.5.4 to understand lack of 
R&D expenditure significance, as some of these surprising results are quite 
significant. 
Skilled human capital as driver:  This is quite a strong result, emphasizing the 
importance of skilled human capital as an innovation driver, as it shares 
importance across theories - a driver common across growth theories, NSI and 
cluster theory – is found consistently significant and positive. Indeed, it is one of 
the highly robust drivers. As will be shown in section 2.6, based upon literature 
on Germany explaining mechanisms of influence on innovation, skilled human 
capital as a driver may be made more effective through the provision of a highly 
skilled and diverse education sector incorporating vocational programmes, 
closely aligned with industry. Thus, though skilled human capital significance for 
innovation is found across all economies, its effectiveness in delivering 
innovation may be increased through additional focus in policy on the diversity 
of the skilled educational sector and its alignment with industry. 
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R&D internal and external focus of firms: As in the separate growth theory, 
the driver capturing the firms’ outsourcing of R&D externally appears to be 
significant and positive. In contrast the choice by firms to undertake internal 
R&D is shown to be negative. This is a surprising result, if internal R&D is viewed 
separately. However, as suggested earlier, these two results in tandem may 
represent the reduced burden of cost of internal R&D, which would impact 
innovation turnover negatively.  Also, as mentioned earlier, maybe this driver 
would be significant for growth of firms rather than innovation fundamentals, 
differentiating growth from small to medium-sized firms and medium to large-
sized firms. This variation is explored in depth in sub-section 2.5.7, where 
drivers are differentiated for firm-size classes.   
Public funding of firms as driver:  The next listed driver, public funding of 
firms, is another remarkably consistent and robust positive driver on innovation. 
Its influence on innovation may well work through the mechanism highlighted in 
section 2.6 on Germany, through encouraging longer-term decision-making and 
stable governance structures, while reducing funding gaps for firms. Despite the 
robustness of this driver, the data of economies reveals some anomalies. There 
is quite a lot of variation in the use of this driver and the delivery of innovation. 
A possible interpretation of the varying effectiveness of this driver on innovation 
may take us back to the original proposal of this paper – the delivery of 
innovation may be better achieved through a wider tool-kit, which in turn may 
increase effectiveness of individual drivers. 
Nonetheless, future research on ownership structures and decision –making using 
demographic data of firm birth and death rates, as started by EU in 2008, may 
provide further insights into understanding the workings of this driver. 
Linkages with academia and government as drivers:  We proceed now to the 
three drivers capturing varying forms of linkages: various sorts of collaborations 
of firms with other enterprises, institutions, academia, suppliers and/or clients; 
collaborations of firms specifically with government institutions; collaborations 
of firms specifically with academia for research. Out of these linkages, the first 
driver representing any type of linkage is significant but negative, whereas the 
second driver of industry linkages with governmental institutions is significant 
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but negative. Only the last driver representing linkages with academia is 
significant and positive.  
The insignificance of the first driver may capture possible losses incurred to 
innovation turnover in short-term, as it also captures effort with clients, 
customers and other agencies. The second linkages driver representing 
collaborations with government institutions, may specify that this association is 
not necessarily fruitful for all firm sizes. Indeed, this is later affirmed, when 
differentiating these drivers for different firm sizes, where it is found significant 
for medium sized firms. While the underlying mechanism for this relationship 
would need further research, it appears that driver differentiation for specific 
firm sizes helps clarify this result. In addition to differentiation of drivers for 
varied firm-sizes, this insignificance may also suggest that collaborations in 
industry may only benefit innovation when focused on specific partnerships. 
However, the last driver representing linkages between industry and academia is 
highly robust, even later irrespective of firm sizes, staying significant and 
positive. As will be explored in section 2.6 on this particular drivers’ influence in 
Germany, it appears conceivable that linkages with academia exerts a positive 
influence on innovation through enhancing commercialization of research for all 
firm-sizes, forged through collaborations between research and entrepreneurs. 
International market and home market focus drivers:  Turning to also the 
surprising negative and insignificant influence of international market focus on 
innovation and positive but still insignificant significance for home market focus 
of firms. As home market focus of firms is considered quite necessary for 
innovation in the cluster theory concept as promoted by Porter, (Porter M. , 
1990), two further regressions are analysed in order to rule out correlation 
mistakenly influencing results, removing higher correlation variables of internal 
R&D and home market. To avoid mistaken results due to imperfect collinearity, 
the significance of international market focus as a driver and home market as a 
driver are assessed separately in regressions listed in Table 2.4 in column (4) and 
(5) respectively. Interchanging either driver in these two regressions does not 
influence the significance of other drivers, though it changes the borderline 
significance of internal markets to insignificant. These additional regressions 
seem to affirm the insignificance of both globalization and home markets as a 
primary driver of innovation. There may however be scope for market influence 
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– be it home market or globalization - to perhaps exert a secondary influence on 
innovation. In other words, markets may be important after innovation has taken 
place to expand future profits. On the other hand, a specific focus on markets 
before knowing the suitability of markets to target, may be an added burden 
detracting finances away from innovation. To differentiate and properly 
understand the order of inter-workings between globalization and innovation, 
further analysis with specific innovation and market data would be required. 
Linkages with suppliers as driver:  Supplier collaboration is found positive and 
significant as expected with cluster theory, contrary to the results found earlier 
in the step-wise analysis.  This may be as a result of improved analysis through 
inclusion of a more complete set of drivers.  The importance attributed by 
cluster theory on the relationship of innovators with suppliers is widely 
acknowledged in policies and is apparent in policy incentives around the world.  
R&D investment driver:  The second listed driver, R&D investment, as pointed 
out earlier is a key driver for innovation policy targets and an important 
component in growth theories. Nonetheless, it was found insignificant for 
innovation in the separate theory analysis and continues to be insignificant in 
the combined driver regression.  
Although data inaccuracies cannot be totally excluded, a few aspects of R&D 
investment driver, which seem plausible given the data, may explain this 
insignificance. Firstly, R&D investment is recognized in practice to be quite a 
stable figure in firms (Hall, Mairesse, & Mohnen, 2010, p. 16), only changing 
gradually over time. This attribute may influence the significance of this drivers’ 
correlation with variations in innovation turnover.  Secondly, and perhaps more 
significantly, it appears that economies most effectively using this driver to 
deliver innovation do not turn out to be the most innovative of economies. This 
anomaly is evident in the figures in table A3 in Annexe, which lists the 
proportional ratios for R&D (innovation output per R&D input, measured in 
billions output per millions R&D input) for the top 10 economies with the highest 
R&D investments: Spain having the highest proportional ratio (2x of Germany), 
yet Germany having the highest turnover (5x of Spain). This lack of correlation 
between the highest proportional ratio of this driver and the highest innovation 
turnover, seems to signify that other drivers may need to be present in an 
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economy, which when working together deliver a total innovation much higher 
than that of this individual driver. This implies that possibly other drivers drawn 
from informal R&D drivers as captured in national innovation systems and not 
R&D investment in particular, may explain the differentiation in innovation 
levels performance of economies. This result is further investigated for model 
robustness in more regressions listed in Table 2.4 above and explained in greater 
detail in the next subsection.  
 Further regressions to investigate lack of significance of 
R&D investment driver:  
In order to make more sense of this result, additional regressions are 
undertaken, which are also listed in Table 2.4, to check for specification error or 
possible collinearity. The regressions listed in column Table 2.4 columns (2-3) 
explore regressions to check for specification, while column (4-5) remove closely 
correlated variables to reduce collinearity errors.   
To first and foremost check the robustness of model specification, the proposed 
complete model as suggested by the merging of theories in this paper is listed in 
column (1), this is compared it to the oft-used model without human capital as 
listed in column (2) of Table 2.4. As this model without human capital is a model 
quite prevalent in innovation analysis with direct innovation data, it is important 
to examine if it can lead to mistaken conclusions due to specification error. 
Furthermore, in order to check our own model for specification error, column (3) 
adds a non-linear component of R&D investment to the proposed model of 
column (1). Non-linear component of R&D is considered, in case there is a 
curved non-linear relationship between R&D and innovation, possibly a tapering 
impact of increasing R&D on innovation, which our model fails to incorporate.  
More so, to alleviate concerns of collinearity, Column (4) and (5) remove higher 
correlated variables, in order to check if that may influence significance of R&D 
investment. Finally, column (6) investigates the possibility of R&D investment as 
a secondary driver, working on innovation growth instead of innovation 
fundamentals depicted by levels. The detailed interpretations are listed below, 
but these regressions appear to show that R&D investment only becomes 
significant as a primary driver when skilled human capital is excluded. On the 
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other hand, it does remain significant as a secondary driver, so indeed important 
for spurring growth of innovation once fundamentals of innovation in place.  
Column (2) results: Regression without skilled human capital: This regression 
is to allow comparison of the proposed model as in column (1) with on oft used 
models in innovation analysis, omitting skilled human capital. The results are 
interesting, as it seems to indicate that misleading significance may be attached 
to other variables, if models omit skilled human capital. Setting aside small 
changes in extent of significance, this regression shows similar results for all 
drivers as in the papers proposed model - except one, R&D investment. It 
becomes highly significant and positive. This appears to indicate that exclusion 
of skilled human capital from this model could lead to mistaken results as a 
result of omitted variable problem, an important aspect that may explain the 
difference of results in this study from previous studies. 
Column (3) results: Regression with additional non-linear component of R&D 
investment: To ensure there is no specification error in papers proposed model 
as listed in column (1), this regression adds a non-linear component of R&D 
investment, as R&D investment itself was not significant. The results again show 
barely any changes in significance for drivers and both R&D investment driver, as 
well as the non-linear component of R&D investment remain insignificant.  
Column (4) and (5) results- To reduce collinearity, two regressions with 
removal of two mirroring variables: To reduce possible errors due to 
imperfect collinearity, the two variables that seem to be mirrored by their 
counterpart, Internal R&D and National markets, are removed. Based on the 
assumption that these two variables reflect their counterparts to a large extent: 
Internal R&D with External R&D and National markets with International 
markets; and as they appear to be highly correlated with these counterparts, the 
two variables may reliably be removed without losing fundamentals of 
specification.  The results do capture two differences from our initial proposed 
model in column (1): significance is lost for external R&D outsourcing and 
government collaboration. This appears to be a robust result, as the switch 
between National markets and International markets, column (4) and (5) 
respectively, shows no change in significance to other drivers. Most importantly, 
it shows no change in significance for R&D investment. 
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To assess whether R&D investment may be a secondary driver, instead of 
primary driver, the combined drivers model is regressed on innovation growth, 
which is examined in the following section. 
 Analysis of secondary innovation drivers – on innovation 
growth, rather than innovation level:  
So far, the study has focussed on determining on finding a complete set of 
primary innovation drivers, to understand what drives the foundation of 
innovation – measured by innovation levels. In order to avoid attributing 
misleading significance to variables due to omitted variable problems, it has 
chosen drivers across a range of theories to provide as holistic a set of 
innovation drivers as is possible within the dataset. While this has yielded 
valuable insights as explained in previous section, it is important to seek to put 
this in context with secondary drivers – those innovation drivers that spur 
growth, after innovation foundation has been laid in the economy. 
Towards this end, it would appear important to apply the same approach of 
regressing a wider set of innovation drivers on innovation growth, to try to 
obtain a holistic set of secondary drivers spurring innovation growth. 
Thus, a regression is now performed on innovation growth (biannual growth, due 
to data availability) instead of innovation level, using the same wider set of 
innovation drivers combining theories, over the same time period 1996-2010. 
Choosing the model of reduced correlation drivers as listed in column (4) in 
Table 2.4, the regression on innovation growth for these same drivers is listed in 
Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5:Regression of combined drivers on innovation growth - not innovation level, to 
determine how secondary drivers may differ from primary drivers 
Strands of 
theories: 
  
(Period 1996-2010) Dependent variable: biannual innovation growth 
(6) Reduced correlation regression with time dummies  
  Observations 86 
 No. of groups 26 
 Obs per group:  
 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
Common 
driver 
No. of Scientists/Engineers 
(Skilled human capital) 
-70*** 
[25] 
Drivers 
specific to 
growth 
Theories 
Total Innovation 
Expenditure (R&D 
investment) 
.000005 *** 
[.0000002] 
 (Total Innovation 
Expenditure)Ù2 
 
 Enterprises with internal 
R&D 
 
 Enterprises with external 
R&D 
14.6*** 
[.000007] 
Drivers 
specific to 
NSI 
Enterprises with public 
funding 
-1.335 [0.97] 
 Enterprises with any 
collaboration 
-5.97* 
[3.09] 
 Enterprises with govt. Insti. 
Collaboration 
-19.6** 
[8.1] 
 Enterprises with University 
collaboration 
19.2*** 
[7.37] 
Cluster 
Theory 
Enterprises focused on 
National markets 
 
 Enterprises with Supplier 
collaboration 
7.37*** 
[3.82] 
Globalizati
on 
 
Enterprises focused on  
International markets 
-3.34*** 
[0.709] 
Constant constant 1.47e+4*** 
Time 
dummies 
2004 -6.8e+03* 
[3.86e+03] 
 2006 -7.1e+03* 
[4.13e+03] 
 2008 -9.8e+03 ** 
[3.96e+03] 
 2010 -7.1e+03 * 
[4.01e+03] 
 Corr(µi, Xb) -0.1589 
 F-test that all µI = 0; 
 Prob > F 
0.0000 
 R2 Within =0.9926 
between = 0.6792 
overall =  0.8797 
Note: p-values: *** denoting significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * 10% significance. 
Std.errors in square brackets. Data sources are CIS and HRST databases.. 
This regression again provides interesting insights. Perhaps the most important 
insight is that R&D investment appears to be a secondary driver influencing 
innovation growth, as R&D investment is significant and positive. Thus, 
underscoring the importance of understanding that the same variables exhibit 
different influences as primary drivers as opposed to secondary drivers. In terms 
of secondary drivers not only is R&D investment significant, but also external 
R&D is positive and significant, while interestingly skilled human capital turns 
negative and public funding loses significance. Exploring these results in further 
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detail is currently out of the scope of this study, however there is one important 
understanding highlighted by this regression - an innovation policy should 
carefully distinguish the target of its policy from fostering the foundations of 
innovation to spurring innovation growth, as then it can accordingly choose the 
appropriate drivers to influence to achieve that goal.  
Within this boundary of understanding, this regression seems to confirm that 
different secondary drivers such as R&D investment are needed to grow 
innovation, after primary drivers have laid the foundation to create innovation 
levels. Thus, accommodating and indeed understanding this differentiation of 
both primary and secondary drivers may be an important insight gained for 
tailoring effective innovation policies. 
Though each driver’s significance or lack of significance does provide further 
opportunities for research, the possible mechanisms of influence of this wider 
set of drivers are explored through exploiting the understanding gained on their 
workings in Germany in Section 5. 
Another perhaps equivalently important message from this analysis is that no 
driver in isolation can be as effective as a wider mix of these drivers. Indeed, if 
this is valid, then it may be possible for economies to boost innovation within 
current capital limitations, purely through applying these wider set of innovation 
drivers in tandem. 
 Robustness checks for innovation drivers:  
To ensure robustness in empirical analysis, some further regressions are 
undertaken and listed in Table 2.6: column (1) lists the regression of reduced set 
of combined drivers as some drivers were excluded due to concerns of 
collinearity, as listed originally in column (3) of Table 2.4. This is supplemented 
in column (2) in Table 2.6, with the addition of time-dummies. Then column (3) 
in Table 2.6 displays results of regression for robustness check, with substitution 
of international market driver with home market driver and external outsourcing 
of R&D replaced with internal R&D driver. As these two pairs of reasonably 
highly correlated with each other, their substitution could highlight weakness in 
regression results. Reviewing the results in column (3) indicates the regression to 
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be reasonably robust, as the substitution of these drivers causes no change in 
significance of other drivers, though it does add significance of time dummies. 
Column (4) lists the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust 
corrected standard errors. There is one change in the significant variables, 
which is that significance of suppliers is reduced to 13%. This implies that the 
earlier higher significance of the supplier variable at 5% may have been 
influenced erroneously through heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Nonetheless, though lower in significance, its effect on innovation may be still 
be evaluated within this lower significance level. 
Last, but not least, these regressions could not rule out endogeneity, as due to 
shortages of time period data, these regressors could not be instrumented to 
ensure there was no reverse causality between drivers, such as linkages between 
academia or linkages between government institutions and innovation measure 
as dependent variable.   
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Table 2.6:Robustness checks for Fixed Effects regression results with reduced set of 
drivers to avoid collinearity 
Dependent variable – annual innovative turnover of firms, measured in quadrillion Euros 
Strands of 
theories: 
  
(Period 1996-
2010) 
(1) Reduced 
regression – 
with no home 
market  
(2) Reduced 
regression – 
but with added 
time dummies 
(3) 
Robustness 
check , 
substituting 
international 
market with 
home market  
(4) Further 
robustness 
check, 
(autocorrel
ation and 
heterosked
asticity)  
Reduced  
regression 
– but with 
added time 
dummies 
  Observations 90 90 90 90 
 No. of groups 27 27 27 27 
 Obs per group:  
 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
Common 
driver 
No. of 
Scientists/Engi
neers 
(Skilled human 
capital) 
2.5*** 
[0.48] 
3.04*** 
[0.56] 
3.325*** 
[0.45] 
3.038*** 
[0.91] 
Drivers 
specific to 
growth 
Theories 
Total 
Innovation 
Expenditure 
(R&D 
investment) 
0.000001 
 [0.000011] 
-0.000007 
 [0.000012] 
-0.000009 
 [0.000011] 
-0.000007 
 [0.000015] 
 Enterprises 
with external 
R&D 
0.018 
 [0.048] 
-0.009 
 [0.05] 
 
 
-0.009 
 [0.058] 
 Enterprises 
with internal 
R&D 
  -0.049 *** 
[0.018] 
 
Drivers 
specific to 
NSI 
Enterprises 
with public 
funding 
0.0849*** 
[0.019] 
0.085*** 
[0.020] 
0.090*** 
[0.016] 
0.085*** 
[0.03] 
 Enterprises 
with any 
collaboration 
-0.229 *** 
[0.051] 
-0.29*** 
[0.058] 
-0.289*** 
[0.053] 
-0.289*** 
[0.107] 
 Enterprises 
with govt. Insti. 
Collaboration 
-0.094  
[0.162] 
-0.066  
[0.158] 
-0.183 
 [0.156] 
-0.066 
 [0.28] 
 Enterprises 
with University 
collaboration 
0.255*** 
[0.255] 
0.247*** 
[0.079] 
0.268*** 
[0.07] 
0.245*** 
[0.085] 
Cluster 
Theory 
Enterprises 
focused on 
National 
markets 
  0.010  
[0.008] 
 
 Enterprises 
with Supplier 
collaboration 
0.165 ** 
[0.069] 
0.247*** 
[0.083] 
0.28*** 
[0.074] 
0.247 
([0.159] 
Globalization 
 
Enterprises 
focused on  
International 
markets 
-0.012  
 [0.012] 
-0.002 
 [0.013] 
 
 
 
Constant constant -5.62e+02*** -4.9e+02*** -3.99e+02*** -4.9e+02*** 
Time 
dummies 
2004  -1.9e+02**  
[94.4] 
-2.31e+02***  
[85.8] 
-1.88e+02* 
[109] 
 2006  -1.33e+02  
 [99.6] 
-1.91e+02 ** 
[90.2] 
-1.33e+02  
 [99.6] 
 2008  -1.34e+02  
 [96.4] 
-1.8e+02 **  
[92.6] 
-1.34e+02  
 [95.7] 
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Dependent variable – annual innovative turnover of firms, measured in quadrillion Euros 
Strands of 
theories: 
  
(Period 1996-
2010) 
(1) Reduced 
regression – 
with no home 
market  
(2) Reduced 
regression – 
but with added 
time dummies 
(3) 
Robustness 
check , 
substituting 
international 
market with 
home market  
(4) Further 
robustness 
check, 
(autocorrel
ation and 
heterosked
asticity)  
Reduced  
regression 
– but with 
added time 
dummies 
 2010  -1.93e+02* 
[99.9] 
-2.45e+02*** 
[92.6] 
-1.93e+02* 
[103] 
 Corr(µi, Xb) -0.9412 -0.9323 -0.9412 -0.9323 
 F-test that all 
µI = 0; 
 Prob > F 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 R2 Within 
=0.8159 
between = 
0.9146 
overall =  
0.8861 
Within 
=0.8388 
between = 
0.8769 
overall =  
0.8528 
Within 
=0.8159 
between = 
0.9146 
overall =  
0.8861 
Within 
=0.8388 
between = 
0.8769 
overall =  
0.8528 
Note: p-values: *** denoting significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * 10% significance. 
Std.errors in square brackets. Data sources are CIS and HRST databases.. 
 
 Differentiating innovation drivers for firm-sizes: small, 
medium and large firm-sizes: 
Thus far, the Innovation drivers have been evaluated for firms across the board.  
Now, however we refine Schumpeter’s hypothesis on impact of firm size on 
innovation (Schumpeter J. , 1942), instead performing regressions to 
differentiate innovation drivers for small, medium and large firm-sizes. It should 
also be clarified that firm-size turnover for each firm-size class is the average 
turnover of small/medium/large firms. To enable differentiation of innovation 
drivers for each firm-size class,  the innovation measure on the left-hand side of 
the equation (4) is changed from measuring innovative turnover for all firms to 
average innovative turnover for small firms initially, then medium firms and then 
large firms. The regression analysis with these changes is listed in Table 2.7 
below. Thus, column (1) lists the combined drivers regression for all firm-sizes, 
whereas column (2) is specific to small firms , column (3) is relevant to medium 
firms and column (4) for large firms. 
The results indicate differing drivers for small and medium firms from the 
general drivers for all firm sizes are interesting and somewhat difficult to 
interpret, without further in-depth data. Noticeably, public funding and supplier 
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collaboration are both found not significant for either small or medium sized 
firms. The loss of significance of linkages to suppliers could indicate that small 
and medium firm products may not be mature enough to benefit from supplier 
collaboration. Albeit, the lack of significance for public funding for SMEs remains 
puzzling and invites further research.   
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Table 2.7:Regression results with reduced correlation terms and time dummies, for differing 
firm-sizes 
Dependent variable: annual innovative turnover (measured in quadrillion Euros) of all firms for column 1; annual 
innovative turnover of small firms for column 2, medium sized firms in column 3 and large sized firms in column 4 
Strands of 
theories: 
  
(Period 1996-
2010) 
(1) Reduced 
correlation 
regression –with 
added time 
dummies – for all 
firm-sizes 
(2) Reduced 
correlation 
regression –with 
added time 
dummies – for 
small firm-sizes 
(3) 
Reduced 
correlation 
regression 
–with 
added time 
dummies – 
for medium 
firm-sizes  
(4) Reduced 
correlation 
regression –
with added 
time 
dummies – 
for large 
firm-sizes  
 
  Observations 90 89 89 89  
 No. of groups 27 27 27 27  
 Obs per group:  
 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
min = 1,  
avg = 3.3,  
max = 5 
 
Common 
driver 
No. of 
Scientists/Engi
neers 
(Skilled human 
capital) 
3.038*** 
[0.56] 
0.439*** 
[0.13] 
0.27*** 
[0.08] 
2.639 *** 
[0.48] 
 
Drivers 
specific to 
growth 
Theories 
Total 
Innovation 
Expenditure 
(R&D 
investment) 
-0.000007 
 [0.000012] 
-0.000002 
 [0.000002] 
0.00000015 
 [0.000001] 
 -0.000009 
 [ 0.000009] 
 
 Enterprises 
with external 
R&D 
-0.009 
 [0.05] 
-0.01086 
 [0.011] 
 
-0.015** 
[0.003] 
 -0.0009 
[ 0.041] 
 
Drivers 
specific to NSI 
Enterprises 
with public 
funding 
0.085*** 
[0.02] 
-0.0037 
 [0.004] 
-0.004 
 [0.003] 
0.09*** 
 [0.016] 
 
 Enterprises 
with any 
collaboration 
-0.289*** 
[0.058] 
-0.0029 
 [0.0136] 
0.004 
 [0.008] 
-0.32*** 
 [0.049] 
 
 Enterprises 
with govt. Insti. 
Collaboration 
-0.066 
 [0.158] 
-0.08**  
[0.035] 
0.047**  
[0.022] 
-0.0245  
[0.125] 
 
 Enterprises 
with University 
collaboration 
0.247*** 
[0.08] 
0.054*** 
[0.018] 
0.034*** 
[0.011] 
0.148** 
[0.06] 
 
Cluster Theory Enterprises 
focused on 
National 
markets 
     
 Enterprises 
with Supplier 
collaboration 
0.247*** 
[0.08] 
0.0068 
 [0.02] 
-0.005  
 [0.013] 
0.299*** 
 [0.07] 
 
Globalization 
 
Enterprises 
focused on  
International 
markets 
-0.002 
 [0.01] 
-0.002 
 [0.003] 
 
0.002 
 [0.002] 
0.002 
 [0.01] 
 
Constant constant -4.9e+02*** -3.11e+01  -3.18e+01  
 
-3.77e+02  
 
 
Time dummies 2004 -1.9e+02**  
[94.4] 
-1,7e+01 
 [26.9] 
-2.47e+01 
 [16.7] 
-
2.52e+02**
* 
 [96.8] 
 
 2006 -1.33e+02  
 [99.6] 
-3.3e+02  
 [28.5] 
-2.13e+01  
 [17.7] 
-
2.22e+02**  
 [10.3] 
 
 2008 -1.34e+02  
 [96.4] 
-8.4  
 [28.6] 
-1.24e+01  
 [17.1] 
-
2.22e+08**  
 [99.3] 
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Dependent variable: annual innovative turnover (measured in quadrillion Euros) of all firms for column 1; annual 
innovative turnover of small firms for column 2, medium sized firms in column 3 and large sized firms in column 4 
Strands of 
theories: 
  
(Period 1996-
2010) 
(1) Reduced 
correlation 
regression –with 
added time 
dummies – for all 
firm-sizes 
(2) Reduced 
correlation 
regression –with 
added time 
dummies – for 
small firm-sizes 
(3) 
Reduced 
correlation 
regression 
–with 
added time 
dummies – 
for medium 
firm-sizes  
(4) Reduced 
correlation 
regression –
with added 
time 
dummies – 
for large 
firm-sizes  
 
 2010 -1.93e+02* 
[99.9] 
-1.88e+01 
 [28.6] 
-1.64e+01 
 [17.7] 
 
 
 
-
2.71e+02**
* 
 [103] 
 
 
 
 
 Corr(µi, Xb) -0.9323 -0.7626 -0.7972 -0.925  
 F-test that all µI 
= 0; 
 Prob > F 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000  
 R2 Within =0.8388 
between = 0.8769 
overall =  0.8528 
Within =0.6744 
between = 
0.4296 
overall =  0.4875 
Within 
=0.9227 
between = 
0.8675 
overall =  
0.8516 
Within 
=0.8372 
between = 
0.7934 
overall =  
0.7640 
 
Note: p-values: *** denoting significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * 10% significance. 
Std.errors in square brackets. Data sources are CIS and HRST databases. 
Further differences specific to their firm sizes are listed below: 
Innovation drivers for small-sized firms: For small firms, skilled human capital 
and linkages with academia remain the positive and significant drivers, with 
linkages to government institutions turning significant but negative. The 
continued significance of linkages with universities seems to support 
commercialization of research through start-ups and spin-offs. The negative but 
significant impact of linkages with governmental institutions is not easily 
explained and should be followed with research into specific data, to understand 
the mechanisms through which this driver influences small firms. 
 Innovation drivers for medium-sized firms: Medium firms show a similar 
positive significance of skilled human capital and linkages with academia. At the 
same time, there is the added negative significance of sourcing R&D externally. 
Contradicting this driver slightly is the positive significance of linkages to 
governmental institutions. The negative significance of sourcing R&D externally 
may be indicative of difficulties of bearing cost burden for medium sized firms, 
while the positive significance of collaborations with governmental institutions 
may capture the reverse – that of reduced cost of R&D when collaborating with a 
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government institution, as reflected in German economy with the use of 
Fraunhofer institutes or in the US through use of extension services by SMEs. 
Further exploration with specific data would yield clearer insights into the 
mechanism of this drivers influence on innovation.  
Innovation drivers for large-sized firms: Large firms are similar to small and 
medium sized firms in the positive significance of skilled human capital and 
linkages to academia. However, they show additional positive significance for 
public funding, as well as suppliers and negative significance for linkages to 
government institutions. The positive significance of public funding and supplier 
relationships appears to reflect that large firms use access to public funding and 
relationships of co-development with suppliers to aid their growth, while the 
negative association with government institutions reflects their lack of need to 
subcontract research externally, as large firms usually have significant R&D 
teams internally. 
Innovation turnover size of SMEs:  A last but perhaps not insignificant aspect is 
that SMEs innovative turnover is reasonably small compared to large firms, which 
appear to dictate a substantial portion of innovation measure. Looking at 
descriptive stats listed in table A1 in appendix, small-size firms mean innovative 
turnover is 11 % of total firm-sizes mean turnover and medium-size firms mean 
innovative turnover also only reaches 19%. Thus, while SMEs may be called the 
hidden growth champions of Germany, their share of innovation turnover is by 
virtue of their size limited. Hence in the long run, economies or indeed sectors 
may be inhibited in innovation as a consequence of a reduced share of presence 
of large firms.  
In brief, some results for these SME drivers remain puzzling and do invite further 
research. It may reflect a step-wise process to building innovation, and that 
order and type of drivers may be important to build differing type of innovative 
economies.  If this is indeed the case, then policy makers may need to account 
for these variations when designing specific policy incentives for SMEs. Following 
Cohen’s line of thinking that historical and case-study literature can provide rich 
insights to supplement interpretation of empirical analysis (Cohen W. , 2010), 
the following section explores the experiences in Germany to illustrate possible 
mechanisms through which drivers may influence innovation. 
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2.6 Germany, as a case in point, for the workings of these 
drivers 
 Possible mechanisms through which drivers may influence 
innovation  
The choice of an apt case study to provide hypotheses for the workings of these 
drivers appears best suited to fall upon Germany. Not only is it the highest 
performing economy according to our innovation measure as listed in Table 2.8 
below, it is also an acknowledged successful innovative economy according to 
other measures. As mentioned earlier, Germany ranks alongside Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland as an Innovation leader above other European economies 
according to the European Innovation Union scoreboard (EIS) (European 
Commission, 2013). Though Germany’s particular type of innovation as a ‘world 
supplier and equipper’ of systems and production technology, integrating newer 
technologies in traditional industries, may not equate it to a globally innovative 
leader as US, which is considered a ‘cutting edge technology leader’ (Wessner, 
2011), the economy could highlight workings relevant to other economies. Thus, 
acknowledging that varying economies may evolve diverse patters of innovation, 
nonetheless some useful insights may perhaps be gained by understanding the 
mechanisms through which these drivers exert influence on German innovation. 
Further cementing Germany’s high performance in this study’s innovation 
measure is also the remarkably consistent and high performance of Germany 
across the wider set of drivers12: skilled human capital, R&D investment, external 
sourcing of R&D, public funding for enterprises, firm linkages with academia, 
firm linkages with governmental organizations, firm linkages with suppliers, 
national market focus for enterprises and Enterprises focused on International 
markets. Drawing on previous research, the next few subsections offer a brief 
summary of the mechanisms through which these drivers may have worked to 
enhance innovation in Germany.  
  
                                         
12 The tables listing the top 10 economies for each driver are in Appendix section 1.3, tables A4 and A5 
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Table 2.8:Top 20 EU economies ranked in order for mean innovative turnover in absolute 
value (in billions of Euros) for all firm-sizes, covering the period 1996-2010 
Countries Mean Innovative turnover 
(all firms) – main 
innovation measure 
Mean innovative 
turnover (for 
only small firms)  
Mean innovative 
turnover (for 
only medium 
firms) 
Germany 2.99 0.23 0.48 
France 1.33 0.11 0.19 
UK 1.00 0.13 0.23 
Italy 0.92 0.16 0.21 
Spain 0.63 0.08 0.12 
Turkey 0.62 0.27 0.14 
Netherlands 0.38 0.05 0.092 
Belgium 0.29 0.048 0.067 
Sweden 0.26 0.04 0.048 
Poland 0.24 0.019 0.046 
Austria 0.23 0.029 0.057 
Ireland 0.18 0.02 0.055 
Finland 0.16 0.015 0.025 
Czech 
Repiblic 
0.15 0.015 0.032 
Norway 0.14 0.019 0.03 
Denmark 0.13 0.023 0.031 
Portugal 0.12 0.023 0.032 
Hungary 0.08 0.006 0.013 
Romania 0.062 0.006 0.011 
Luxembourg 0.057 0.008 0.013 
CIS database, Eurostat  
Commercialization of research through: aligned skilled human capital and 
linkages to research Germany’s ability to commercialize its research, a 
mechanism quite vital for innovation, appears to be facilitated by the presence 
of two drivers in particular. According to Soskice, the highly skilled and diverse 
German work force, a distinguishing feature of German economy, delivered by 
the strength of its diversified education sector, combined with the strong 
linkages between research and industry, appear to enhance Germany’s ability to 
commercialize its research (Soskice, 1997). The linkages not only align 
government policy with industry interests and research institutions through 
industry-wide associations, they also help tailor skills and research to industry 
needs (Burton & Hansen, 1993). The heavy investment of industry in both the 
educational sector and the funding of specialized vocational programmes ensures 
continued alignment and channelling of the workforce in accordance with 
demands in industry (Soskice, 1997). From this very brief synopsis, it appears 
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that these drivers work in tandem to stimulate innovation through encouraging 
the commercialization of research. 
Longer-term decision-making and reduced funding gaps through: public 
funding: The long-term governance and public financing of firms, another quite 
distinct feature of German firms (Soskice, 1997), appears to be supported 
through one driver in particular – public funding. It seems that public funding 
influences this characteristic of the German industry, through encouraging 
longer-term decision-making, with the provision of long-term finance for firms 
over longer periods relative to commercial loans, (Buiguis & Sekkat, 2009). The 
provision of long-term loans for firms in Germany may be as long as 20 years, 
though typically 10 through the German state investment bank Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederafbau (KfW) and regional Sparkassen banks (Buiguis & Sekkat, 2009). 
These longer periods of loans seem to allow firms greater time periods for 
recovery of profits, reducing short-term pressures and encouraging innovation of 
products which may have longer lead times. The availability of public finance 
not only influences innovation through encouraging these longer-term 
governance and decision-making structures, but may also impact the funding gap 
in R&D investment (Buiguis & Sekkat, 2009; Soskice, 1997). The presence of 
funding gaps in R&D, or rather the difficulties associated in financing R&D are 
well recognized and were raised early on by Schumpeter (1942), Nelson (1959) 
and Arrow (1962).  R&D investment may be inadequate because of in ability of 
firms to appropriate knowledge or avoid leakages (Schumpeter, 1942; Nelson, 
1959; Griliches, 1992). However, R&D investments could suffer due to the gap 
between private rate of return and external cost of capital (Schumpeter, 1942; 
Arrow, 1962; Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). In competitive markets, Hall and Lerner 
recognize that either of these aspects could combine to create a funding gap for 
R&D investments in firms (Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). A study in Finland was shown 
to demonstrate that public funding helped bridge funding-gaps for firms, 
avoiding constraints on growth and innovation investments (Hyytinen & 
Toivanen, 2005). Through having a provision of public financing for firms, 
minimizing some of these funding gaps and encouraging longer-term governance 
structures, public funding appears to provide a strong support for innovation in 
Germany. 
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Concentrated ownership and governance structures enhanced through public 
funding: Public funding appears to encourage another aspect in German 
industry, that of a more concentrated form of ownership structures. It appears 
that the long-term governance and financial planning in firms enhanced through 
public funding, seems also to be associated with a smaller group of stable 
shareholders in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon dispersed shareholder value model 
(Soskice, 1997). Buigues and Sekkat also associate the provision of long-term 
loans for firms in Germany, with longer-term planning and governance structures 
(Buiguis & Sekkat, 2009). Such ownership structures appear to forge relationships 
with banks, allowing easier monitoring by banks, enhancing longer-term financial 
agreements. Perhaps this concentrated form of ownership structures allied to 
longer-term financial agreements, augmented through public funding, is another 
mechanism through which public funding has worked to influence innovation in 
Germany.  
Diffusion of knowledge and technology through inter-industry linkages: Not 
only do linkages enhance commercialization of research, they also appear to 
enhance diffusion of technology within industries. According to Burton and 
Hansen, Germany’s industry-wide linkages are important to innovation, as they 
encourage the dissemination of new technologies by pooling of resources and 
allow industry as a whole to remain competitive (Burton & Hansen, 1993). 
Soskice suggests that these linkages between industry and research embed links, 
which encourages investment by firms and in turn enhances technology diffusion 
(Soskice, 97). This diffusion of knowledge allowing industry as a whole to remain 
competitive may be another mechanism through which these industry-wide 
linkages shape innovation in Germany. 
 Reduction of costs for firms through linkages with research: It appears that 
industry-wide linkages with external contract centres such as Germany’s 
Fraunhofer institutes and research units, which in turn link up with university 
research, may additionally work on enhancing innovation in the economy 
through reducing the burden of funding for R&D for firms (Burton & Hansen, 
1993; Martin & Scott, 2000). This may be similar to the provision in the US, 
where extension services have helped reduce R&D burden on small firms (Nelson 
& Rosenberg, 1993). This may be another aspect through which linkages with 
research may enhance innovation in Germany. 
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SMEs - growth champions for Germany: Though not considered a driver for this 
study, it appears that SMEs are an important aspect of growth and innovation in 
the German economy. According to Schutte, Germany’s State Secretary for 
Education and Research, Germany’s hidden growth champions are its SMEs, 
(Wessner, 2011). This focus on SMEs appears to be re-iterated in Germany’s 
Federal government white paper on innovation policy, the High-tech Strategy 
2020, where financing of innovation for SMEs receives high prominence 
(Rammer, 2011).  The earlier analysis distinguishing the drivers for small and 
medium firm sizes throws some light on the varying drivers needed in an 
economy to stimulate wide-spectrum of firms. 
Although this is a very brief synopsis of the conceivable mechanisms through 
which drivers may influence innovation in Germany, it does appear to offer 
insights on the possible workings of these drivers. Brief as it is, it does seem to 
validate Cohen’s suggestions that historical and case study literature can be a 
source of hypotheses aiding the interpretation of empirical research. With these 
interpretations in mind, the next section summarizes the key findings of this 
study.  
2.7 Conclusion 
Let us return to the main queries of this research: What is the wider set of 
innovation drivers that may address the innovation process more completely and 
importantly, what is the order of these drivers, differentiating primary drivers 
from secondary? More so, how do these drives differ for different firm-sizes. This 
wider set of drivers is sourced from combining analysis of formal R&D process 
promoted by growth theories, alongside informal R&D linkages emphasized by 
national innovation systems. This study also sought to query whether current 
R&D policy targets, based on formal R&D process, are a sufficient response for 
driving innovation?  
There were varied regressions undertaken, in order to seek answers to the above 
queries. A short summary of the key findings of the regressions are listed in 
Table 2.9 and thereafter, the outcomes are described in greater length. 
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Table 2.9:Summary table of overall key findings 
Focus of analysis  The key drivers found significant  
Primary innovation 
drivers – driving 
innovation levels – all 
firm sizes 
• Skilled human capital 
• Access to public funding for enterprises 
with some form of state support 
• Linkages between industry and 
academia, supporting commercialization 
of research  
• Linkages between industry and suppliers, 
aligning research and upstream suppliers 
Primary innovation 
drivers – driving 
innovation levels – small 
firm-size 
• Skilled human capital 
• Linkages between industry and 
government institutions and laboratories 
(negative) 
• Linkages between industry and 
academia, supporting commercialization 
of research  
Primary innovation 
drivers – driving 
innovation levels – 
medium firm-size 
• Skilled human capital 
• Enterprises sourcing external R&D 
(negative) 
• Linkages between industry and 
government institutions and laboratories 
• Linkages between industry and 
academia, supporting commercialization 
of research  
 
Primary innovation 
drivers – driving 
innovation levels – large 
firm-size 
• Skilled human capital 
• Access to public funding for enterprises 
with some form of state support 
• Linkages between industry and 
academia, supporting commercialization 
of research  
• Linkages between industry and suppliers, 
aligning research and upstream suppliers 
 
Secondary innovation 
drivers – driving 
innovation growth  
• Skilled human capital (negative) 
• R&D investment (including acquisition of 
external knowledge and capital) 
• Enterprises sourcing external R&D 
• Linkages between industry and 
government institutions and laboratories 
(negative) 
• Linkages between industry and 
academia, supporting commercialization 
of research  
• Linkages between industry and suppliers, 
aligning research and upstream suppliers 
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Primary drivers versus secondary drivers:  
The results from this empirical analysis covering 27 EU economies over the 
period 1996-2010 appear to negate the latter part of the query. Importantly, 
R&D investment is not found significant as a primary driver working on 
innovation levels. Instead the primary drivers found significant and positive for 
innovation are based on the informal R&D linkages emphasized in national 
innovation systems: industry linkages with academia, public funding of firms, 
industry collaborations with suppliers and importantly skilled human capital. 
These findings seem to provide partial support for Mokyr’s historical analysis for 
building up innovation in an economy – importance of collaborations or rather 
linkages - though in this case not only restricted to academia, but instead 
extending to other institutions, firms and bodies, as is well acknowledged in 
national innovation systems. The mechanisms through which these drivers may 
influence innovation are drawn from a brief analysis on Germany and are 
touched upon briefly below. 
Linkages with academia as a primary innovation driver: Basing our 
interpretation on previous research on Germany, it appears that the driver 
representing linkages with academia could exert influence on innovation through 
two facets: aligning education sector with industry to deliver skilled human 
capital in accordance with demands of industry; and facilitating 
commercialization of research through forging collaborations between 
entrepreneurs and educational sector, working beyond geographic proximity and 
helping spawns the creation of spin-offs and start-ups. 
Public funding as a primary innovation driver: Public funding as a driver of 
innovation, as understood from the workings in German economy, may shape 
innovation through encouraging longer-term decision-making and reduction of 
funding gaps for firms, along with supporting more stable ownership structures.  
This driver would benefit from future research using firms birth demographic and 
ownership data, as started in Eurostat for CIS since 2008, as it would yield 
clearer insights into ownership patterns and governance structures. 
Industry collaborations with suppliers as a primary innovation driver: The 
impact of linkages with suppliers on innovation as stressed by cluster theory, 
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appears to work through enhancing incremental innovation through joint 
collaborations with suppliers.  
Skilled human capital as a primary innovation driver: Skilled human capital, 
along with linkages to academia are probably the two most robust drivers for 
innovation, affirming the central role of skilled human capital in innovation, 
working in tandem with alignments of industry with academia. The importance 
of a diversified education sector, including the offering of vocational 
programmes to help deliver the skilled work force is highlighted through German 
analysis. This delivery of skilled human capital in line with the needs of industry 
seems too encourage investment from industry into educational sector. in 
Germany. Mayhap this alignment in educational sector across economies, could 
thus not only fine-tune the training of the skilled human capital, but perhaps 
even provide an alternative source of funding for institutions. 
Lack of significance of R&D investment as a primary innovation driver: The 
absence of significance for R&D investment as a primary driver on innovation 
levels was surprising and unexpected. While this result invites further research 
specially into drivers of innovation growth, there are certain aspects evident in 
the data, which may explain this insignificance. Firstly, R&D investment is 
recognized in practice to be quite a stable figure in firms (Hall, Mairesse, & 
Mohnen, 2010, p. 16), only changing gradually over time periods.  Secondly, it 
appears that economies most effectively using this driver to deliver innovation 
do not turn out to be the most innovative of economies. This is evident in the 
lack of correlation of highest proportional ratios of R&D investment to highest 
innovation turnovers. Seeming to signify that presence of other drivers in an 
economy, working in tandem may deliver a total innovation level higher than 
that of this individual driver. Thirdly, and perhaps more significantly, R&D 
investment appears significant as a secondary driver when regressed on 
innovation growth, thus validating the difference between secondary drivers 
from primary drivers for a process. This innovation growth regression seems to 
confirm that secondary drivers, such as R&D investment, are needed to grow 
innovation after primary drivers have laid the foundation to create innovation 
levels. This result also invites further research into the wider set of innovation 
growth drivers itself.  
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Accommodating and indeed understanding this differentiation of both primary 
and secondary drivers may be an important insight gained for tailoring effective 
innovation.   
This also appears to support previous findings that innovation growth may 
initially diverge from productivity growth (Tunzelmann G. V., 2000), thus growth 
drivers may differ somewhat from innovation drivers in initial stages of 
technology generation. Further reiterating the need for policymakers to 
acknowledge this differentiation and ensure that policies target both innovation 
drivers as well as growth drivers in the long run.   
Lack of significance for globalization as an Innovation driver: Globalization 
is also not found significant as a driver, nor is the driver representing home 
markets focus found significant. The absence of both these market drivers on 
innovation may reflect that the focus on markets may follow innovation, when 
the product may determine the choice of markets and not the other way around. 
This would again imply that time periods necessary for technology maturing and 
diffusion, as also referred to by Tunzelmann (Tunzelmann G. V., 2000), may 
explain these differences between drivers of growth from drivers of innovation. 
Differences in innovation drivers for firm-sizes:   
Innovation drivers for small-sized firms: For small firms, skilled human capital 
and linkages with academia were found positive and significant drivers, with 
linkages to government institutions surprisingly significant but negative. 
However, linkages with universities continues to be found significant and 
positive, seeming to support commercialization of research through start-ups 
and spin-offs. The negative but significant impact of linkages with governmental 
institutions is not easily explained and should be followed with research into 
specific data, to understand the mechanisms through which this driver 
influences small firms. 
 Innovation drivers for medium-sized firms: Medium firms similarly found 
skilled human capital and linkages with academia positive and significant. 
However, external sourcing of R&D was found negative. Contradicting this driver 
slightly is the positive significance of linkages to governmental institutions. The 
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negative significance of sourcing R&D externally may be indicative of difficulties 
of bearing cost burden for medium sized firms, while the positive significance of 
collaborations with governmental institutions may capture the reverse – that of 
reduced cost of R&D when collaborating with a government institution, as 
reflected in German economy with the use of Fraunhofer institutes or in the US 
through use of extension services by SMEs. Further exploration with specific data 
would yield clearer insights into the mechanism of this drivers influence on 
innovation.  
Innovation drivers for large-sized firms: Similar to small and medium sized 
firms, large firm analysis found skilled human capital and linkages to academia 
positive and significant. However, they show additional positive significance for 
public funding as well as linkages to suppliers and negative significance for 
linkages to government institutions. The positive significance of public funding 
and supplier relationships appears to reflect that large firms use access to public 
funding and relationships of co-development with suppliers to aid their growth, 
while the negative association with government institutions could reflect their 
lack of need to subcontract research externally, as large firms usually have 
significant R&D teams internally. 
Firm eco-sphere for innovation: 
 Importance of large firm presence for innovation: A last but perhaps not 
insignificant aspect is that large firms appear to dictate a substantial portion of 
innovation measure. While SMEs may be called the hidden growth champions of 
Germany, their share of innovation turnover is by virtue of their size limited. 
Hence in the long run, economies or indeed sectors may be inhibited in 
innovation as a consequence of a reduced share of presence of large firms.  
German insights:  
The brief analysis of Germany helped offer insights into the mechanisms through 
which these wider sets of drivers may influence innovation: commercialization of 
research; alignment of industry, academia and government policy; and 
encouragement of longer-term decision-making, along with the reduction of 
funding gaps. Apart from offering insights into the mechanisms through which 
Chapter 2  69 
these drivers exert influence on innovation, Germany also shows that the use of 
a wider tool kit of innovation drivers may allow different drivers to drive 
different segments. It that is indeed the case, then policy makers in other 
economies may enhance the delivery of innovation across a range of firms sizes, 
through setting up structures and regulations that encourage the creation of this 
wider mix of drivers in economies.  
Thus, by no means complete and with some results remaining puzzling and 
inviting further research, this wider analysis of drivers highlights the importance 
of increasing the toolkit to analyse influences on innovation and paves the way 
for further research into understanding the mechanisms through which these 
drivers shape innovation. Germany’s consistent high usage of these other 
innovation drivers provides some affirmation of this wider tool kit of innovation 
drivers. Perhaps, the most important message is that no driver in isolation may 
be as effective compared to using a mix of drivers, while distinguishing primary 
drivers from secondary drivers enables policy tools to effectively target required 
outcome. If the results of this analysis are indeed valid, then it appears that 
innovation may be increased in economies without expanding capital investment 
– through just widening the toolkit to incorporate the primary drivers. 
Chapter 3  70 
Chapter 3 Are firm-size structures important for 
Productivity? -  An adapted Lewis model to draw 
firm-sizes into the arena of productivity analysis   
3.1 Abstract 
UK labour productivity levels have lagged well below US, Germany and France 
since the 70’s, something often cited as a productivity conundrum for the 
economy (FT, 2016). This study explores whether deeper determinants may 
explain productivity levels. In particular, this chapter explores the structural 
compositions of the economy, which may influence productivity. Using an 
adaptation of the economic development framework, the Lewis model, this 
study proposes that country level labour productivity may be driven structurally 
by the movement of resources from smaller firm sizes to larger firm-size 
structures. To enable this analysis, a new database is built up at sector level for 
the 32 European economies between 2000-2012. The contribution of firm-size to 
country productivity is measured through isolating classifications of small, 
medium and large firms, alongside control variables capturing growth theory 
drivers, globalization, credit conditions and monetary lending policies. Large 
firm sizes are indeed found to be the most significant structure for country 
labour productivity. These findings underscore the fact that focus on factors of 
production alone, be it firm investment or skills shortage, may not be sufficient 
to enable productivity improvements – understanding the firm-landscape 
composition may be as essential. 
Additionally, this chapter examines whether sectoral composition of an economy 
can shape country labour productivity levels. The findings from sector 
composition analysis are less clear. Some sector productivities were found 
significant for country productivity, while revenue-size was found significant for 
some sectors. These results suggest that firm structures may not be an equally 
sensitive issue over all sectors. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) analysis showed UK labour productivity to 
have grown by 0.9% for the second quarter in 2015 (ONS, 2015), though this 
decreased in 2016 to 0.4% (Harari, Briefing paper, n0 06492, 2017). While these 
figures indicate some recovery of productivity growth, productivity levels remain 
below the pre-financial 2008 crisis trend. According to ONS figures, productivity 
growth was indeed flat between Q3 2013 and Q2 2014. Bank of England (BoE), 
undertaking an analysis in 2014 into UK labour productivity, concluded that 
alongside cyclical factors, two persistent non-cyclical factors could perhaps 
better explain UK’s lower labour productivity growth: reduced investment and 
impaired resource allocation (Barnett et al., 2014). While these figures are 
specific to UK productivity growth and productivity levels related to 2008 crisis, 
an equivalently if not more worrying aspect is that UK’s productivity levels have 
lagged well below Germany, France and US since the ‘70’s (Harari, Number 
06492, 2016). Indeed, productivity levels and not only productivity growth, 
remains and has been a key focus of concern for advanced economies, but 
specially for UK. 
The roots of the BoE productivity analysis lie in the long-advocated Lewis 
development model (Lewis, 1954), which emphasizes resource allocation as key 
to growth. This line of thought provides the theoretical grounding for the BoE 
analysis, which focuses on explaining constraints on factors of production 
influencing resource reallocation. These theories on factor constraints could be 
broadly grouped in two camps. The first one centres on distortions, which hinder 
capital investment flows and the consequent impact on skills shortage 
(Bannerjee & Duflo, 2005; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009). The second related camp 
targets the time lag or slow diffusion of technology as an explanation for slower 
resource reallocation (Tunzelmann, 2000; Klenow & RodriguezClare, 2005; 
Caselli & Feyrer, 2007). The core focus of both these camps, as reflected in the 
BoE analysis, remains on identifying constraints or distortions in credit and 
labour market - the removal or reduction of which could encourage resource 
reallocation. Notwithstanding, an analysis of constraints on resources without 
assessing the underlying structures that channel these resources, appears 
incomplete. Understanding the role structures play in determining productivity 
could perhaps be as significant in identifying the hindrances on productivity. 
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Gollin’s review of the Lewis model (Gollin, 2014), proposes that productivity and 
not capital, as assumed by Lewis, may be the long run driver for growth (Gollin, 
2014). Importantly, he attributes growth through productivity to be driven 
structurally, through the movement of resources to higher productive sectors. 
While Gollin focuses on the movement of resources between sectors as the 
means to raising productivity, there could perhaps be another equivalently 
important structural aspect governing higher productivity from resources – that 
of movement of resources across firm structures. 
Why firm structures, instead of sectors? This draws on the linkage of productivity 
to innovation, where innovation is recognized as the long run driver of growth, 
through increasing productivity (Solow, 1956; Romer, 1990). The emphasis on 
firm structures in innovation is rooted in the theories promoted by one of the 
earliest innovation economists, Joseph Schumpeter, who drew attention to the 
structures prevalent in economy through which innovation is channelled. 
Schumpeter questioned which size of firm could best function as the principal 
engine of innovation, initially emphasizing the role of small firms (Schumpeter, 
1934), later singling out the presence of large firms as critical to long run 
technological progress (Schumpeter, 1942). It would appear that firm structures 
play an important role in driving innovation. Given the intricate linkage of 
innovation with productivity and building upon Gollin’s review, the question 
arises: Could lack of country level labour productivity be driven through 
hindrances of moving resources, not only across sectors as implied by Gollin’s 
review of Lewis model – but also across firm structures? That is the key question 
this thesis aims to address.   
This thesis develops this insight through offering a structural model for country 
level labour productivity, building upon Gollin’s review of Lewis’s model of 
growth, remodelling the resource movement across firm structures – not sectors, 
as in Gollin’s work (Gollin, 2014). In other words, could a country’s lack of 
productivity levels be hindered by constraints on moving resources to larger firm 
structures? A focus on importance of firm-size structures on country 
productivity, irrespective of firm productivity or sectors. To this end, the study 
assesses whether firm structures are significant for a country’s labour 
productivity economy, and if so, which firm-size structures. Identifying the firm-
size structures most significant for labour productivity, enables an assessment of 
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the influence of expansion or reduction of that firm-size structure on 
productivity levels of an economy. In particular, it may offer clues to the 
productivity puzzle in the UK, whose productivity levels remain towards the 
bottom of the G7 league table (Financial Times, 2018). In essence, this study 
aims to show the linkage between firm structures and country productivity, 
offering a theoretical framework through the further adaptation of the Lewis 
model. 
To demonstrate this linkage, this study focuses on how differing firm-sizes may 
influence country labour productivity. Firms are classified into firm-size 
groupings based on size of average revenue (turnover) to enable initial 
assessment of importance of firm size on an economy – irrespective of the firm 
productivities. Later, firm sizes are also assessed through average firm 
productivity’s influence on country productivity. This differentiation is to enable 
insights on whether just sheer presence of particular firm sizes is important or 
not for an economy, irrespective of whether those firm-sizes are productive or 
not. Reason for this focus on firm size, irrespective of firm productivity, is to 
recognize that certain firm sizes may be lifting country productivity through 
other channels such as best practices, R&D spill-overs, skills training – and as 
such may be valuable for an economy in their own right, irrespective of their 
productivity. 
Nonetheless, firm productivity is of importance, which though assessed also in 
this study, has already been documented at varied aggregate levels previously by 
a valuable body of research. The seminal paper linking firm productivity to 
aggregated sector productivity in this field was by Bailey et al. (1992), who 
examined the empirical linkage of plant productivity to sector level aggregate 
productivity. Examining 23 manufacturing sectors, they found an econometric 
positive correlation between productivity of plants and sector productivity, thus, 
establishing an empirical base line linking productivity of plants with an 
aggregated sector productivity. Developing this theme further, further research 
has shown that reallocation of resources from lower to higher productive firms 
largely influenced sector-level labour productivity growth (Olley & Pakes, 1996; 
Griliches & Regev, 1995).  Following a slightly different theme, using cross-
country data Bartelsman et al. (2013) examine entry/exits of firms impact on 
country labour productivity and find that country-level labour productivity can 
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to a large extent be explained by within-firm productivities. These studies 
provide significant evidence underscoring the relationship between firm 
productivity and either sector-level productivity or country-level productivity, 
yet there appears to be far less research on the link between firm size and 
country level labour productivity. The only previous study on this topic is by 
Leung et al. (2008), who find that the reallocation of labour towards larger firm 
structures appears to have a positive correlation on country level productivity 
Building upon this theme using econometric analysis, this thesis seeks to 
examine the influence of the varied firm-size structures on country-level labour 
productivity for 32 European economies between 2000-2012. More so, it aims to 
offer an explanation for the mechanisms by which firm sizes may impact on 
country labour productivity, through an adapted form of the Lewis model.  
The adapted Lewis model, introducing Schumpeterian innovation concepts of 
firm structures, essentially explains the impact of varied firm size landscapes on 
the labour productivity of an economy. By necessity, models are simplifications 
in order to clarify a mechanism. Thus, to enable this study to focus on a model 
to highlight the relationship between firm-size and country labour productivity, 
it is not possible to include all other heterogenous firm aspects well-
acknowledged in industrial organizational literature. Hence, within these 
limitations and keeping view of the insights sought by this study, the question 
arises - does the data corroborate this adaptation of the Lewis model and do 
firm-size structures indeed dictate productivity for an economy?  
The findings from this study support the proposed adaptation of the Lewis 
model, with some caveats. It would appear, based on average firm turnover 
shares, that only large firms’ structures were found to impact country level 
productivity significantly and positively, with small and medium sized firm 
structures seeming to have a negative influence. More so, only large firm 
productivity was found robust and significant for country level productivity. This 
overlaps with recent research by ECB, which found that though small and 
medium sized firms (SMEs) employed nearly 70 percent of the workforce in the 
EU business economy in 2012; they generated only 60 percent of the value added 
(ECB, 2013). Further, if measured by number of firms, though SMEs accounted 
for 99.8 percent of the firms in the business economy, large firms comprising 
only 0.2 percent of the total, generated 40 percent of the value added 
Chapter 3  75 
(Eurostat, 2012). That roughly translates to a factor 330 times higher value 
added per large firm compared to SMEs, indicating larger firms appear to have 
much higher productivity. However, it should be kept in context with the fact 
that despite lower productivity, SMEs are found to be an important source of 
employment and country growth (Beck et al., 2005). Similarly, both small and 
large firms were found critical for innovation (Bradley, 2014), bearing in mind 
that innovation is a critical element for long-term productivity.  Keeping sight of 
the varied value of the different firm-size structures, it would appear that 
moving resources from SMEs over to larger firm structures for purposes of raising 
country level labour productivity, could be beneficial. That is essentially the 
main insight for the model.  
In particular, interpreted in UK’s case, this could be a problem, as on average 
the UK appears to have a declining large firm density trend since the 70’s 
(Bradley, 2018). This would require policy makers to look beyond constraints on 
factors of production, looking to devise policies to increase or support large firm 
presence in the economy. 
This study also examined sector influence on country productivity, aspiring to 
shed some insights on Gollin’s view that moving resources to higher productivity 
sectors could help lift the country level productivity of an economy. However, 
findings in this area were more mixed. It appears that some sectors influence 
country level productivity through their productivity and others through sector 
size. Where sectors influence through size, it would appear that such sectors 
would benefit from presence of all three firm-sizes in those sectors. In contrast, 
those sectors influencing through productivity may benefit from a larger firm-
size presence in those sectors. These findings add some detail to Gollin’s 
interpretation of Lewis model, lending some clarification of the type of 
structures towards which to move resources in varied sectors. However, these 
implications would need further detailed corroboration through detailed 
research, to verify the validity of these implications.  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows: the next section 3.3 addresses the 
theoretical framework and thereafter section 3.4 covers the relevant literature 
around the questions addressed by this study. Section 3.5 explains the data and 
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methodology. Section 3.6 highlights the main results, concluding in section 3.7 
with possible policy implications. 
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
This study offers insights into the structural drivers of productivity, based on 
adaptation of Lewis’s development model for growth, as interpreted by Gollin 
(Gollin, 2014). Gollin suggested productivity was the long run driver of growth 
instead of capital, as proposed originally in Lewis’s model (Lewis, 1954). Gollin 
based this interpretation on Lewis’s original dual-sector model, attributing 
growth through productivity to be driven structurally through the movement of 
resources to higher productive sectors. This study builds further upon Lewis’s 
model, but with two differences. Firstly, it aims to explain country level labour 
productivity, not country level growth.  Secondly, it proposes that this 
productivity could be driven structurally, through the movement of resources 
across firm-structures, irrespective of sectors. The focus is on firm structures, 
small versus large, deriving from Schumpeterian concepts of innovation 
(Schumpeter, 1942; Schumpeter, 1934). It simplifies the firm structures into 
dual-structure concept of small and large, in order to explain the mechanism of 
shift of resources. Thus, this study not only proposes that country level labour 
productivity is driven structurally by the movement of resources across firm 
structures, it proposes a particular direction – movement from smaller firm sizes 
to larger firm-size structures. 
 This direction of movement from smaller firm-size structures to larger firm-size 
structures to enhance labour productivity is based to an extent on simplification 
of previous research on firm structures and related firm productivities. While 
research has widely found large firm-size structures to have higher firm 
productivity (Lucas, 1978; Snodgrass & Biggs, 1996; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Van 
Ark & Monnikhof, 1996), there is caution that this could be sector dependent or 
indeed dictated by various other aspects, including management practices 
(Bartelsman et al., 2013). Thus, keeping this caveat in mind, the model proposes 
a direction of resources towards larger firm-size structures for enhancing 
productivity, based on the assumption that larger firm-size structures are on 
average associated with higher productivities.  
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In turn, this movement of resources to larger firms, in effect more highly 
productive firms, is proposed to deliver higher country level labour productivity. 
In essence, this proposal is based on the key insights by earlier research that 
moving resources to higher productivity structures raises sector level labour 
productivity (Olley & Pakes, 1996; Griliches & Regev, 1996; Bailey et al., 1992). 
In this study, this same mechanism is proposed to translate to country level 
labour productivity as depicted in Figure 3.1. In effect, this study builds upon 
these various insights in literature and pulls them together, to offer an adapted-
Lewis model for country level labour productivity.       
 
Figure 3.1 Adapted Lewis Model for Productivity, source (author)  
 
This adapted Lewis model, based on simplification of the interrelationship 
between innovation and productivity, highlights the impact of firm structures on 
country level labour productivity. Combining various insights from above 
mentioned previous research, this model proposes that shift from smaller firm 
structures towards larger firms raises country level productivity – both through 
channels of firm productivity and firm revenue. The model is explained basically 
through representations of marginal product of labour (MPL) curves for small and 
large firms, with shifts in these MPL curves observed for their impact on country 
level labour productivity.   
The proposed mechanism of shifting MPL of large firm rightward or leftward, 
whilst not shifting left hand corner of MPL curve, in essence represents a firm’s 
capital expansion without productivity shift. On a country level, however, this 
MPL can be seen as representative of expansion or reduction in the share of 
Chapter 3  78 
large firm presence in an economy. This is however different from a firm 
productivity shift (due to introduction of a new technology/innovation or 
efficiency), in which case the entire MPL shifts outwards due to a firm 
productivity increase. Smaller firms are depicted on the right-hand side of the 
diagram with on average a much lower MPL than large firms. This follows a 
similar mechanism as explained for large firms, with a leftward shift of the MPL 
capturing expansion of the smaller firm-size presence in an economy, but a full 
outward-shift of the smaller-firm MPL only caused by a productivity increase. 
However, should the small firms struggle to scale up, as evidenced in UK 
(Bradley, 2018), then the smaller MPL may not scale up outwards as firms do not 
appear to last the distance to grow.   
The study assesses the data to verify the validity of this adapted Lewis model for 
productivity, thus assessing the questions of whether firm structures are indeed 
significant for a country’s labour productivity economy, and if so, which firm-
size structures? To assess if large or small firm-size structures are indeed 
relevant for country level productivity irrespective of their firm productivities, 
firm-size structures are assessed for their influence both through their average 
turnover share and firm productivity, essentially, allowing a dual-check of 
relevance of firm-size structures.  It uses evidence to identify the firm-size 
structures most significant for country labour productivity and thereby, 
examines the validity of the proposed adapted Lewis model. Importantly, if this 
model is found valid –the expansion or reduction of particular firm-size 
structures in an economy could be then found to offer clues to the longer-term 
productivity levels of an economy. This itself could offer vital clues for longer 
term productivity challenges, for example in the UK economy.  
The study examines the evidence through a panel database on firm-sizes and 
country productivity at sector level for 32 EU economies between 2000-2012. It 
includes firm size classification (OECD, 2005) of small, medium and large firms 
at sector level for core innovative sectors spanning manufacturing and services, 
using both average firm turnover and average firm productivity to assess 
importance of firm structures (EUROSTAT CIS, 2013). 
The findings of this study appear to validate the proposed adapted Lewis model. 
Large firm structures are indeed found to be an essential positive force on the 
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country level labour productivity. In fact, only large firm turnover share and 
large firm productivity were found significant and positive. In contrast, firm 
turnover shares of small and medium sized firms were found to influence country 
level labour productivity negatively, thus, underscoring the importance of large 
firm presence in an economy for country level productivity and affirming that a 
shift of resources towards larger firm structures, which essentially could shift 
the MPL-curve of large firms rightwards (expansion of firms) or fully outwards 
(productivity increase for new frontier technology firms), would raise country 
level productivity. Vice versa, a reduction in large firm presence in an economy 
would entail a shift of resources away from large firms towards smaller firms, 
resulting in a lowering of country level labour productivity. Thus, the research 
emphasizes the importance of including an understanding of firm-structures, 
alongside constraints on factors of production, into the arena of productivity 
analysis of an economy. 
3.4 Existing Literature.   
As noted earlier, excepting that of Leung et al. (2008), previous research is 
mainly silent on the examination of firm sizes and their influence on country 
labour productivity.  Leung et al. (2008) examine the influence of reallocation of 
resources towards large firms on country labour productivity, offering insights of 
the mechanism that increasing employment in large firms appears to raise 
country level productivity. This study takes this a step further and investigates 
initially how the varied firm size structures influence country level labour 
productivity, irrespective of firm productivities, thereafter, also assessing 
influence of firm productivities on country productivity, for which there is a 
valuable body of prior research.   
There are nonetheless valuable insights in previous literature on the importance 
of firm-structures, even if they don’t specifically relate it to country 
productivity. This section reviews the existing literature on the relationship of 
firm-structures, firm productivity, country productivity and growth. 
There is a relatively wide range of studies that have investigated the link 
between firm sizes and firm productivities. Partially inspired by Schumpeter’s 
differing claims of firm-sizes for innovation, Lucas researched movements in firm 
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productivity due to employment shifts of highly skilled managers as a 
consequence of rising wages and found an association in the US between large 
firms and higher firm productivity (Lucas R. J., 1978). Lucas, though, indicated 
this could possibly vary in accordance with the level of advancement of 
economies, with perhaps smaller and medium sized firms having greater 
importance for developing economies. On the other hand, Snodgras and Biggs, 
assessing a wide range of parameters on the role of SMEs in India and newly 
industrializing economies of the far east, research revealed that on aggregate, 
firm labour productivity appeared to be positively correlated with firm-size 
(Snodgrass & Biggs, 1996). They cautioned that this could be sector dependent, 
as a few sectors showed that SMEs had comparable or higher productivity. 
Supporting Lucas’s earlier findings while examining advanced economies, Van 
Ark and Monnikhof having constructed data sets based on three manufacturing 
sets in advanced economies between the 60’s and late 80’s, reported that higher 
firm productivity appeared correlated with larger firm sizes (Van Ark & 
Monnikhof, 1996). Assessing developing economies, Van Biesebroek relating firm-
size to firm productivity for manufacturing sectors across some African 
economies, showed that firm-size was positively correlated with both firm 
growth and firm productivity (Van Biesebroeck, 2005). This supports earlier 
findings by Biggs et al.(1996) examining manufacturing sectors in African 
economies, where large firms were found to have higher labour productivities. 
With some variation for developing economies, this set of research overall seems 
to support views that higher firm productivity is closely associated with larger 
firm sizes in advanced economies and some developing economies. 
As mentioned earlier, there are valuable studies linking firm productivity with 
aggregate productivity. The seminal paper linking firm productivity to 
aggregated sector productivity in this field was by Bailey et al. (1992), who 
examined the empirical linkage of plant productivity to sector level aggregate 
productivity. Examining 23 manufacturing sectors, they found a positive 
econometric correlation between productivity of plants and sector productivity, 
thus, establishing an empirical base line linking productivity of plants with an 
aggregated sector productivity. Developing this theme further, further research 
has shown that reallocation of resources from lower to higher productive firms 
largely influenced sector-level labour productivity growth (Olley & Pakes, 1996; 
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Griliches & Regev, 1995). With a slightly different focus, Bartelsman et al. 
(2013), use firm productivity gaps to capture resource misallocation that explain 
cross country productivity differences across five advanced and three eastern 
European economies. These studies provide valuable insights linking firm 
productivities to aggregate productivity, finding shifts towards higher productive 
firms reflected in raised aggregate productivity measures.  
Furthermore, there is also research assessing total factor productivity (TFP) and 
its impact on country level productivity. Using TFP to capture some resource 
misallocation caused by constraints to physical and human capital, a positive 
association was found between lower TFP and lower country productivity 
(Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare, 1997). This association of TFP with country labour 
productivity is supported by findings from Hall & Jones, using growth accounting 
on extended human capital Solow models to compute TFP (Hall & Jones, 1999). 
Caselli evaluating country income and TFP through development accounting finds 
cross-country incomes are not sufficiently explained by factors of production and 
questions if departure from Cobb-Douglas function may aid future research 
(Caselli, 2005). As this study does not use growth accounting or TFP to capture 
impact of technology, instead using firm structures to capture innovative 
activity, this association is of less direct relevance here. 
On another related strand, there is some research assessing firm-size, classified 
by employment share, and its effect on aggregate country growth. . Historically, 
there is evidence for the vital role of SMEs on country growth for some 
developing economies. Indeed SMEs played a critical role in Japan’s 
industrialization after the Meiji revolution and experience of emerging 
economies like Taiwan seemed to further strengthen these convictions 
(Snodgrass & Biggs, 1996). However Snodgrass and Biggs(1996) also emphasized 
that was not the experience of most second tier industrializing European 
economies, nor of Korea as an emerging economy, showing that variable firm 
sizes seemed to have suited differing economies to deliver growth. Albeit, the 
role of SMEs in delivering growth in emerging economies is also supported by the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2002; World Bank 2004). While recent research by Beck 
et al. (2005) further supports the correlation of SMEs with growth, they find no 
empirical support for a causal relationship. Beck et al. (ibid) use national 
characteristics as instrumental variables to assess this causal relationship, 
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cautioning that this is only indicative of the lack of empirical support for the 
significance of this relationship, not evidence to support the absence of a causal 
relationship; which leaves the issue of firm sizes open for further evaluation. 
Excluding causality, it appears there is quite a significant body of evidence 
supporting the association of smaller and medium sized firms with country 
growth. While country growth differs from country productivity, the focus for 
this current study, nonetheless this strand of research underlines the importance 
of evaluating all three firm sizes carefully for their impact on country level 
labour productivity. 
This study thus hopes to complement this body of research on firm-structures, 
through assessing how presence of varied firm-size structures influences labour 
productivity at country level.  Using these insights, it assesses the proposed 
adapted Lewis model offering a mechanism through which firm-sizes could 
impact country level productivity. This is followed by an examination of sector 
sizes and sector productivities, which may shed insights on the differing types of 
firm-structures needed in sectors for country productivity. The description of 
the data and methodology follows in the next section. 
3.5 Data and Methodology 
 Measures of Firm-size structures and productivity, as well 
as Sector share and Sector productivity 
To ensure the collection of a comprehensive set of firm size measures, the study 
uses a newly built database comprising of two types of sector level survey data 
and one set of country level data. The sector level firm data is sourced from bi-
annual community innovation survey data (CIS) for 32 European economies 
between 2000-2012 (EUROSTAT CIS, 2013) and Structural Business survey data 
(SBS) between 2008-2012 (EUROSTAT SBS, 2015). Although CIS data covers the 
period of 2000-2012, as there is often missing sector data for 2002, that year is 
dropped from the regression analysis. The corresponding country specific control 
variables between 2000-2012 are drawn from World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) accessed from the World DataBank (World Bank, n.d.).  
Using these datasets, a panel database is built, incorporating all firm-sizes, 
including SMEs and large firms, for 32 European economies over the period of 
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2000-2012. Moving away from an analysis into either just manufacturing or 
services sectors, it instead incorporates core innovative sectors within countries, 
as defined by Eurostat (2013). This includes both manufacturing and service 
sectors, permitting the study to engage with all sectors contributing to 
innovation, the key to long run growth and productivity. This panel database has 
essentially 5 layers of classifications: year, country, sector, type of firm 
(innovative, non-innovative) and firm size (small, medium and large). The data 
for sectors is available at aggregated core innovative sector level, sub-
aggregated level and detailed sector level. 
3.5.1.1 Firm classification and Firm turnover: 
To classify firm-size structures influence on the productivity of an economy, this 
study separates firm turnover and firm productivity at sector level into three 
OECD-defined groups: small, medium and large firm size class structures 
(EUROSTAT CIS, 2013; OECD, 2005), with small featuring 0-49 employees, 
medium between 50-249 employees and large with 250+ employees. Firm 
turnover is the average turnover of small/medium/large firms, measured by 
aggregated turnover at sector level for each size class. The firm-size measure is 
in fact a dynamic measure, as it captures the net firm data bi-annually, 
including entries and exits of firms at sector level. Though the survey data 
provides access to invaluable aspects of firm data, it has the associated 
shortcoming of survey data and thus limited in its coverage of the entire 
economy. Eurostat attempts to ensure that the population cover is 
representative of the economy and by measuring both innovative and non-
innovative firms, tries to ensure a balanced snapshot of the economy at sector 
level (EUROSTAT CIS, 2013; EUROSTAT SBS, 2015). Its unique strength lies in its 
provision of international comparability, an aspect that has seriously hindered 
previous cross-country studies, opening up the possibility of panel data studies. 
3.5.1.2 Firm productivity, Sector productivity and Sector share:  
Firm size structures are captured by the associated turnover related to firm-size 
classes: small, medium and large for the period of 2000-2012. Lacking gross 
value added per employee data in CIS, the productivity of firm sizes is captured 
by turnover per employee for the time period 2000-2012, critically with CIS data 
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providing related firm-size information.  The study also uses SBS data, which 
provides accurate productivity measures of gross value added per employee data 
at sector level, however as it for shorter time period of 2008-2012 and lacks 
firm-size information, and opportunities for corroboration are limited. 
Furthermore, as varying sectors will have missing data across the 32 economies 
for different year groups, the number of actual panel years per sector employed 
in the analysis is reduced accordingly, with the year 2002 often dropped due to 
missing sector data. Another limitation of firm size structure data is that it is 
only available at approximately 10 aggregated sector levels, restricting firm size 
structures analysis to that level. However detailed sector level turnover and 
turnover per employee is available, albeit without firm-size classification, 
allowing detailed sector share and sector productivity analysis. Sector share is 
defined as the aggregated turnover for firms in that sector, while sector 
productivity is measured as turnover per employee aggregated at sector level.  
3.5.1.3 Level of aggregation of sectors:  
As this study focuses on firm-size structures, it is restricted to varying depths of 
sector level for the regression due to restrictions imposed by availability of data. 
CIS survey data is the only source of firm-size structures classification data, 
providing firm-size information either at a fully aggregated sector level defined 
as ‘Innovation Core activities’, encompassing all innovative sectors or at sub-
aggregated levels of sector aggregation. The 9 sub-aggregated innovative sectors 
providing firm-size structure classification are as follows: Industry (except 
construction); Information and communication; Financial and insurance 
activities; Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and 
analysis; scientific research and development; advertising and market research; 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; manufacturing; Water supply; 
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; Transport, storage and 
communication; Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles. The 
firm-size structures and firm-size productivity regressions are of necessity 
performed at this sub-aggregated level. In contrast, as no firm-size classification 
is required, the detailed sectors comprising about 60 innovative sectors are used 
during the examination of sector share and sector productivity influence on 
country productivity. 
Chapter 3  85 
The width of sectors chosen for this analysis also deserves some clarification. As 
innovation over the last few decades has moved away from pure manufacturing 
and is increasingly wrapped up in the software and design in the services sector, 
the study uses OECD’s grouping of sectors, defined as core innovative sectors 
(OECD, Innovation Manual, 2005). Though this grouping or classification has thus 
far not been used widely in studies, the author of this study previously used this 
grouping in a study on innovation drivers (Bradley, What are the drivers of 
Innovation and does policy target them?, 2014), and again uses this grouping for 
this study as it enables to focus the examination on sectors most relevant to 
innovation across manufacturing and service sectors. 
 Measures of Country productivity, alongside country 
specific control variables  
As the study examines the relationship of firm-size structures on country level 
productivity, the dependent variable is country level labour productivity 
measured by Gross Value Added per employee, sourced from WDI. Following this 
regression, the study assesses the impact of sector level turnover and sector 
productivity on country productivity, the dependent variable for country level 
labour productivity again being measured by Gross Value Added per employee. 
When assessing impact of sector productivity on country productivity, the sector 
productivity variable of interest is initially measured by turnover per employee if 
using CIS data, over the period 2000-2012. However, this is later followed up by 
an alternative and more accurate measure of sector productivity as measured by 
Gross value added per employee from SBS data, albeit with a shortened time 
period of analysis from 2008-2012 due to data availability restrictions. On the 
other hand, sector turnover is measured only by the size of turnover of 
corresponding sector each second year over the period 2000-2012. 
The level of analysis for firm-size structures is restricted by the availability of 
firm-size data only at particular sub-aggregated sector level. The sub-aggregated 
sectors are detailed in the regression. However, regressions analysing sector 
turnover and sector productivity impact on country productivity are independent 
of firm-size structures, and thus are implemented at detailed sector level.  
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To ensure that the regression only captures the firm structure effects, we 
separately control for country specific growth drivers which influence 
productivity as per Solow model (Solow,1956): capital formation and labour 
force participation rates; as well as globalisation growth impact captured by 
export trade; last but not least, also controlling for differing monetary policy 
growth impacts through country specific deposit rates alongside lending rates 
influencing variable credit conditions. Though sourced from World DataBank, 
they are a mixture of National statistics data, as well as IMF, IFC and ILO 
collected data statistics (World Bank, n.d.). As the CIS data is only available 
biannually, the country specific measures are accordingly drawn for a similar 
period and frequency from World databank. The choice of these control 
variables is defined in greater length in the sub-section 3.5.3.1 
To provide a snapshot of the movement of economies between 2000-2012, Table 
3.1 provides a listing of the country labour productivities (derived from WDI, 
World DataBank) analyzed in this study, initially in 2000 and then 2012. 
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Table 3.1 GVA per employee (K Euros per Empl) of the 32 economies in this study at 2000 
and 2012, derived from WDI indicators sourced from World DataBank 
 
Country  GVA per employee 
(2000) 
        (K Euros per 
Employee) 
 
GVA per employee 
(2012) 
(K Euros per Employee) 
 
Austria 43.9 82.7 
Belgium 47.9 92.3 
Bulgaria 3.8 15.04 
Croatia - 33.3 
Cyprus 19.3 40.9 
Czech republic 11.2 36.8 
Denmark 47.9 96.2 
Estonia 8.1 30.6 
Finland 39.8 75.4 
France 45.6 81.2 
Germany 45.5 78.6 
Greece 26.97 55.97 
Hungary 8.97 24 
Ireland 46.75 98.77 
Italy 47.4 80.5 
Latvia 8.7 27.3 
Lithuania  29.3 
Luxembourg 94.97 193.4 
Malta 22.04 - 
Netherlands 42.6 81.3 
Norway 53.7 148.8 
Poland 9.5 26.04 
Portugal 19.5 40.1 
Romania 2.8 16.4 
Serbia - 15.1 
Slovakia 11.2 34.9 
Slovenia 18.9 42.1 
Spain 32.7 66.4 
Sweden 43.8 87.1 
Turkey 9.1 23.7 
United Kingdom 44.7 71.2 
United States 
(Reference only, not 
analyzed in regressions) 
56.9 92.8 
Note: Whist care has to be taken interpreting these nominal values, Luxembourg had the highest 
labour productivity in 2000 and yet again in 2012. In contrast Romania had the lowest 
GVA/employee in 2000, yet in 2012 Bulgaria appears to have even lower labour productivity than 
Romania. Excluding Canada and Japan, the G7 economies listed here vary in their labour 
productivities with UK with the lowest productivity level, France and Germany virtually equivalent, 
then Italy and US the highest in 2000. This remains similar in 2012 for UK being lowest and US 
highest. Inbetween it changes somewhat with France increasing its productivity above Germany, 
as well as Italy.  Though US continues to remain slightly less than half of Luxembourg. Norway 
stands out in increasing its productivity nearly three-fold from 2000 to 2012. 
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 Methodology 
3.5.3.1  Country level Productivity and Firm-size Regressions 
Measurement of productivity is inherently derived from growth models. Either 
neoclassical growth models that estimate income of an economy based on a 
functional form relating human and physical capital with technology exogenous 
to model (Solow, 1956; Mankiew, Romer, & Weil, 1992). Or endogenous growth 
models can be used to measure income of an economy, with yet another 
functional form relating capital, both human and physical, to some measure of 
technology endogenous to model (Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1990). While labour 
productvity has many definitions, the most commonly used measure of labour 
productvity is income of an economy per employee or more specifically income 
per hour worked (OECD, 2001). This study, due to data restrictions, uses income 
per employee, as measured by gross value added (GVA) per employee to 
estimate country labour productvity. 
Purpose of regression: As explained earlier, this study assesses the data, to 
verify the validity of this adapted Lewis model for this measure of country 
labour productivity, in other words, assessing whether firm structures are indeed 
significant for a country’s labour productivity economy, and if so, which firm-
size structures? To initially examine whether large or small firm-size structures 
are indeed relevant for country level productivity irrespective of their firm 
productivities, firm-size structures are assessed for their influence both through 
average turnover share impact on country labour productivity. Thereafter, 
average firm productivity of the varied firm size structures is assessed for its 
impact on country labour productivity, essentially, allowing a dual-check of 
relevance of firm-size structures.  The findings are then used to identify the 
firm-size structures most significant for country labour productivity and thereby, 
to assess the validity of the proposed adapted Lewis model. 
Choice of control variables: Assesment of the validity of the proposed adapted 
Lewis model, requires examining the impact of the varied firm-sizes on country 
labour productvity. To ensure the regression captures the correct impact of firm 
size structures on country productivity, the regression controls for basic drivers 
of growth, globalization and monetary policy. Growth drivers are represented by 
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human and physical capital, where human capital is captured by employment 
labour force particpation rate, in order to also assess Becker and Gordon’s 
findings that productvity and employment may move in opposite directions 
(Gordon & Becker, 2008). Physical capital is proxied by the gross capital 
formation at country level. Along with these basic elements of productvity 
analysis, the empirical analysis controls for country specific moneatry policy and 
financial lending rates, which could influence credit constraints impacting labour 
productvity. Furthermore, it controls for export, as that aspect of country-
specific trade policy may also influence labour productivity. Lastly, time 
dummies are included to capture any anuual shocks across the panel.  
Regression equation: The regression equation used to evaluate the relationship 
between country productivity and firm-size structures, using panel data over the 
period 2000-2012 for the 32 European economies, can be defined as follows:  
yij= a1GCFit + a2EMPit + a3EXPit+ a4LENDit+ a5DEPit + b1SmallFirmijt + b2MedFirmijt 
+ b3LgeFirmijt + hyear dummies + e  (1)  
where y is the country-level labour productivity measured by GVA per employee, 
GCF is the gross capital formation at country level, EMP is the country’s labour 
force participation rate measured as Employment to population % ratios, EXP is 
the country specific export as a % ratio to GDP as proxy for government policy, 
LEND is the lending interest rate capturing credit constraint conditions, DEP is 
the deposit interest rate to proxy monetary policy. Year dummies are included 
to capture any time shocks and e represents error term. The subscripts in 
regression following standard notation of ‘i’ representing country variation, 
subscript ‘j’ sector variation and subscript ‘t’ denoting year variation. GCF and 
EMP chiefly represent country specific productivity factors influencing physical 
and human capital accumulation. This regression evaluates at the aggregated 
and sub-aggregated innovative sector levels, as firm-size information is not 
available at detailed sector level.  At these two levels of aggregation, initially 
the regression examines influence of average turnover of the firm size 
structures: small, medium and large size class. Thereafter, the regression 
evaluates these three firm-size structures through average firm-turnover share 
(firm intensities), with average turnover of each firm-size class as a proportion 
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of total turnover. Lacking data on actual firm numbers, the share in revenue or 
turnover was proxied to represent firm-intensities.  Both regressions offer 
differing, but equally important insights. Essentially, firm turnover reveals how 
the average revenue of the small, medium and large firms impacts on country 
productivity, while average turnover-share examines how the proportions of 
particular firm-size classes present in an economy can influence country 
productivity. 
As described in the adapted Lewis model, firm structures influence country level 
productivity either through channels of expanding turnover or through increasing 
firm productivity. To examine the validity of the proposed adapted Lewis model, 
firm-size structures are assessed thus additionally through channels of firm 
productivity as well as turnover. The equation for the regression adding the 
influence of firm-size productivities on country labour productivity can be listed 
as follows: 
yij= a1GCFit + a2EMPit + a3EXPit+ a4LENDit+ a5DEPit + b1SmallFirmijt + b2MedFirmijt 
+ b3LgeFirmijt + g1SmallFirmProdijt + g2MedFirmProdijt + g3LgeFirmProdijt + hyear 
dummies + e  (2)  
where SmallFirmProd, MedFirmProd and LgeFirmProd are represented by 
turnover per employee.  
In both these regressions, the coefficient b indicates the ratio of country 
productivity to firm-size turnover, according to classification of small, medium 
and large size class. As the b coefficient is the slope response of a unit change of 
a particular class of firm-size turnover, a higher value of b implies a higher 
impact on country productivity for a unit change of the associated firm-size 
turnover.  
Similarly, the coefficient g represents the ratio of country productivity to firm-
size productivity, classified again into small, medium and large size grouping. 
This coefficient g is the slope response on country productivity for a unit change 
in firm-size productivity. Again, a higher g value is suggestive of a greater 
productivity of that firm-size class, with the sign and significance of the 
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coefficient indicating whether there is any relationship between firm-size 
productivity of that class and country productivity. A positive sign implies a 
favourable influence, while a negative sign an adverse effect. 
3.5.3.2  Country level Productivity and Sector Regressions 
This study also examines the relationship of sector size and sector productivity 
on country level productivity. As firm-size turnovers determine sector size and 
firm-size productivities in turn shape sector productivities, this examination in 
effect allows an alternative cross-check of firm-size influence on country 
productivity. It offers the added advantage of a lower level of evaluation at 
detailed sector level, as no firm-size classification is required, increasing the 
robustness of the regression.  
Each sector size is measured by turnover of the corresponding sector for each 
biannual year, over the period 2000-2012. On the other hand, sector productivity 
is measured by turnover per employee using CIS data over a panel data period of 
2000-2012 biannually. When measuring sector productivity by GVA per employee 
using SBS data, the period of observation is restricted to 2008-2012. Using this 
more accurate measure of sector productivity, albeit restricted to a shorter time 
period, offers a robustness check to the regression. 
It is to be noted that as there is lack of firm-size classification, sectors can only 
be assessed for their relationship of sector size or productivity on country 
productivity. Not for the makeup of firm-size classes within those sectors on 
country productivity. The following regression is used: 
yij= a1GCFij + a2EMPij + a3EXPij+ a4LENDij+ a5DEPij + b1SectorShareij + … + 
b60Sector Shareij + g1SectorProdij + … + g60SectorProdij + hyear dummies + e  (3)  
In this case, coefficient b indicates the ratio of country productivity to sector 
turnover. As b is effectively the slope response of a unit change of sector 
turnover on country productivity, a higher b value suggests a larger impact on 
country productivity for a unit sector turnover. A positive and significant b 
suggests a beneficial impact of sector size on country productivity, whilst a 
negative sign would indicate an adverse effect. 
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In this instance, coefficient g represents the ratio of country productivity to 
sector productivity. Thus the coefficient g is the slope response on country 
productivity for a unit change on sector productivity. As earlier, a higher g 
implies a greater influence on the country productivity, with a positive 
(negative) sign implying country productivity benefits (adverse effect) from that 
particular sector’s productivity. 
In essence, sector size (measured by turnover) could expand without improving 
sector productivity (turnover per employee) through increasing employment, yet 
benefitting country productivity by shifting resources from lower productive 
sectors to employment in higher productive sectors, as proposed in original 
Lewis model (1954). On the other hand, sector productivity could increase 
through efficiency in the short term or innovation in the long term shifting the 
firm technology composition, as per adapted Lewis model – yet again benefitting 
country productivity. 
As both sector sizes and sector productivity are examined, this process is 
examined comparatively - whether sector sizes or sector productivity have a 
similar significance of influence. If there is disparity in significance, the 
predominance of one aspect, either sizes or productivity, is suggestive of a more 
(less) than proportional influence of that aspect on country productivity. 
This initial analysis of sector size as captured by turnover is followed by a set of 
regressions where sector size is instead represented by sector share, measured 
with sector turnover as a proportion of total core innovative sectors’ turnover. 
In essence, sector share = sector size (turnover) / total turnover of all innovative 
sectors, enabling each sectors weight in the whole economy to be determined. 
Whereas sector size examines sector revenue as an alternative channel of 
influence on country productivity, sector share assesses whether the proportion 
of sectors relative to total core innovative sectors is important for country 
productivity. 
3.5.3.3  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3.2 lists summary statistics of the variables for . Looking at labour 
productivity variations of GVA per employee overall, the mean labour 
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productivity across the 32 economies for the period 2000-2012 is measured as 
49KEuros per employee. However, looking overall at the 32 countries over the 
period 2000-2012, there is also substantial variation with the lowest labour 
productivity of a country recording absolute value of 2.8 K Euros GVA per 
employee, possibly Romania and the highest labour productivity measuring 215 K 
Euros GVA per employee, possibly Luxembourg.  Sector turnover has a mean of 
63 billion Euros, with a maximum turnover of sector reaching 3.2 trillion Euros. 
Sector productivity, as proxied for this study and defined by turnover per 
employee has a mean of 300 K Euros per employee, varying between sectors 
from 103 K Euros per employee to 1, 822 K Euros per employee. These contrasts 
with Sector productivity figures of gross value added per employee with a mean 
of 75 K Euros per employee, varying between 27 K Euros per employee to 2197 K 
Euros per employee. It appears that sector productivity as defined by turnover 
per employee is approximately factor five higher than sector productivity for the 
mean as measured by gross value added. The turnover per standard deviation is 
somewhat higher than standard deviation of gross value added per employee, 
possibly indicating it is a less sensitive measure of sector productivity.  
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Std dev Min  Max Observations 
Country GVA/Empl 
(K Euros per 
Employee) 
overall  
between 
within 
 
49.3 
 
35.93 
0 
35.9 
 
2.81 
49.3 
2.81 
 
215.3 
49.3 
215.3 
 
N= 65520 
n = 312 
T = 210 
Gross cap form 
GCF/Empl (K Euros 
per Employee) 
overall 
between 
within 
 
6.88 
 
5.27 
0 
5.27 
 
.104 
6.9 
.104 
 
30.5 
6.9 
30.5 
 
N = 66768 
n = 312 
T-bar = 214 
Employment ratio 
(Empl) 
(Labour %age of 
Pop) 
overall 
between 
within 
 
53.25 
 
7.13 
7.1e-15 
7.1 
 
35.5 
53.25 
35.5 
 
72 
53.25 
72 
 
N= 66456 
n = 312 
T = 213 
Export (Export as 
%age of GDP) 
- overall 
- between 
- within 
 
51.9 
 
29.5 
0 
29.5 
 
9.8 
51.9 
9.8 
 
193.3 
51.9 
193.4 
 
N = 66768 
n = 312 
T-bar = 214 
Lending interest rate 
- overall 
- between 
- within 
 
8.6 
 
 
6.01 
0 
6.01 
 
.5 
8.6 
.5 
 
53.85 
8.6 
53.85 
 
N= 43056 
n = 312 
T = 138 
Deposit interest rate 
- overall 
- between 
- within 
 
4.8 
 
7.8 
0 
7.86 
 
.01 
4.89 
.01 
 
78.7 
4.89 
78.7 
 
N= 37440 
n = 312 
T = 120 
Turnover Billion 
Euros (of sectors) 
(CIS) 
- overall 
- between 
- within 
 
63 
 
184 
68 
170 
 
0 
0.9 
-273 
 
3,290 
340 
3,040 
 
N = 4360 
n = 60 
T-bar = 72.7 
Turnover/Empl (K 
Euros per Employee) 
(CIS) 
- overall 
- between 
- within 
 
300.8 
 
581.15 
272.06 
524.9 
 
1.8 
103.8 
-1512.2 
 
22505.7 
1822.3 
20984.3 
 
N = 4125 
n = 60 
T-bar = 68.75 
Sector GVA/Empl (K 
Euros per Employee) 
(Sbs) 
- overall 
- between 
- within 
 
75.9 
 
349.2 
283.5 
307.8 
 
-323.7 
27.9 
-2001.1 
 
18451.6 
2197.665 
16329.9 
 
N = 13788 
n = 171 
T-bar = 80.6 
 
Table 3.3 shows the correlation matrix values between country productivity, 
GVA per employee, and the independent variables. Country productivity has the 
highest correlation percentage with gross capital formation, as well as labour 
force participation rates, with negative correlations for the lending and interest 
rates. Export, the trade variable is also positive, while sector turnover and 
sector productivity showing also positive correlation. Interestingly sector 
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productivity, as measured by turnover per employee, or sector productivity as 
measured by GVA per employee, show a similar level of correlation.  
Table 3.3 Correlation Matrix values 
 
 Country 
GVA/Em
pl 
GCF/Em
pl 
Empl 
(%ag
e to 
Pop) 
Expor
t 
(%ag
e to 
GDP) 
Lendin
g rate 
Deposi
t 
rate 
Sector 
Turnove
r 
Sector 
Turnove
r per 
Empl 
Sector 
GVA/Em
pl 
Country 
GVA/Em
pl 
1         
GCF/Em
pl 
.96 1        
Empl 
(%age to 
Pop) 
.765 .831 1       
Export 
(%age to 
GDP) 
.187 .109 .305 1      
Lending 
rate 
-.507 -.39 -.44 -.705 1     
Deposit 
rate 
-.036 .06 .17 -.377 .60 1    
Sector 
Turnover  
.217 .17 .18 .097 -.19 -.25 1   
Sector 
Turnover 
per Empl 
.399 .367 .30 .15 -.25 -.05 .23 1  
11Sector 
GVA/Em
pl 
.390 .378 .305 .06 -.18 -.0006 .12 .58  
 
3.6 Empirical Results  
 Country level Productivity and Firm-size Regressions 
3.6.1.1 Firm turnover and Firm productivity: 
Using Fixed Effects Estimation (FEM) to minimize country specific effects, as 
well as controlling for country specific variables influencing productivity, the 
results for the regression for the 32 European economies between 2000-2012 are 
listed in Table 3.4.  The first two columns report regression results for equation 
(1). The first column lists the impact of firm-size turnover on country 
productivity at an aggregated level encompassing all core innovative sectors, 
with the second column listing results for firm-size turnover at the detailed sub-
sector aggregated level. The next two columns list the results of the regression 
for equation (2). The third column, showing the impact of firm-size turnover and 
firm-size productivity on country productivity at again the aggregated level 
encompasses all core innovative sectors, while the fourth column lists results for 
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regression conducted at a sub-aggregated sector level. Due to insufficient data 
for many sectors in 2002, it appears to drop out of the regressions, with year 
dummies reflecting shocks relative to reference dummy of year 2000. 
Besides the firm-size turnover and firm-size productivity indicators, the 
regression includes gross capital formation, employment as a percentage of 
population, export as a percentage of GDP, lending interest rate and deposit 
interest rates. All control variables are significant in column (1), with 
employment and lending rate showing a negative coefficient. A negative 
coefficient on employment seems to support findings of Gordon & Becker (2008) 
that employment may move in opposite directions to labour productivity. For 
the rest of the three columns, export is insignificant while employment and 
lending rate continue to show a negative coefficient. 
As this study assesses the importance of firm-size structures on country 
productivity through the channels of both firm revenue and firm productivity, 
initially regressions listed in Table 3.4 are only on firm turnover impact on 
country productivity followed by regressions of both firm-size turnover and firm-
size productivity on country productivity. The initial regression examining firm-
size turnover in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 is mainly to build an understanding 
of how firms impacts country productivity through channels of revenue, followed 
by regressions in column 3 and 4 in Table 3.4 of both channels of revenue and 
firm productivity influence on country productivity.   
Firm-size turnover is significant for all three firm-sizes in all columns 1, 3 & 4 at 
the one percent significance level. Firm-size productivity is however only 
significant for the large and small firm-size classification at the aggregated level 
in column 3, whereas at sub-aggregated level although small and large firm-size 
productivity is mostly found significant in column 4 , this varies across 
subsectors.  
The firm-size structures in column 1 of Table 3.4 are found to be all significant, 
while in column 2 all three firm-sizes are also found significant for most sub-
sectors, when assessed through impact of firm turnovers on country productivity. 
As explained earlier, the higher the value of the firm-size coefficient, the 
greater the impact of turnover of that size class on unit country productivity. At 
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first glance, the findings indicate that large firms appear to have a slope 
response roughly half to one-third the impact on country productivity compared 
to small or medium firms for a unit change in large firm turnover. Furthermore, 
as large firm share of value added was found to be 40 percent on average 
between 2008-2013 in the EU economy (ECB, 2013), it would appear that the net 
impact on the economy of large firms is indeed less than that of small or 
medium sized firms.  However, this needs to be assessed in context with the fact 
that only 0.2 percent of total firms were found to be large firms and they alone 
made up the 40 percent of value added share. Hence to perceive the actual 
impact of the creation or loss of a large firm in the economy, this slope response 
needs to be evaluated in context of the net impact of a firm. Given that this 
translates to a magnitude of value added per large firm in the EU economy as 
approximately 330 times higher than an SME firm, then the net impact per 
creation or loss of a large firm presence could in essence have a much larger 
significance on the economy at country level than is implied at first glance from 
the slope response. Based on this wider context of ECB survey that on average 
the large firms are about 0.2% of total firms, as the data itself does not yield the 
number of firms making up large firm turnover, it would appear turnover 
influence per large firm can be estimated by dividing slope by 0.2% - making the 
actual impact per large firm much larger indeed. Similarly, the effect per firm 
for smaller and medium sized (SME) firms requires the slope to be divided by 
their total percentage of 99.8%, which would make the slope of SME firms’ 
influence on country productivity much smaller, thus, establishing an 
understanding of the much larger scale of influence of large firm-size revenue on 
country productivity relative to both small and medium sized firms’ revenue. 
Furthermore, it is notable that R-square is reasonably high in the regression 
results, yet it is not necessarily a problem as similar high R2 are found in an 
OECD study of use of firm structures impact on country level job creation using 
country panel data (Criscuolo et al, 2014), indicating it is not unusual to find 
such R2 values in similar types of studies. Indeed, Goldberger attributes only a 
modest role to R-square in regressions indicating that ‘… a high R2 is not 
evidence in favour of a model and a low R2 is not evidence against it’ 
(Goldberger, 1978). In fact, Gujarati (2003) puts the emphasis on ensuring model 
is correctly specified, which has been attempted in this study.  
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Table 3.4 FEM of Firm-size Turnover and Firm-size productivity impact on Country 
Productivity 
  (1) – Eq (1) (2) – Eq (1) (3) – Eq (2) (4) – Eq (2) 
Aggregation 
Level of 
Turnover: 
Aggregated all 
core innovative 
sectors  
Sub- aggregated 
innovative sectors 
Aggregated all core 
innovative sectors 
Sub- aggregated 
innovative sectors 
 
Firm-size 
Turnover 
Firm-size 
Turnover Firm-size Turnover Firm-size Turnover 
Small Firms 6.98 e-8*** (9.66e-9)  
5.38e-8*** (1.18e-8) 5.4e-8*** (4.97e-9) 
Medium Firms 6.13e-8*** (8.79e-9)  
6.87e-8***(9.95e-9) 5.13e-8*** (4.62e-9) 
Large Firms 2.41e-8*** (3.68e-9)  
2.07e-8*** (4.02e-9) 1.27e-8*** (1.45e-9) 
 
 
Firm-size 
Turnover (sub-
sectors) 
Firm-size 
Productivity 
(Turnover per 
Emply) 
Firm-size Productivity 
(Turnover per Emply) 
(sub-sectors) 
Small Firms   .025** (.01)  
Medium Firms   .0009 (.004))  
Large Firms   .015**(.006)    
Inf & com  Inf & com 
Small Firms 
 
1.14e-6***(4.3e-7)  .057 ***(.019)  
Medium Firms 
 
1.95e-6***(7.5e-7)  .09*** (.035) 
Large Firms 
 
1.37e-6**(5.8e-7)  .07*** (.025)   
   
  
Fin & ins  Fin & ins 
Small Firms 
 
8.2e-8*(4,5e-8)  .001 (.002)  
Medium Firms 
 
8.3e-8**(4.05e-8)  .002(.003) 
Large Firms 
 
2.4e-8***(8.6e-9)  .006 (.003)   
   
 
 Arch & Engg  Arch & Engg 
Small Firms  1.4e-6(2.8e-6)  .05 (.06)  
Medium Firms  1.3e-6***(5.2e-7)  .053*** (.02) 
Large Firms  2.6e-6**(1.07e-6)  .017 (.03) 
     
 
 Elec & Gas  Elec & Gas 
Small Firms  -1.2e-6**(5.9e-7)  -.001 (.002) 
Medium Firms  -1.1e-7(3.2e-7)  -0.001(0.002) 
Large Firms  -2.5e-8(1,7e-7)  -.00007 (.003) 
 
    
 
 Manufacturing  Manufacturing 
Small Firms  8.3e-8***(2.1e-8)  .03 ***(.009) 
Medium Firms 
 
6.2e-8***(1.6e-8)  .008(.006) 
Large Firms 
 
1.5e-8***(4.4e-9)  .01**(.004) 
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  (1) – Eq (1) (2) – Eq (1) (3) – Eq (2) (4) – Eq (2) 
Aggregation 
Level of 
Turnover: 
Aggregated all 
core innovative 
sectors  
Sub- aggregated 
innovative sectors 
Aggregated all core 
innovative sectors 
Sub- aggregated 
innovative sectors 
  
Mining & 
Quarrying 
 Mining & Quarrying 
Small Firms  3.9e-7(9.6e-7)  .001(.002) 
Medium Firms  -9.7e-7***(3.5e-7)  -.00009(.001) 
Large Firms  -1.4e-7***(4.97e-8) 
 .0003(.002) 
     
  Water,Sew & 
Waste 
 Water,Sew & Waste 
Small Firms  3.7e-6**(1.9e-6)  .03***(.01) 
Medium Firms  3.1e-6***(1.06e-6)  .02**(.01) 
Large Firms  2.5e-6**(1.03e-6)  .03**(.013) 
     
  Tranpt, Stor & 
com 
 Tranpt, Stor & com 
Small Firms  3.2e-7***(9.3e-8)  .03***(.009) 
Medium Firms  3.4e-7***(1.1e-7)  .0003(.002) 
Large Firms  1.1e-7***(2.98e-8)  .04***(.01) 
     
  Wholesale Trade  Wholesale Trade 
Small Firms  1.53e-7***(6.07e-8) 
 .01(.008) 
Medium Firms  1.3e-7**(5.3e-8)  .01(.007) 
Large Firms  2.2e-7**(9.4e-8)  .017***(.006) 
     
Observations 192 33,455 186 2,046 
No. of groups 3 312 3 57 
Obs per group min = 64 min = 7 min = 62 min = 6 
 avg= 64 avg= 107.2 avg= 62.0 avg = 35.9 
 max= 64 max= 114 max= 62 max= 80 
R-sq within= 0.97 within= 0.9419 within= 0.9738 within = 0.9605 
 between between = .7147 between between = 0.6047 
 overall = 0.972 overall = 0.9418 overall = 0.972 overall= 0.9571 
Corr (u_i,Xb) -0.0084 -0.0196 -0.0353 -0.0232 
        
Note: The regression equation for column (1) and (2) is country productivity measured by 
GVA/Emplij= a1GCFij + a2EMPij + a3EXPij+ a4LENDij+ a5DEPij + b1SmallFirmij + b2MedFirmij + 
b3LgeFirmij + hyear dummies + e  (1). While for column (3) and (4) , the equation is country 
productivity as measured by GVA/Emplij= a1GCFij + a2EMPij + a3EXPij+ a4LENDij+ a5DEPij + 
b1SmallFirmij + b2MedFirmij + b3LgeFirmij + g1SmallFirmProdij + g2MedFirmProdij + g3LgeFirmProdij + 
hyear dummies + e  (2) Country Productivity is represented by gross value added at factor cost 
GVA/empl, derived from World Bank national accounts data. To control for country specific 
productivity influencing aspects, a range of variables are used: GCF is country level gross capital 
formation sourced from World bank national accounts; EMP is employment to population ratios, 
sourced from ILO; EXP is export as a %age to GDP sourced from World bank National Accounts; 
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and credit conditions is captured by lending rate sourced from IMF, while monetary policy is 
proxied by deposit rate derived from interest rate spread sourced from IMF. Small firms refer to 
firms with less than 49 employees, medium is less than 249 employees and large is 250+ 
employees – all as defined by OECD.  
*** indicates significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. 
To complete the analysis, regressions in column 3 and 4 assess influence of firm-
size structures on country productivity through both channels: firm turnover and 
firm productivity, column 3 is aggregated level and column 4 is at sub-
aggregated level.  In column 3, all three firm-size turnovers are indeed still 
found significant for their influence on country productivity, whereas only large 
and small firm-size productivity is found significant. This is to an extent also 
reflected at sub-aggregated level in column 4, where small and large firm-size 
productivity are predominantly found significant in sub-sectors, though this is 
not true for all subsectors. In some subsectors, all three firm-size productivities 
are significant, in one sub-aggregated sector only medium class is found 
significant, with more often the small and large firm size class productivity 
found significant for rest of sub-sectors. These slight variations suggest that 
different sectors have differences in how firm productivity impacts country 
productivity, although in general even at sub-aggregated level, it appears that 
enabling firms to grow to become medium and large firms would be beneficial 
for country productivity. As noted earlier, these results hold when controlling for 
country specific aspects influencing productivity including trade policy, credit 
conditions and monetary policy. 
The finding that predominantly small and large firm-size productivity have a 
significant influence on country productivity at both aggregated and sub-
aggregated level, is quite important. This echoes the findings of ECB, which 
analysed firm-size labour productivity in EU business economy between 2008-
2013 and assessed large firms to have 130% productivity compared to SMEs at 
87% (ECB, 2013, p. 42). It thus further corroborates the importance of large firm 
presence for building productivity levels in economies. The fact that both small 
and large firm productivity is significant underscores Schumpeters’ focus initially 
on small (Schumpeter, 1934) and then large firms (Schumpeter, 1942) as drivers 
of innovation. Indeed, it appears that the influence of structures on country 
productivity is quite intricate, with large and small firms seeming to exert their 
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influence in a dual capacity, through both turnover and productivity. However 
given the ECB (2013) analysis of large firm value-added on average 330 times 
SME’s and large firm productivity 130% relative to SME 87%, it appears important 
to ensure large firms continue to keep their share in the economic landscape for 
maintaining high country productivity. 
3.6.1.2 Firm turnover-share: 
To properly assess how the size (and hence the expansion or reduction) of 
particular firm-size structures impacts country productivity, firm-size classes’ 
turnover needs to be assessed as a proportion of total turnover.  To assess how 
the size of small, medium and large firm-size presence in an economy impacts 
country productivity, equation (1) is used to regress firm turnover shares on 
country productivity. As earlier, these are initially examined separately and then 
alongside firm-size productivity. The results are listed in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 FEM of Firm-size Turnover-share impact on Country Productivity 
 
 
Aggregation Level 
of Turnover: 
(1) – Eq (1) 
Aggregated all core 
innovative sectors  
Firm-size Turnover 
Small Firms 
Medium Firms 
Large Firms 
 
-15.8  (10.72) 
-34.07*** (12.1) 
18.07*** (6.995) 
Observations 192 
  
No. of groups 3 
Obs per group min = 64 
avg= 64 
max= 64 
R-sq within= 0.957 
between 
overall = 0.878 
Corr (u_i,Xb) -0.2877 
   
   
Note: The regression equation for column (1) is country productivity measured by GVA/Emplij= 
a1GCFij + a2EMPij + a3EXPij+ a4LENDij+ a5DEPij + b1SmallFirmij + b2MedFirmij + b3LgeFirmij + 
hyear dummies + e  . Country Productivity is represented by gross value added at factor cost 
GVA/empl, derived from World Bank national accounts data. To control for country specific 
productivity influencing aspects, a range of variables are used: GCF is country level gross capital 
formation sourced from World bank national accounts; EMP is employment to population ratios, 
sourced from ILO; EXP is export as a %age to GDP sourced from World bank National Accounts; 
and credit conditions is captured by lending rate sourced from IMF, while monetary policy is 
proxied by deposit rate derived from interest rate spread sourced from IMF. Small firms refer to 
firms with less than 49 employees, medium is less than 249 employees and large is 250+ 
employees – all as defined by OECD.  
*** indicates significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis  
The findings are quite suggestive.  At aggregated sector level as listed in column 
1, only large-sized firm intensity is found to be positive for country productivity, 
with both small and medium firm-intensities showing a negative contribution 
towards country productivity. This latter result is intriguing, as in terms of 
actual revenue, small and medium sized firms appear to have about 3 times 
larger impact per unit turnover compared to large firms, as listed in Table 3.4. 
Yet, perhaps as a consequence that net revenue generated by SMEs is so much 
lower on average than large firms (ECB, 2013), their expanded share in the total 
economy may not be that positive for country productivity. Perhaps that could 
serve to explain the negative impact on country productivity of SMEs, though it 
is to be noted that small sized firm intensity is found to be statistically 
insignificant. Essentially at aggregated levels, these findings reveal that the size 
of large firm presence in an economy, captured through its turnover share, is the 
most significant influence on country productivity. 
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In contrast, the size of the smaller and medium sized firms’ presence in an 
economy appears to have a negative influence on country productivity.  This 
finding, nonetheless has to kept in perspective, as SMEs are well recognized for 
their importance on the economy through channels of growth or employment. 
Indeed, Beck et al. (2005) found that SMEs play a positive role in delivering 
country growth. 
These two insights - positive impact of size of large firm presence in an economy 
on country productivity versus negative impact of size of smaller and medium 
sized firms on country productivity – seem to validate the proposed adapted 
Lewis model. This model essentially demonstrates that the size of the large firm 
presence in an economy is critical for its influence on country productivity and 
that reduction (or expansion) would lead to consequent fall (or rise) of country 
productivity. The findings from these regressions appears to support this 
proposed mechanism of working of the adapted Lewis model. 
In the same vein, further to firm-size structures, the question arises whether 
specific sectors or industries could be more relevant for country productivity. 
Furthermore, is it the size of sectors or rather sector turnover as determined by 
firm structures important, or is sector productivity of greater import for country 
productivity? To seek answers to this query, the next section examines the 
impact of specific sectors both for their turnover and productivity on country 
productivity. This not only could shed some light through isolating industries and 
their channel more pertinent to country productivity, it may also provide an 
alternative examination at sector level of the influence of firm-sizes structures 
on country productivity.  
 Country level Productivity and Sector Regressions 
3.6.2.1 Sector Size and Sector productivity: 
The FEM results of analysing specific sector sizes and sector productivities on 
country level productivity are listed Table 3.6. Column (1) lists the sectors 
turnover coefficients and column (2) lists the coefficient for sector 
productivities, measured by turnover per employee. As these variables use CIS 
data, the analysis is conducted over the time period of 2000-2012 for the 32 
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European economies. Sectors found significant for both aspects are highlighted 
in column 3.  
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Table 3.6 FEM of Sector turnover and Sector turnover/Employee on Country Productivity 
 
Sectors 
-1 -2 Sectors 
found 
significant 
for both 
aspects 
Sector turnover 
coefficients 
Sector Productivity 
(turnover/Empl) 
coefficients 
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance 8.9e-7
*** (2.07 e -
07) .0132
* (.006) Ö 
Advertising and market research 1.41e-6* (8e-07) .0089 (,0197)   
Air transport 3.9e-6
*** (6.86e-
07) (6th highest) -.0022 (.003)  
 
Architectural, engineering and technical activities 1.06e-6
*** (1.55e-
07) .004 (.014)  
 
Collection, purification and distribution of water 1.12e-6
** (5.04e-
07) .038
*** (.0117) Ö 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 6.89e-7
*** (9.47e-
08) .015
 (.0104)  Ö 
Electric power generation, transmission and distribution -6.6e-8(2.93e-07)  .001 (.004)  
 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1.51e-7(1.65e-07)  .0002 (.005)   
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas -7.16e-8 (5.82e-08)  .0032
*** (.0013)  
Financial service activities, except insurance and pensions 1.81e-7
*** (3.83e-
08) .006(.0045)   
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 1.10e-7
*** (2.69e-
08) .005
** (.002)  
Land transport and transport via pipelines 6.83e-8 (5.66e-08)  .078
*** (.016) (2nd highest)  
Manufacture of basic metals 4.74e-7
*** (1.41e-
07) .018
***   (.004)  
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products  1.96e-6
** (8.91e-
07) (10th highest) .017 (.014)  Ö 
Manufacture of beverages  1.34e-6 (1.15e-06)  .024
*** (.008)  
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 1.43e-7
*** (3.74e-
08) .019
*** (.005) Ö 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 2.53e-7
*** (8.72e-
08) .00003 (.001)  
 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products -6.15e-7
** (2.21e-
07) (negative)  .053
*** (.011) (8th highest) Ö 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 5.48e-7
 (3.52e-
07) .03
** (.013) Ö 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery 
2.88e-7*** (8.9e-
08) (7th highest) .06
*** (.011) (4th highest)  Ö 
Manufacture of food products 2.71e-7
*** (6.55e-
08) .003 (.011)   
Manufacture of furniture 4.01e-6
*** (1.62e-
06) (5th highest) .03 (.023)  
 
Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels 3.7e-7 (5.37e-07)  -.001 (.002)  
 
Manufacture of leather and related products 2.98e-6
*** (9.4e-
07) (8th highest) .064
*** (.008) (3rd highest) Ö 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3.54e-7
*** (7.66e-
08) .028
***  (.009) Ö 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2.08e-8 (4.26e-08)  .037
*** (.007)  
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 5.42e-7
*** (1.75e-
07) 
.050*** (.009) (10th 
highest) Ö 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 3.91e-7
*** (1.56e-
07) .037
*** (.007) Ö 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 5.49e-7
*** (1.84e-
07) .035
*** (.007) Ö 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 2.7e-7 (1.13e-07)  .059
*** (.01) (6th highest)  
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Sectors 
-1 -2 Sectors 
found 
significant 
for both 
aspects 
Sector turnover 
coefficients 
Sector Productivity 
(turnover/Empl) 
coefficients 
Manufacture of textiles 8.41e-7
** (3.78e-
07) .081
*** (.01) 
 
Manufacture of tobacco products 5.4e-7 (1.12e-06)  .006
*** (.002) Ö 
Manufacture of transport equipment 5.22e-8 (1.96e-07)  .018 (.021) 
 
Manufacture of wearing apparel 9.59e-7
*** (3.72e-
07) .053
*** (.006) 
 
Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork 7.21e-7
* (4.12e-
07) .055
*** (.011) Ö 
Mining of coal and lignite 2.56e-7 (5.34e-07)  .024
*** (.006) Ö 
Mining of metal ores 1.76e-6 (3.58e-06)  .009 (.019)  
 
Mining support services -1.38e-6
*** 
(4.41e-07) .023
*** (.005) 
 
Motion picture, video and television .000018
*** (3.9e-
06) -.023 (.015)  
Other manufacturing 5.05e-6
*** (8.82e-
07) (4th highest) -.019 (.024)  Ö 
Other mining and quarrying 2.97e-6
*** (9.49e-
07) (9th highest) .032
*** (.005) Ö 
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 2.36e-6 (2.01e-06)  .003 (.027)  
 
Postal and courier services 3.8e-6
** (1.73e-
06) (7th highest) -.005 (.011))  Ö 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 3.62e-7
** (1.72e-
07) .082
*** (.013) (Highest)  
 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 6.27e-7
*** (1.02e-
07) -.025
** (.011) Ö 
Programming and broadcasting activities .000012
** (4.93e-
06) (3rd highest) -.0003 (.03)  Ö 
Publishing activities 2.06e-6
* (1.25e-
06) .022 (.032)   
Remediation activities and waste management 
.000052*** 
(.000018) 
(Highest)  
-.018 (.02)   
Scientific Research and development 3.16e-6
*** (6.76e-
07) .05
*** (.013) (9th highest)  
Sewerage .000024
*** (6.4e-
06) (2nd highest) .003 (.022)  Ö 
Telecommunications 1.01e-6
** (4.91e-
07) -.002(.007)  
 
Transportation and Storage 3.12e-7
*** (8.31e-
08) .0007 (.024)   
Warehousing and support activities for transportation 9.61e-7
*** (2.17e-
07) -.01 (.013)  
 
Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities 2.07e-6
*** (4.15e-
07) .022
*** (.005)  
Water collection, treatment and supply 1.82e-6(2.08e-06) .033
*** (.009) Ö 
Water transport 1.94e-6
*** (3.86e-
07) .003 (.0058)  
 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles 1.62e-8
***  
(4.48e-09) .023
*** (.004)  
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycle 7.85e-8
***  
(1.40e-08) -.0004 (.005)  Ö 
No. of Obs 2,313   
No of groups 59   
Obs per group  Min = 8   
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Sectors 
-1 -2 Sectors 
found 
significant 
for both 
aspects 
Sector turnover 
coefficients 
Sector Productivity 
(turnover/Empl) 
coefficients 
Avg = 39.2  
Max = 61  
R-sq 
Within = 0.9743 
 
 
Between 0.8581  
Overall = 0.9711  
Corr (u_i, Xb)  -0.0442     
Note: The regression equation for this regression is yij= a1GCFij + a2EMPij + a3EXPij+ a4LENDij+ 
a5DEPij + b1SectorShareij + … + b60Sector Shareij + g1SectorProdij + … + g60SectorProdij + hyear 
dummies + e  (3) , with similar control variables as explained in previous regression 
*** indicates  significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. 
The coefficient or slope-response of sector turnover measures the ratio of 
country productivity to sector turnover or size of revenue, whilst the sector 
productivity coefficient or slope-response measures the ratio of country 
productivity to sector productivity.  For both coefficients, the higher the 
coefficient value, the greater is the impact on country productivity for a unit 
change of sector turnover (or sector productivity). 
As in the earlier regressions, alongside sector turnover and sector productivity 
indicators, the regression includes controlling variables of gross capital 
formation, employment as a percentage of population, export as a percentage of 
GDP, lending interest rate and deposit interest rates. All controlling variables 
are found significant in the regression, again with employment and lending rate 
having a negative coefficient for their impact on country productivity. A 
negative coefficient on employment yet again appears to supports propositions 
by Gordon & Becker (2008) that employment for advanced economies may move 
in opposite direction to labour productivity.  
The overview reveals that sectors differ in their contributions to country 
productivity. The sectors found significant for turnover listed in column (1) are 
not necessarily accompanied by significance of that sector’s turnover per 
employee listed in column (2). The sectors with both overlapping sector 
turnovers contribution, as well as sector productivity as measured by turnover 
per employee, are indicated in column (3). Observing the higher impact sectors, 
as suggested by the coefficient size, the difference in sector results suggests 
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that the channels through which sectors influence the economy may be 
different. The coefficient size can suggest the relative influence level of sectors 
in terms of either size of revenue or productivity on country productivity. 
Furthermore, it is to be noted, that no comparisons may be drawn from these 
results differentiating the impact of these two channels on country productivity.  
To evaluate net responses of sectors on country productivity, a similar caution 
has to be exercised by placing coefficients in context alongside the actual size of 
sectors. Sectors with smaller coefficients or slope responses may exert a larger 
influence on country productivity based on the net impact incorporating size and 
slope response. While the listing of the net impact of sizes of sectors for the 32 
EU economies for the time period 2000-2012 is outside the current scope of this 
study, it implies there should be caution in drawing conclusion based on 
coefficients alone. However, it is somewhat surprising that sectors, such as 
financial services, basic pharma, transport and storage and telecommunication 
sectors are not found significant for their productivities. In contrast, their sector 
turnovers are found significant. This implies they do not seem to exert influence 
on country productivity through firm productivities, rather only through their 
turnover. Given that all three firm-sizes are important for turnover, in particular 
with large firms found to contribute disproportionately higher magnitude of 
turnovers, this invites further research on the role of structures in these 
particular sectors.  
These sector results may be contrasted with slightly different FEM sector 
turnover and productivity results displayed in Table 3.7. Although this regression 
covers the 32 European economies again, it is regressed over a shorter time 
period, i.e. 2008-2012. Further, this regression measures sector productivity 
more accurately through the measure GVA/employee through use of SBS data. 
However, as SBS data is restricted to 2008-2012, the period of analysis is shorter 
and certain sectors are dropped as data not available in SBS data, the 
comparison should be viewed with caution.  Column (1) lists the sector turnover 
coefficients and column (2) the coefficients of sector productivity as measured 
more accurately by GVA per employee. Column (3) again indicates sectors found 
to be significant in both sector turnover and sector productivity to country 
productivity.  
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Table 3.7 FEM of Sector turnover and Sector GVA/emp on Country Productivity 
 
Sectors -1 
Sector turnover coefficients 
-2 
Sector Productivity 
(GVA/Empl) 
coefficients 
Sectors 
found 
significant 
for both 
aspects 
Advertising and market 
research 5.85e-7 (4.35e-07) 
.3604** (.08) (6th 
highest) 
 
Air transport 2.94e-6** (1.33e-06) (7th highest) .0856*** (.024) Ö 
Architectural, engineering 
and technical activities 1.25e-6*** (2.67e-07) .123*** (.033) Ö 
Computer programming, 
consultancy and related 
activities 
7.67e-7*** (1.96e-07) .1922*** (.034) Ö 
Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply  -4.05e-8 (7.37e-08)   .0579***  (.008) 
 
Extraction of crude 
petroleum and natural gas -8e-7 (5.44e-07) .0119***  (.002) 
 
Financial service activities, 
except insurance and 
pensions 
-6.23e-7*** (2.5e-07) .1389*** (.023) Ö 
Land transport and transport 
via pipelines 5.56e-7** (1.04e-07) .2661*** (.021) Ö 
Manufacture of basic metals 6.46e-8 (2.03e-07) .2025** (.064)  
Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products 1.86e-6 (1.4e-06) .1247** (.021) 
 
Manufacture of beverages -1.55e-7 (9.73e-07) .168*** (.019)  
Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products 2.16e-7*** (8.26e-08) .0854***  (.023) Ö 
Manufacture of coke and 
refined petroleum products -2.24e-7 (1.99e-07) .1109*** (.024) 
 
Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical 
products 
2.74e-7 (1.96e-07) .1866*** (.022)  
Manufacture of electrical 
equipment 2.01e-7 (2.93e-07) .285*** (.032) 
 
Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except 
machinery 
2.12e-7 (1.74e-07) .296*** (.043)  
Manufacture of food 
products 1.46e-7 (1.15e-07) .247*** (.070) 
 
Manufacture of furniture 1.7e-6 (1.4e-06) .3586*** (.057) (8th highest) 
 
Manufacture of leather and 
related products 2.4e-6 (1.99e-06) 
.3606*** (.035) (5th 
highest) 
 
Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c. 4.15e-7*** (1.4e-07) .147*** (.029) Ö  
Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
-9.45e-8 (6.87e-08) .335** (.033) (9th highest) 
 
Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products 4.08e-8 (3.34e-07) 
.3865*** (.043) (3rd 
highest) 
 
Manufacture of other 
transport equipment 3.53e-7 (4.83e-07) .2379*** (.041) 
 
Manufacture of paper and 
paper products 7.69e-7 (6.5e-07) .2886*** (.051) 
 
Manufacture of rubber and 
plastic products -4.63e-8 (2.08e-07) .323***  (.037) 
 
Manufacture of textiles 7.58e-7 (9.15e-07) .374*** (.038) (4th highest) 
 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 4.85e-7 (1.11e-06) .1530*** (.022) 
 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel 3.13e-7 (9.21e-07) 
.3602*** (.038) (7th 
highest) 
 
Manufacture of wood and 
products of wood and cork -3.95e-7 (6.66e-07) 
.4295*** (.0411) (2nd 
highest) 
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Sectors -1 
Sector turnover coefficients 
-2 
Sector Productivity 
(GVA/Empl) 
coefficients 
Sectors 
found 
significant 
for both 
aspects 
Mining of coal and lignite 8.05e-8 (8.41e-07) .134 (.083)  
Mining of metal ores -.0002 (.000017) -113 (.19)  
Mining support services 8.37e-7*** (2.55e-07) .0462***(.004) (4th highest) Ö 
Motion picture, video and 
television 
.000022*** (3.64e-06) (2nd 
highest) -.036 (.04) 
 
Other manufacturing 1.87e-6* (1.14e-06) (9th highest) .3198*** (.054) Ö 
Other mining and quarrying 2,41e-7 (2.97e-06) .194*** (.043)  
Other professional, scientific 
and technical activities 1.32e-6** (6.04e-07) .1947*** (.083) Ö 
Postal and courier services 1.86e-6** (5.49e-07) .509*** (.047) (highest) 
 
Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
1.66e-6** (6.01e-07) (10th 
highest) 
.333*** (.087) (10th 
highest) 
 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 6.40e-7*** (1.57e-07) .0498 (.043) 
 
Programming and 
broadcasting activities 
.000019*** (3.63e-06) (3rd 
highest) -.008 (.073) 
 
Publishing activities 1.4e-6 (1.21e-06) .187*** (.079)  
Remediation activities and 
waste management .000029** (.000015) (highest) .131* (.066) Ö 
Scientific Research and 
development 3.95e-6* (1.08e-06) (6th highest) .314*** (.044) Ö 
Sewerage .000015*** (4.87e-06) (4th highest) .219*** (.052) Ö 
Telecommunications 1.96e-7 (3.07e-07) .109** (.012)  
Transportation and Storage 2.7e-7*** (5.49e-08) .1695*** (.045) Ö 
Warehousing and support 
activities for transportation 6.64e-7*** (1.67e-07) .128*** (.038) Ö 
Waste collection, treatment 
and disposal activities 1.22e-6** (5.05e-07) .253*** (.043) Ö 
Water collection, treatment 
and supply 3.55e-7 (1.7e-06) .146*** (.019) 
 
Water transport 3.43e-6** (1.46e-06) (5th highest) .0383***  (.036) Ö 
Wholesale trade, except of 
motor vehicles and 
motorcycle 
4.65e-8** (1.78e-08) ..183*** (.051) Ö 
No. of Obs 1224   
No of groups 52   
Obs per group Min = 5   
 Avg = 23.5   
 Max = 38   
R-sq Within = 0.9874   
 Between 0.9152   
 Overall = 0.9832   
Corr (u_i, Xb) -0.0589   
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Given this caution in comparison, nonetheless the difference in the lists of 
sectors significant for turnover and productivity on country productivity is quite 
remarkable. Firstly, there is a substantial decrease in the listing of sectors 
significant for turnover, with previously significant sectors with high slope 
responses such as basic pharma, furniture, leather and other mining and 
quarrying found to be insignificant. Secondly, only five of the sectors within 
the10 highest slope responses for turnover overlap with the previous list. 
Thirdly, while sectors significant for productivity are not substantially reduced, 
again the listing of the sectors with the 10 highest slope responses is different. 
In this case,six of the sectors with the highest slope response for productivity 
overlap with the previous list. As the time period of analysis is shorter and 
certain observations may lose their weight, it is not a straightforward 
comparison. Notwithstanding this caution, it is to be noted that the list of 
sectors found significant for both their turnover and productivity on country 
productivity is diminished.  
These results have two pertinent implications. Critically, they suggest that 
turnover per employee, despite its similar correlation to country productivity, is 
limited in its role as proxy for sector productivity as measured by GVA per 
employee. Secondly, the results further substantiate the earlier conclusion that 
sectors differ in their channels of influence on country productivity. Size of 
revenue appears to remain a valid and separate channel of influence from sector 
productivity on country productivity.  
Essentially, both these detailed sector regressions deliver two findings. Firstly, 
these results indicate that not all core innovative sectors contribute equally to 
country productivity. Certain industries or sectors appear to have a greater 
influence on country productivity. Specifically, sectors appear to differ in the 
manner in which they exert an influence, either through productivity or size of 
revenue. There, however, appears to be a set of sectors that contributes both 
through aspects of sector turnover and productivity. To discern whether that 
makes those sectors of greater import for country productivity is beyond the 
current scope of this study.  Further research would be required to ascertain the 
actual size of turnovers of those sectors in economies and assess net impact 
through evaluating the slope responses in context with the size of sectors. 
Nonetheless, the key finding that sectors exert influence through dual channels 
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of size and productivity has critical implications, as it brings firm structures 
alongside factors of production into the core of the debate surrounding 
productivity. 
3.6.2.2 Sector Share and Sector productivity: 
Before concluding this section on sector analysis, we perform one more set of 
regressions: sector share and sector productivities on country level productivity. 
Sector share is defined by sector turnover as proportional to total core 
innovative sector turnover. Sector shares essentially neutralize the size of the 
sector or its weight in the economy, enable measuring the impact of a unit 
percentage change of the sector on country productivity, irrespective of size of 
the sector. This basically enables capturing which unit shifts of sectors, be they 
smaller or larger dominant sectors, influence country productivity. Identifying 
those unit shifts with the most significant impact on country productivity could 
enable policymakers to support those shifts, irrespective of its current size or 
firm structures. To recap, sector size assesses the original Lewis model 
proposition that shifting resources across sectors influences country productivity 
positively by expanding sector sizes of those sectors. In comparison, sector share 
examines which unit change of a sector, irrespective of its size, influences 
country productivity most significantly, in effect refining the Lewis model to 
examine whether changing weightage of sectors in an economy influences 
country prouctivity. Thus, using sector shares in the regression allows this study 
to examine whether a unit shift in the relative proportional size of sectors, as 
opposed to size itself as examined earlier, is of consequence to the labour 
productivity of an economy.  
The FEM results analyzing sector shares and sector productivities on country 
level productivity using equation (3), with similar controls as in previous 
regression are listed Table 3.8. Column (1) lists the sector share coefficients and 
column (2) lists the coefficient for sector productivities, measured by turnover 
per employee. As these variables again use CIS data, the analysis is conducted 
over the time period of 2000-2012 for the 32 European economies. Sectors found 
significant for both aspects are highlighted in column 3. 
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Table 3.8 FEM of Sector turnover and Sector turnover/Employee on Country Productivity 
 
Sectors -1 
Sector turnover coefficients 
-2 
Sector Productivity 
(turnover/Empl) 
coefficients 
Sectors 
found 
significant for 
both aspects 
Activities auxiliary to financial 
services and insurance 535.41** (213.76) .011
 (.009)  
Advertising and market research 336.9 (727.9)  .034** (.017)  
Air transport -134.95* (84.3) (negative) .0047 (.0035)  
Architectural, engineering and 
technical activities 197.69 (148.65) .05** (.011) 
 
Collection, purification and 
distribution of water -64.20 (262.3) .051*** 
 
Computer programming, consultancy 
and related activities 437.1***
 (165.8) -.0019 (.0207)    
Electric power generation, 
transmission and distribution -65.3 (55.82) .001 (.002) 
 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
-97.41*** (33.03) 
(negative) .005** (.003) Ö 
Extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas -1.92 (14.09) .002* (.001) 
 
Financial service activities, except 
insurance and pensions -29.65**
 (12.12) (negative) .019*** (.005) Ö 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension 
funding 97.27*** (35.9)
  .004 (.003)  
Land transport and transport via 
pipelines -75.16** (31.7) (negative) .098***
 (.013) Ö 
Manufacture of basic metals -91.05*** (35.49) (negative) .024***
 (.0045)   Ö 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical 
products 122.37 (209.6) .039***
 (.01)  
Manufacture of beverages 139.7 (283.07) .031*** (.009)   
Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 79.28* (41.95)
  .023*** (.005)  Ö 
Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products -57.8***
 (22.35) (negative) .0023** (.0009) Ö 
Manufacture of computer, electronic 
and optical products 
-107.03*** (34.37) 
(negative) .044*** (.009) Ö 
Manufacture of electrical equipment -189.89** (94.52) 
 
(negative) .035***
 (.01) Ö 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery -126.02**
 (53.5) (negative) .08*** (.01) 
Ö 
Manufacture of food products 94.4** (40.7)  .035*** (.008) Ö 
Manufacture of furniture -41.57 (173.72)  .073*** (.02) 
 
Manufacture of gas; distribution of 
gaseous fuels 34.8 (68.76) -.003 (.001) 
 
Manufacture of leather and related 
products 339.18
 (239.85) .07*** (.01) 
 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 14.32 (45.27) .051*** (.008)
  
 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 
-63.34*** (19.17) 
(negative) .047***
 (.007) Ö 
Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 
-401.76*** (111.5) 
(negative) .047*** (.009) 
Ö 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 91.61 (96.25) .044*** (.007) 
 
Manufacture of paper and paper 
products -53.67
 (61.75) .048*** (.007) 
 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products -114.79 (71.27) .067***
 (.01) 
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Sectors -1 
Sector turnover coefficients 
-2 
Sector Productivity 
(turnover/Empl) 
coefficients 
Sectors 
found 
significant for 
both aspects 
Manufacture of textiles -212.63 (148.3) .083*** (.011) 
 
Manufacture of tobacco products -592.78*** (204.83) (negative) .005*
 (.002) 
 
Ö 
Manufacture of transport equipment -40.62 (73.57) .039 (.034) 
 
Manufacture of wearing apparel -27.11 (89.31) .053*** (.007) 
 
Manufacture of wood and products 
of wood and cork 
-102.96*** (36.09) 
(negative) .064***
 (.01) 
 
Ö  
Mining of coal and lignite -80.50 (182.39) .023*** (.007) 
 
Mining of metal ores -558.92** (260.34) (negative) .021 (.015) 
 
Mining support services -388.67***
 (145.76) 
(negative) .02***
 (.004)  Ö  
Motion picture, video and television -672.69 (2329.04) .022 (.02) 
Other manufacturing 753.48 (566.7) -.012 (.026) 
 
Other mining and quarrying -558.82 (469.05) .035*** (.005) 
 
Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities 959.61 (1421.79) .015 (.028) 
 
Postal and courier services -675.002 (905.88) .02*** (.005) 
 
Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media -1.42 (120.59)
  .096*** (.013) 
 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 246.17*** (81.57) -.011
 (.013) 
 
Programming and broadcasting 
activities -609.9 
 (991.88) .06 (.019) 
 
Publishing activities -294.87 (335.63) .077*** (.0165) 
 
Remediation activities and waste 
management 3691.59
 (3385.2) .029*** (.018) 
 
Scientific Research and 
development 242.89 (446.82) .063***
 (.015) 
 
Sewerage 2642 (2389.3) .054*** (.019) 
 
Telecommunications -313.26*** (89.4) (negative) .006 (.005) 
 
Transportation and Storage 3-15.25 (25.02)  .077*** (.016) 
 
Warehousing and support activities 
for transportation -44.42
 (47.96) .039*** (.009) 
 
Waste collection, treatment and 
disposal activities 192.1
 (131.05) .028*** (.006) 
 
Water collection, treatment and 
supply 709.6 (692.7) .043*** (.0105) 
 
Water transport -113.86 (100.1) .023*** (.006) 
 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of 
motor vehicles 15.3 (11.69) .029*** (.006) 
 
Wholesale trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycle 1.79 (11.99)
  .018*** (.0042) 
 
    
No. of Obs 2,297   
No of groups 59   
Obs per group 
Min = 8 
  Avg = 38.9 
Max = 61 
R-sq 
Within = 0.9695 
  Between 0.6259 
Overall = 0.9573 
Corr (u_i, Xb) -0.1136     
*** indicates significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. 
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The coefficient or slope-response of sector share measures the unit change of 
each sector’s weight in the economy on country productivity. On the other hand, 
sector productivity coefficient is same as in earlier regressions and measures the 
slope-response of country productivity to sector productivity.  For both 
coefficients, the higher the coefficient value, the greater is the impact on 
country productivity for a unit change of sector turnover (or sector 
productivity). 
As stated earlier, in essence the sector share examines which unit change of a 
sector, irrespective of its size, influences country productivity most 
significantly, in effect refining the Lewis model to examine whether changing 
weightage of sectors in an economy influences country productivity. Comparing 
these results of sector share as listed in table 8 to sector turnover in table 6, 
certain differences are immediately apparent. Firstly, there are far fewer 
significant sectors impacting country productivity through the unit change in the 
size of their relative share, in contrast to a higher number of sectors that 
impacted country productivity directly through their turnover. Secondly, a large 
number of the significant sectors for their relative size appear to influence 
country productivity negatively. A few conclusions can perhaps be drawn from 
these results. Primarily, it appears that the relative unit change of sectors may 
be less important than actual size of turnover when examining influence on 
country productivity. This seems to draw attention to the makeup of sectors and 
the aspects driving the turnover of size of sectors, rather than an indiscriminate 
focus on relative size of sector in an economy. Factors such the type of 
innovation determining turnover in those sectors, firm-structures and 
consequent productivity may be of greater consequence than its relative size 
when examining influence of that sector on country productivity. Secondly, and 
more puzzling, is the negative impact of quite a large number of unit change of 
relative sector shares on country productivity. The causes for this result would 
appear to be outside the current realms of this study, but could indicate that 
either dominance or the opposite, too small a relative size of sectors could 
detract from country productivity. Both of these results are intriguing and would 
benefit from more detailed examination, specifically a study to isolate why and 
how relative size of sectors, be it dominance or smallness, can appear to have a 
negative impact on country productivity. In essence though the conclusion 
Chapter 3  116 
remains that sectors appear to influence country productivity both through 
sector productivity and sector turnover, in this case through their relative share 
in sector turnover. 
Overall, these findings provide not only an alternative assessment of the impact 
of firm-size structures on productivity; they shed a light on the firm-size 
structures relevant to sectors, depending upon the channel through which they 
influence country productivity. Sectors with only productivity contributions 
would appear to benefit from small and large firm structures. On the other 
hand, sector with turnover contributions would appear to require all three firm-
size structures, specifically large-firm structures. Sectors contributions through 
relative share in turnover appear to be more complex and would require 
assessment beyond the scope of this study, specifically examination of relative 
sector dominance or weakness in an economy. As this study is restricted by data 
availability and unable to regress firm-size structures at detailed sector level, 
further analysis would be required to assess these potential implications. 
These results need to be qualified in their findings on a few aspects. Firstly, 
although it uses panel data, the time period is essentially short. It is biannual 
data over a period of 12 years (2000-2012) and thus limited in its depth of study. 
Secondly, although the study controls for country-specific aspects that influence 
productivity, it does not provide the depth of an individual country analysis 
conducted over a longer period of time. Thirdly, by using Eurostat firm data on 
turnover measured on a bi-annual basis, it captures the entries and exits of firms 
providing a dynamic picture of the firm presence in sectors. Fourthly, though the 
study uses some hard data from World Bank Database (WDI), the study draws 
heavily from processing raw data obtained from innovation and business surveys 
collected by Eurostat. This has its limitations in the extent and uniformity of 
coverage of all sectors, specifically internationally across all 32 economies and 
thus the results may suffer from similar limitations. Shortage of data availability 
meant that not all variables could be weighted to altogether avoid this disparity. 
Lastly, without an endogenity regression to check reverse causality, these results 
only confirm that firm-structures are a characteristic of economies with high 
productivity levels, not necessarily a determinant of it.  
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3.7 Conclusion  
This study proposed an adapted Lewis model to relate how particular firm-size 
classes presence in an economy may influence country labour productivity. In 
particular, it proposed that size of large firm-size presence in an economy, is 
critical to country productivity and the consequent reduction (expansion) could 
lead to a fall(rise) of country productivity. 
To assess this relationship, the study examined the influence of firm-size 
structures on country labour productivities through two channels: firm turnover 
share and firm productivities. Using FEM panel data was examined for 32 
European economies over a time period of 2000-2012, across core innovative 
structures encompassing both manufacturing and service sectors. Whereas Fixed 
Effects Methods (FEM) was used to minimize sector or country specific effects, 
an additional array of country-level variables was also used to control for 
country-specific aspects that could influence country labour productivity.  
The regressions assessed whether firm structures are indeed significant for a 
country’s labour productivity economy as proposed in the Lewis adapted model, 
and if so, which firm-size structures? It also examined whether large or small 
firm-size structures are relevant for country level productivity, irrespective of 
their firm productivities. These firm-size structures were assessed for their 
influence both through turnover share impact on country labour productivity. 
The findings reveal that the size of large firm presence in an economy, captured 
through its turnover share and firm productivity, is the most significant influence 
on country productivity. In contrast, the turnover share of the smaller and 
medium sized firms’ presence in an economy appears to have a negative 
influence on country productivity, although small firm productivity is found 
significant and positive for country productivity.   Thus although SMEs are well 
recognized in previous research for their importance on the economy through 
channels of growth or employment, in terms of country productivity it appears 
overall that large firms are of most importance in an economic landscape.  
The findings are very suggestive. Substantially they offer these two insights, i.e. 
that positive impact of size of large firm presence in an economy on country 
productivity versus negative impact of size of smaller and medium sized firms on 
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country productivity seem to validate the proposed adapted Lewis model. This 
model centrally proposes that the size of the large firm presence in an economy 
is critical for its influence on country productivity and that reduction (or 
expansion) would lead to consequent fall (or rise) of country productivity. The 
findings from these regressions appear to support the mechanism of influence of 
firms structures on country labour productivity, as proposed in the adapted 
Lewis Model. 
Although these insights highlight the importance of large firms’ influence on 
country productivity, however, the means through which large firms may exert 
their influence on productivity is outside the scope of this study. Previous 
theoretical insights underscore their financial ability to undertake fixed R&D 
costs over a longer period of time, extensive skill training feeding into sector as 
a whole, ability to withstand longer product development times and access to 
funds for capital investment (Pack &Westphal, 1986; Achs & Audretsch, 1988; 
Brown et al., 1990).   
This mechanism of the adapted Lewis model on the role of size of large firm 
presence in an economy on country productivity, may deliver some insights on 
the productivity conundrum currently present in the UK. Specifically, it draws 
the spotlight to the UK’s reducing intensity of large firm presence. According to 
Van Ark and Monnikhof, the UK had a comparable large firm intensity to 
Germany in the 60’s, but this had reached a lower intensity comparable to 
France in the late 80’s (Van Ark & Monnikhof, 1996). Though this study’s data 
does not contain direct intensity data, using firm turnover share to capture firm 
intensity, the UK in 2012 appears to have roughly a third the level of large to 
small firm intensity compared to Germany and about 60 percent of that in 
France. These figures are only approximations and not accurate enough to lead 
to firm conclusions. Nonetheless, they invite future UK firm-level research to 
examine carefully how changes in the varied firm size structures in UK over the 
decades may have impacted country labour productivity. Specifically, detailed 
research examining the means through which this relationship exerts an 
influence on country labour productivity. 
Furthermore, this study assessed whether sector size and not only sector 
productivity was of relevance in determining country labour productivity. The 
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analysis revealed size indeed to be important for some sectors, whilst sector 
productivity appeared significant for other, with a few sectors retaining both 
channels of influence. This was also an interesting result, from two perspectives. 
Firstly, if sector size is of import, as indicated, as well as sector productivity, 
then future policy making on productivity could best be served by looking at 
both these aspects. Secondly, this finding has possible implications for firm-
structures most suited to sectors depending upon their mode of influence. 
Though needing further corroborations, the implication is that sectors 
influencing through size would benefit most from presence of turnover 
contributions of all three firm-size structures. In contrast, sectors contributing 
through sector productivity may benefit from a higher intensity of large firms in 
that sector. These implications were outside the scope of the current study, due 
to limitations of firm-structure classification at detailed sector level data. 
Should that data become available in the future, these implications could be 
corroborated allowing future policy support of firm-structures to be shaped in 
accordance to mode of influence of sectors.  
Lastly, this study also examined whether sector share, the proportion of a 
sectors turnover share to total core innovative sectors turnover, as distinguished 
from sheer size of sector also exerts an influence on country productivity. In 
essence, sector share examines which unit change of a sector, irrespective of its 
size, influences country productivity most significantly, in effect refining the 
Lewis model to examine whether changing weightage of sectors in an economy 
influences country productivity.  The results indicate that unit change of some 
sectors is significant for country productivity, although comparatively fewer 
sectors than those found significant for size of turnover. It would appear that 
focussing on size of sectors, as proposed in Lewis model is relatively of greater 
importance than consideration of the change of relative weight of a sector in the 
economy. Nonetheless, what is puzzling is that of those sectors found significant 
in terms of share, quite a large number appeared to have a negative influence 
on country productivity. Although isolating the cause for this result is outside the 
scope of the study, this could be indicative of a negative impact through either 
dominance or conversely weakness of sectors proportional to the total 
innovative sectors. Further in-depth research would be needed to assess whether 
this is or is not an issue for country productivity.
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Chapter 4 Why does the UK not have its own 
Google, let alone a new ARM - does firm 
independence matter?’   
An assessment of how firm independence and tax, 
financing and regulatory policy incentives are 
impacting firm growth in UK 
4.1 Abstract  
The UK is considered globally successful at generating innovative start-ups. Yet, 
despite this abundance of innovative start-ups, why has not even a single one of 
them scaled up and gone on to become at least one of the new future Googles of 
UK or a new ARM? That is the key question.  
This chapter examines whether firm independence, previously not considered 
critical for firm growth, may indeed be an important criterion to enable scale up 
of innovative firms into successful frontier large firms. To shed light on the role 
of independence, the study examines the drivers of firm growth and the policy 
tools used to support tax & financing incentives along with M&A activity drive 
firm growth – with innovative independent firms separately assessed from overall 
innovative firms. Using firm level dataset for all UK sectors between 2006-2016, 
policy tax and financing tools supporting start-up, growth and merger activity 
are examined alongside growth theory drivers, globalization and monetary 
lending policy. The empirical analysis reveals that independent firms reap much 
higher growth, with age of independence delivering a bonus growth-dividend. 
Firm independence appears to be one of the most vital aspects for growth – an 
aspect neither enhanced nor specifically protected in current policy.   
Other findings reveal that lower corporate tax rates promote innovative firms, 
though general firms can grow despite increased rates. Access to seed and 
venture capital was found positive both general and innovative firm growth, 
specially SMEs. The verdict on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) was slightly 
mixed, with M&As positive for general and innovative firms, though they do no 
drive innovative SMEs – only large innovative firms and general SMEs.  
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4.2 Introduction 
Why has Europe not given birth to a significant tech company in the past 30 
years, except ARM?, to paraphrase Michael Moritz’s query (Moritz, 2016). 
Scrutinizing the 40 most valuable tech companies in Europe formed over the last 
25 years, Moritz observed that ARM Holdings, a UK firm, was the sole European 
entrant. Although Moritz’s observations were perhaps directed towards a 
defence of American tech companies, the question remains valid. Ironically, 
however, a few months after Moritz’s question, the UK high tech firm ARM was 
taken over by a Japanese firm (BBC News, 2016). Even though ARM may have 
been the only British tech company in the top 40 by valuation created over the 
last few decades, it was not the only tech company sold to foreign ownership. In 
fact, there have been other potentially significant UK frontier technology 
companies created across that same period that were sold before they appeared 
to reach full potential - DeepMind, CSR, Swiftkey or Skyscanner, to name but a 
few.  
It was however the sale of ARM holdings that provoked some outcries directed at 
the incoming prime minister, Theresa May, to reassess this potential takeover 
(Guardian, 2106), which also led to talks on revival of industrial policy with 
specific new national interest tests to vet foreign takeovers of UK firms 
(Financial Times, 2016). National interest tests to vet takeovers would not be 
unique to UK. Countries such as US have their own foreign takeover vetting 
system in the form of the Committee on Foreign Investment CFIUS (Jackson, 
2016), as does Australia with its Foreign Investment review board (Ghori, 2015), 
amongst some other advanced nation states. As a point of fact, public interest 
tests were part of UK law earlier, until they were removed by the Enterprise Act 
2002 (Elks, 2014).  Indeed, this issue of public interest tests was also raised 
earlier in the UK during a potential foreign takeover bid by Pfizer for UK’s 
second largest pharmaceutical firm AstraZeneca (Miliband, 2014). This issue was 
raised yet again by Unilever in its fight to stay independent against a hostile bid 
from Kraft-Heinz (FT, 2017). Unilever’s urgings to reshape the UK takeover code, 
which in contrast to that of the Netherlands leaves firms far more exposed, were 
met by the government “with official shrugs” (FT, 2107). It appears that 
Unilever’s recent decision to rebase its headquarters to Netherlands could be 
partly rooted in the greater protection afforded to firms in Netherlands from 
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hostile takeovers (FT, 2018), bringing the issue of firm independence and 
mergers and takeovers to the fore. As GKN, another well-established aerospace 
UK firm, currently strives to defend itself against a hostile takeover  (FT, 2018), 
it appears that the issue of independence cannot be ignored. Is independence 
then indeed critical to the growth of the firm and could it be one element in a 
complex puzzle to explain why UK has only managed to create one significant 
tech firm by market valuation over the last few decades. What has prevented UK 
from creating the global giants of today – and does independence matter? 
It is this very question that this study aims to shed light upon. Answering it 
requires understanding firm growth at both ends of the spectrum. At one end, 
understanding the key growth drivers for small and medium sized firms (SMEs) 
and at the other end, understanding the key drivers for continued growth or 
rejuvenation of large UK firms. To put the importance of addressing both ends of 
this spectrum into perspective, it is perhaps best to understand the current 
position of both SMEs and large firms in the UK economy. 
UK has quite an impressive position for generating innovative start-ups in the 
world. While the UK ranks 9th in the world on Global entrepreneurship index 
(GEI) for quality innovative start-ups in 2016, it was placed 4th in 2015 (GEDI , 
2016). On the other hand, it ranks quite a bit lower, in fact 26th, on the GEI’s 
finer scale of scale-up quality of start-ups. This scale, which measures quality of 
growth for start-ups/SMEs over 5 years, appears to capture a weakness in UK’s 
scaling up ability of SMEs (ibid). This compares to US position as 1st in this 
measure, with France and Germany in 12th and 15th position respectively. An 
OECD analysis assessing start-up survival rates across 18 OECD countries, also 
found that only 5% of UK’s micro firms still grew after 3 years (Criscuolo, Gal, & 
Menon, 2014). This scaling up weakness of UK start-ups is coupled with large 
firms diminishing on the UK economy landscape. Appraising large firm share in 
the UK’s economy, OECD analysis revealed a decreasing trend in large firm share 
starting from the 1970’s, which proceeded into the 1990’s (Van Ark & Monnikhof, 
1996). This trend was observed to continue by UK’s business, innovation and 
skills (BIS) department reporting that large firm share in UK economy was 8 
percent lower in 2013 compared to 2000 levels (BIS, 2013). However, the latest 
BIS figures appear to show a reversal of this trend, with current large firm share 
in economy in 2016 having risen back to 2000 levels of 0.13% share of large firm 
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in economy (BEIS, 2016). Albeit positive that it has recovered to 2000 levels, it is 
perhaps important to realize that UK ‘s current large firm share of 0.13% 
compares to US large firm share of 0.81% in 2011 (SBA , 2016). That comparison 
reveals UK to have quite a gap, possibly as large as a factor 6-7 lower than the 
US. Given that current OECD analysis suggests US large firm share has continued 
to grow in 2016 (OECD, 2016), this gap could conceivably grow larger. To 
understand why this may matter – either a weakness in scaling up SMEs or a 
diminishing large firm share, it is perhaps best to understand how the landscape 
of firm-sizes in an economy relates to the two central pillars of UK’s growth: 
productivity and innovation.  
One of the challenges facing UK economy since the 1970’s has been its lower 
productivity levels amongst the G-7, which have lagged behind those of France, 
Germany and US (Harari, Number 06492, 2016). This could be viewed as 
detrimental in the long run, as economic development models appear to stress 
that not capital, but rather productivity is the long run driver of growth (Lewis 
A. , 1954)  (Gollin, 2014).  Gollin indeed emphasizes the central role of resource 
allocation in generating productivity (Gollin, 2014). Around a similar period as 
Lewis, analysing growth models, Solow concluded that innovation was the most 
important factor by far in explaining long term economic growth (Solow, 1956). 
As productivity and innovation are viewed as complementary to each other, 
though often accompanied by a lag (Tunzelmann G. V., 2000), these theories and 
understanding of growth drivers are not contradictory. Previous research has 
shown that firm-sizes can play a critical role in shaping both innovation and 
productivity, the two driving pillars of growth in the long run. 
The earliest research on firm size impact on innovation can be traced to an 
Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who viewed firm size as one of the key 
elements influencing both these aspects (Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1942). 
Schumpeter questioned which firm size was critical in driving innovation, 
initially emphasizing small firms (1934) and later advocating the critical role of 
large firms (1942). Subsequent research has shown that firm sizes play a complex 
role in innovation (Bhattacharya & Bloch, 2004; Achs & Audretsch, 1988). 
Although in terms of productivity, large firms were generally found to have 
higher productivity (Van Ark & Monnikhof, 1996; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; ECB, 
2013), small firms have been found to be more productive in certain sectors 
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(Snodgrass & Biggs, 1996). A recent study examining firm-size share impact on an 
economy also found that large firm presence was significant in shaping country 
level labour productivity (Bradley, 2016). Although not conclusive, evidence does 
appear to support the importance of large firm share in an economy to drive 
productivity, with the presence of both small and medium sized firms important 
for employment and growth (Beck et al., 2005; World Bank, 2004; World Bank, 
2002). Given this importance of firm-sizes to both innovation and productivity, 
but specifically large firm size impact on productivity - the query as to why UK 
has not been able to grow global innovative titans in frontier technology sectors, 
be it creative, science or digital sectors acquires even greater significance.  
Thus, this study seeks to understand why UK has not produced the new 
innovative giants of tomorrow through analysing whether firm independence 
matters - and how this fits in alongside tax & financing incentives and M&A 
activity: policy tools which drive firm growth. The aim here is to determine how 
independence or policy tools influence firm growth and to distinguish 
insufficiencies in incentives or regulation currently, which may partially explain 
UK’s lack of frontier firm giants. Specifically, the idea is to distinguish factors 
having an impact on innovative firms, although overall firms are analysed as a 
starting point. The question, put in other words, is whether these various policy 
initiatives over the last few decades in UK could have inadvertently shaped the 
current UK economy – perhaps boosting the creation of innovative start-ups like 
DeepMind (Shead, 2016), but not sufficient to support firms to last the distance 
to scale up to create the Googles itself? Furthermore, as the sale of potential 
successful innovative UK firms before reaching their potential, which is a part of 
M&A activity, appeared to be of relevance to this issue - it became important to 
identify the impact of this firm characteristic – independence on firm growth. To 
identify the influence of independence, the growth reaped from basic growth 
drivers was examined relative to overall firms. As research is currently largely 
absent on the influence of firm independence on firm growth, this appeared to 
be an important void for this study to fill. Hence, the main contribution of this 
study is to understand the influence of independence on firm growth – which 
allows the value of the various growth policy tools to be put in context and thus 
to enable re-assessment of insufficiencies or shortcomings in the current policy 
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toolkit, something which is important as independence is currently neither 
protected nor specifically supported in growth policy.  
In order to understand this influence of policies and independence on firm 
growth, this study measures firm growth through revenue growth, one of the 
OECD defined measures of firm growth (OECD,2005). Previous studies have 
scrutinized some of the tax and financing policy tools impact on other firm 
aspects (Devereux & Maffini, 2006; Gemmel et al., 2010; Achleitner et al., 2012; 
Wright et al.,2009), but not revenue growth. However, as this study seeks to 
understand what enables the growth of firms to become the innovative giants of 
tomorrow, the various policy tools are examined for their impact on firm 
revenue growth.  
To enable putting the value of independence on firm growth in context with 
other growth policy tools, it is first required to measure the influence of these 
policy tools on firm growth. The first tax policy tool or incentive considered for 
its influence on firm growth is corporate tax. Analysing its influence on firm 
growth seems particularly relevant, as UK has viewed it as one of the key policy 
measures to promote firm growth. So much so, that UK has been near the 
forefront in lowering corporate tax in G7 countries over the last decade, 
although it is not the only OECD country vying to lower this tax (Devereux & 
Vella, 2014). As a point of fact, UK’s corporate tax at 29% in 2009 was the 
second lowest statutory rate amongst the G7 (Griffeth & Miller, 2010), and the 
UK rate became the lowest in G7 when it was lowered to 26% by 2012 (Bilicka & 
Devereux, 2012). As corporate tax has been considered an important policy tool, 
it has drawn valuable previous research, yet this previous research seems not to 
have focussed on firm revenue growth.  Conducting an extensive review, 
Devereux & Maffini classify the focus of various corporate tax studies on 
assessing the impact on location of capital, firm production and firm profits 
(Devereux & Maffini, 2006). Furthermore, corporate tax has been examined for 
its influence on investment, productivity and innovation as measured by total 
factor productivity (TFP) (Vartia, 2008; Grubert & Mutti, 2000; Gemmel et al., 
2010; Devereux et al., 2016). This study, in contrast, seeks to understand if this 
policy measure of lowering corporate tax, actually influences the growth of 
firms. In particular, it will explore whether lowering of corporate tax will 
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promote growth of the innovative firms, which could become the frontier giants 
of tomorrow. 
Another area of tax, also missing previous examination for its impact on firm 
growth, are UK’s competitive tax relief incentives around venture capital 
investment and capital gains tax. In fact, UK has maintained the lowest capital 
gains tax rate amongst G7 economies since 2000, as an incentive to promote 
venture capital investment (Achleitner et al., 2012). This low capital gains tax 
exists alongside financing incentives to support innovative start-ups, such as the 
enterprise investment scheme (EIS) which UK has operated since 1994 (OECD, 
2015) or the Venture Capital Trust Scheme (VCT) offering relief to indirect 
investments into smaller businesses operational since 1995 (ibid), These have 
been further enhanced through the introduction in 2012 of a Seed Enterprise 
Investment Scheme (SEIS) (OECD, 2015). Nonetheless, despite all these 
initiatives UK venture capital ratio relative to GDP is still about a factor 7~8 
lower than US (OECD, 2016). Wright et al, reviewing extensive studies on private 
equity, show that these venture capital studies cover a wide area of impact 
extending from profitability, productivity, employment and wage growth to 
investment strategies (Wright et al., 2009). Surprisingly, these previous studies 
have not assessed venture capital’s impact on firm revenue growth, despite the 
fact that these policy initiatives appear to be aimed at firm growth, involving 
both the scaling up of start-up firms, as well as rejuvenation or growth of 
medium and large firms. Yet, the assessment of venture capital on firm revenue 
growth seems essential, in order to judge the importance of these venture 
capital-enhancing policies in shaping the innovative firm landscape of the 
economy. Thus, this study aims to fill this gap by examining how venture capital 
shapes firm growth, as well as enable placing these policy tools in context with 
other policy tools and firm characteristics for their importance in creating the 
innovative giants of tomorrow. 
The analysis of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) influenced both by policy 
regulation and policy incentives, on firm growth appears also essential. The 
impact of private equity is not only through venture capital for start-ups, but it 
appears to have a potential impact on medium and large firm growth through 
mergers and acquisitions as a means of accessing new knowledge (Purunam & 
Kannan, 2005). In fact, business historians assign an important role to mergers 
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and acquisitions in creating British conglomerates post-Second World War period 
(Toms & Wright, 2002). In contrast, Chandler, another business historian, views 
mergers and acquisitions as having only a subsidiary role in large firm growth, 
emphasizing instead the role of organic growth (Chandler A. , Scale and Scope, 
1990). Not denying acquisitions could serve as a possible means for accessing 
new technologies, Chandler cautions that historically they also appear to have 
destroyed value across a range of industries (Chandler A. , 1994). As Wright et 
al. (2009) pointed out in their review, private equity in the form of mergers and 
acquisitions has been empirically analysed for its impact on employment, wages, 
profitability and innovation. This debate raging within business history upon the 
role of mergers and acquisitions impact on medium and large firm growth 
underscores the importance of assessing the impact of this activity on firm 
revenue growth in econometric analysis. More importantly, as mergers and 
acquisition form the channel through which firms not only grow but also lose 
independence, its impact on firm growth needs to be evaluated. If the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions activity on firm growth outweighs the gains of growth 
from firm independence, then firm independence should not be an issue of 
consideration for policy regulation. If, however, firm independence surpasses 
impact of other policy tools in influence, then some form of policy regulation to 
support independence may become advisable. 
Analysis of these policy regulations and tools on firm growth appears essential, 
as successive UK governments have launched a multitude of policy incentives 
over the last few decades, aimed at increasing firm growth. Peculiarly, analysis 
of these incentives on firm revenue growth itself has been absent. Notably, 
despite these globally competitive tax and financing incentives, firms have not 
grown to become the frontier UK giants of tomorrow. More so, regulation 
hindering mergers and acquisitions was reduced since the removal of public 
interest tests in Enterprise act 2002, also aimed at boosting firm growth. Yet 
despite these myriads of initiatives, its puzzling that UK has not created even 
one of the frontier global giants of tomorrow. This study seeks to shed light on 
this puzzle by assessing the impact of these policy initiatives on firm growth. 
Have these policy tools been perchance been insufficient, or could policy 
regulation have missed protecting/enhancing firm independence, if that is an 
important firm characteristic for growth itself? This analysis undertakes to put 
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all these policy tools in perspective, alongside the firm characteristic of 
independence – to try to determine, whether or which aspect is most critical for 
firm growth.  
The outcome was quite unexpected. Contrary to expectations, the impact of 
independence on growth seems to outweigh other influences, though policy tools 
still provided valuable aid to growth. Independence, not only allows innovative 
firms to reap much greater response from basic growth drivers, there also 
appears to be a bonus independence growth dividend based solely on the years 
that a firm can manage to stay independent. This independence growth dividend 
appears to deliver a quite astonishing 15% growth for each year of 
independence, albeit at 15% significance. It appears that independence has a 
large impact on firm growth and the fact that currently there is no policy tool in 
place either to support or protect it, may be one of the reasons that UK’s 
innovative firms struggle to scale up into the future frontier UK giants of 
tomorrow.   
Notwithstanding the importance of firm independence as a vital influence on 
growth, policy tools remain a critical component to aid growth. However, even 
the analysis of policy tools led to some surprising outcomes. It appears, that 
general (innovative and non-innovative) firms can grow despite increases in 
corporate tax rates, contrary to expectations. However, the policy of lowering 
corporate tax rates does appear to benefit innovative firms, where lowered 
corporate tax rates are positive for firm growth. Albeit, the magnitude of impact 
on firm growth is relatively small and as such, this context should be kept in 
mind when weighing the cost of such a policy tool.  Thus, it would appear that a 
blanket policy on corporate tax rate reduction may not be the best choice, 
rather a tailored policy approach adapted to type, and size of firms seems 
advisable, weighing the benefits of this policy carefully against the costs.  In 
contrast, access to seed and venture capital does appear to be an important 
source of finance to support long-term growth for both general and innovative 
small and medium (SME) sized firms, albeit yet again the magnitude is relatively 
small. It would seem that policy tools enhancing seed and venture capital 
promote across the board, both general and innovative SME firm growth. Indeed, 
it seems these policy tools need further enhancing, as UK has approximately a 
factor 7~8 lower availability of venture capital ratio to GDP relative to US 
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(OECD, 2016). The verdict on mergers and acquisitions was slightly mixed. 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were analysed through both management buy-
outs (MBO’s) and buy-ins (MBIs) impact on firm growth. The findings suggest that 
M&As are positive and significant, with a similar impact for both general and 
innovative firms. Yet again to put the impact in context, it is not large 
relatively, as MBO’s which include external hostile/consensual takeovers as well 
as management buyouts, have about half the impact of venture capital. In 
contrast MBIs seems to have a much higher impact than venture capital, though 
MBI’s make up a very small fraction of M&A activity (Wright & Wilson, 2013). 
More so, detailed analysis revealed that M&As do not drive firm growth for 
innovative SME’s, only large innovative firms and general SME’s. It would appear 
that M&A play a differing role in promoting growth for different firms and thus 
remain an important tool of choice for creating a diverse economy– it appears 
not to be the option for delivering growth for innovative SME firms.  
These results show the importance of maintaining a diverse policy tool kit for 
growth, yet at the same time underscore the importance of bringing in some 
policy tools to either support or protect firm independence, given its reasonably 
large impact on firm growth. Especially, as policy is currently absent in this 
area. 
The rest of this study is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
previous studies conducted on the tax and financing incentives taken into 
consideration for this research, selected for their influence on reducing finance 
constraints for firm growth. These include impact of seed and venture capital on 
firm growth, impact of mergers and acquisitions on large firm growth and studies 
on corporate tax impact. This is followed by the empirical section, describing 
methodology, analysis and results. The conclusion summarizes the findings and 
possible policy considerations. 
4.3 The selection of tax and financing policy incentives 
for this study for their impact on firm growth 
As mentioned in the introduction, this study aims to understand the drivers of 
firm growth and place the various tax and financing policy tools currently 
targeted at firm growth in context of these drivers, lastly distinguishing whether 
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the characteristic of firm independence influences either growth itself or these 
drivers. The tax and financing policy tools impacting firm growth considered for 
this study are those that have been a key focus of British government over the 
last few decades, which include: corporate tax; seed and venture capital 
financing incentives; and impact of mergers and acquisitions on firm growth. 
To enable this objective, the next sub-sections firstly explain why these tax and 
financing tools have been selected and thereafter explores the previous studies 
conducted on these tax and financing objectives and examines how they have 
been researched for their impact on firm growth. 
 Why tax and financing incentives that shape finance for 
firms matters for firm-growth 
The selection of tax or financing incentives for their impact on firm growth is 
rooted in the basics of growth theory. Although basic growth theory would hold 
that both physical and human capital, alongside innovation, are critical to 
growth (Solow, 1956), this study focuses on policy incentives aimed at enhancing 
physical capital for firms, in particular those reducing financial constraints on 
firms. Using the lens of finance as a growth constraint on firms, the tax and 
financing incentives are identified for those that may have impacted the current 
firm landscape of UK. 
Although Lucas may have disregarded the importance of finance in growth as an 
“over-stressed” driver of economic growth (Lucas R. , 1988), Schumpeter long 
advocated the importance of finance in driving economic growth (Schumpeter J. 
, 1912). Previous studies would appear to endorse Schumpeter’s view, as their 
findings generally appear to support availability of finance as one of the 
pertinent enablers of both economic and firm growth. Levine, reviewing a wide 
array of theoretical and empirical studies on the inter-connectedness of finance 
and economic growth, concludes that overwhelming evidence suggests that 
availability of finance, through financial intermediaries or markets, appears to 
matter for economic growth (Levine, 2005). Focusing specifically on impact of 
finance and firm growth using cross-country research, Beck and Demirguc-Kent 
found that constrained access to finance can have significant diminishing impact 
on small and medium sized (SME) firm growth (Beck & Demirguc-Kent, 2006). 
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Their research suggests that small firms particularly face larger constraints on 
access to formal sources of external finance, thus hampering growth. Aghion et 
al. (2007), evaluating both entry and expansion of small firms in industrialized 
and emerging economies, observe that access to finance has again a significant 
impact on the entry of firms, but also particularly in influencing their expansion 
growth. Assessing different sources of finance impact on firm growth, Segarra 
and Teruel (2009) associate the availability of long-term debt with high growth 
firms, with short-term debt being correlated to lower growth firms.  
Furthermore, assessing finance’s impact on innovation, Savignac (2008), using a 
specifically designed innovation survey for French firms, observes that financial 
constraints are also seen to hamper innovative activity. Even when Fernando and 
Ruggieri (2015) examine the impact of restrained financial access on firm labour 
productivity, they observe that financial constraints impact it negatively. Thus, 
financial constraints appear to have a significant impact on firm growth, be it 
through direct influence on growth or through hampering innovation and 
productivity in firms. 
Over the last few decades UK has competitively engaged in certain tax and 
financing incentives, which could have influenced finance constraints of firms. In 
particular, these would include venture capital, mergers and acquisitions and 
corporate tax, which are investigated in this study.  
 What have previous studies on Venture capital deduced for 
firm growth  
Venture capital is a critical source of finance for firms, alongside traditional 
bank lending, especially for high-risk but also high-growth innovative firms. An 
OECD project on SMEs and Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE) undertook an extensive 
review of financing options for SMEs, as part of its objective to understand the 
challenges facing both start-ups and small and medium sized firms (OECD, 2015). 
While acknowledging that bank lending remains an integral part of finance for 
many SMEs, they recognize the challenges in accessing traditional finance for 
both innovative higher risk start-ups, as well as SMEs seeking to change 
ownership structures or to de-leverage and improve their capital structures 
(ibid). Reviewing options of external financing alternative to straight debt, they 
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observe that equity financing targets the start-ups or innovative high-risk SME’s 
with the potential of high growth. According to their classifications of 
alternative financing, equity finance incorporating venture and seed capital, as 
well as private equity, can provide significant access to finance to overcome the 
capital gap often faced by such firms.  
Specifically, analysing the impact of venture capital on young and high growth 
firms in Germany, Engel finds that surviving venture capital backed firms appear 
to have higher employment growth compared to non-venture capital funded 
comparable firms (Engel, Discussion paper 02-02, 2002). Moreover, his findings 
appear to indicate that venture capitalists are able to push firms towards higher 
growth compared to other investors. However, when using German firm data to 
distinguish the impact of venture capital on growth as well as innovation, Engel 
and Keilbach found that while venture capital has indeed a positive impact on 
firm employment growth, it appears not to have a significant impact on 
innovation (Engel & Keilbach, 2007). This finding was further corroborated by 
Peneder, using Austrian firm-level data to examine impact of venture capital on 
firm growth, observes that while venture capital impact is positive on firm 
growth, it appears to have no impact on innovation output of firms (Peneder, 
2010). It would appear that these findings suggest that while venture capital has 
a positive impact on growth, it is less so on innovation.  In fact, Engel and 
Keilbach imply that venture capitalists pre-select innovative firms and focus on 
enhancing commercialization of the innovative product, rather than adding to 
innovation itself (2007). 
Using Swedish survey data, Smlarski and Kut use their study to qualify the impact 
of incremental versus lump-sum venture capital finance, combined with number 
of external investor involvement on firm growth (Smolarski & Kut, 2011). 
According to their analysis, firm growth is positive with either incremental 
financing or a syndicate of two or more investors. However, when these two 
aspects are combined, this appears to have a negative impact on firm growth. 
Thus, the type of investor involvement combined with method of financing 
appears to alter the impact of venture capital on firm growth. 
Lastly, the research by Bottazi and Da Rin using European data, caution that 
financing policy incentives to encourage venture capital may not be sufficient in 
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themselves to deliver firm growth, unless the policies and regulations to support 
maturing of capital markets are in place to support it (Bottazi & Da Rin, 2002). 
While they do find venture capital provides critical access to finance for 
otherwise constrained highly innovative firms, they do not find venture capital-
backed firms grow any quicker than non-venture capital backed firms. 
Intriguingly, they imply that this could to some extent be attributed possibly to 
immature European capital markets. Their supposition is based on the lengthy 
time period taken to develop venture capital industry in the US. Describing the 
historical path taken by US venture capital, they trace the establishment of the 
first venture capital fund American Research and Development (ARD) in 1946. 
However, the maturation of the venture capital was not straightforward, with 
the 1980’s still finding venture capital heavily reliant on publicly funded Small 
Business Investment Companies (SBIC). According to Botaazi and da Rin, the 
industry only really managed to take off in the late 1980’s, after the 1979 
Employment Retirement Income Stabilization Act had enabled pension funds to 
invest in venture capital. The resulting overwhelming increase in funds allowed 
SBIC’s to be gradually replaced by limited partnerships as the dominant form of 
venture capital firms, resulting in the successful venture capital industry of 
today. These studies caution that venture capital financing incentives in 
themselves may not be sufficient to increase the impact of venture capital on 
growth – that polices and regulations to support maturing of venture capital 
markets may be as necessary a part of this process. Aspects which cannot be 
evaluated with the current data unfortunately and thus a possible limitation to 
this studies analysis. 
These various studies provide us with valuable insights into the impact of 
venture capital and how that process was built up over time. Nonetheless, there 
are opportunities to build upon this research and take the analysis somewhat 
deeper, specifically through using firm level data. These studies, limited often 
by shortage of data, were often confined to evaluating venture capital’s impact 
on firm growth through comparing growth between similar subset of venture 
capital backed or non-venture capital backed firms. Notwithstanding their 
pertinent conclusions, they were unable to distinguish between seed and 
venture capital effect on firm growth mainly due to data limitations, nor could 
they capture a direct correlation measure between venture capital investment 
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and firm growth. These are some of the gaps that this study hopes to provide 
further insights on.  
 What is known about the impact of mergers and acquisition 
impact on firm growth  
Following up further with policy tools that influence firm growth alongside 
access to finance, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is another route for firm 
growth. Indeed, it is a tool of firm growth, which was employed by British firms 
in the 20th century, the benefits of which have been debated by business 
historians and management literature. In particular, this tool is of interest, as 
there has been a debate across the field of business history and management 
literature, whether M&A still remain a pertinent route of firm growth, with the 
debate on the merits of organic growth versus growth through acquisitions. 
According to business historians, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have played an 
important role in large firm growth in the first half of the twentieth century, 
allowing British firms to create their own conglomerates to catch up with US 
firms (Hannah, 1983; Lamoreaux, 1988). Yet, this appears to have changed in 
the second half of the twentieth century, with Chandler viewing mergers as 
subsidiary to large firm growth and instead emphasizing the role of organic 
growth (Chandler, 1990; Chandler, 2005). However, Miskell & Jones following 
resource-based management literature (Harrison et al, 1991), find that 
complementary rather than related acquisitions can provide valuable source of 
growth for large firms (Miskell & Jones, 2007). These historical studies, though 
not conclusive, appear to assign at least a subsidiary if not slightly more 
significant role to acquisitions and mergers in large firm growth. In fact, it would 
appear that acquisitions could be important in rejuvenating large firm growth, 
depending on the type of acquisitions. 
The significance of type of acquisition in determining the impact on large firm 
growth appears to be borne out also in management studies. Recent 
management studies examining acquisitions have found technology sourcing to 
be one of the motivations driving mergers and acquisitions (Desyllas & Hughes, 
2008; Ruckman, 2004). These technology-driven acquisitions have led to some 
financial studies evaluating the consequent market valuations of acquired firms 
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(Feys &  Manigart, 2010) , as well some management studies examining the 
impact of acquisitions on consequent innovation of the combined firms (Cefis, 
2010). 
Despite this varied historical and management analyses on mergers and 
acquisitions, econometric analyses examining the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) on the growth of the consequent combined firm seems to be 
largely absent. Previous empirical studies appear to have mainly focussed 
examining impact of M&A activity on employment or wage growth, not firm 
growth.  Burghardt and Helm use Swiss firm data for newly acquired firms to 
assess employment growth (Burghardt & Helm, 2015). They find that the size of 
the acquiring firm is correlated positively to the labour growth of the newly 
acquired firm. Contrastingly, the combined size of the net establishment is 
negatively related to its net workforce growth. Conyon et al. (2002), examining 
the impact of mergers on employment in UK firms, suggest that the combined 
merged firms tend to reduce labour after mergers, while Gugler and Yutoglu 
(2004) find similar negative effects for mergers amongst European firm, though 
not amongst US firms. Another management study, using Swedish data, assesses 
firm growth in order to distinguish whether firm growth drives acquisition or the 
reverse (Xiao, 2013). These studies mainly yield insights into the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions on employment growth and its impact on labour growth 
within the merged units of the firm.  
On the whole, it would appear that mergers and acquisitions seem to exert a 
significant impact on large firms, though this could be a positive or negative 
impact based on a complex set of criteria. This is perhaps a positive impact 
when it leads to rejuvenation of technology or absorption of new capabilities, 
with a possibly more negative influence if merger focus detracts from organic 
growth.  
Given the importance of this influence of mergers and acquisitions on firm 
growth, it is perhaps also pertinent to understand the limitations of the 
influence of tax policy on this process. Although private equity buyouts have 
been critiqued as a possible tax shield (Treasury Select Committee, 2007), 
Auerbach & Reishaus previously researching US firms found no strong evidence to 
support taxation as a driving factor in merger activity (Auerbach & Reishus, The 
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Effects of Taxation on the Merger Decision, 1988). Indeed, Auerbach and 
Reihaus, evaluating American firms, did not find tax benefits to play an 
important role in shaping the activity of mergers and acquisitions (ibid). 
However, Klodt and Kleinert reviewing merger waves over the last century, 
attribute increased merger activity to sectoral shocks, with deregulation and 
globalization possibly influencing the last wave of mergers (Kleinert & Klodt, 
2002). Thus, though tax policy itself may not have a direct influence on mergers 
and acquisition, it appears the regulations governing the wider financial sector 
have had a significant impact on the process.  
These historical and empirical studies yield insights, which may help explain the 
complex interaction shaping the outcomes of mergers. Nonetheless, it is 
noteworthy that there is an absence of empirical analysis examining the impact 
of acquisitions on firm growth.  Yet, it is precisely this insight on the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions on firm growth, which could perhaps some shed some 
light on explaining the decline of larger firm share. Did UK large firms not have 
the option of technology acquisition, or was there some other obstacle 
hampering their innovation? An empirical study may not be able to answer 
conclusively, but it may provide some clues to deepen our understanding of this 
process.  
 Impact of Corporate tax on firm growth  
Essentially, this research to assess finance constraints, along with mergers and 
acquisition impact on firm growth, is motivated by the expectation of clarifying 
or at least placing some order of significance on policy incentives, specifically 
the policy incentives that could influence this firm growth. Within that 
framework, there is the multitude of tax relief schemes associated with EIS, SEIS 
and VCT. Furthermore, there is capital gains tax and lastly, corporate tax. 
Corporate tax perhaps deserves a particular mention, as it has been long 
considered a means to attract inward investment by foreign MNC Britain, as well 
as make British medium and large firms competitive (Devereux & Vella, 2014; 
Devereux et al., 2002). 
To understand its impact on inward investment and firm competitiveness, 
Devereux and Maffini (2006), conducting an extensive review of studies, 
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conclude that tax does appear to play a role in location and capital allocation 
choices of multinational firms (MNC). Using American MNC firm data, Grubert 
and Mutti (2000) find that average effective tax rate appears significantly to 
influence the location of capital invested in a host country. Using industry level 
data for 16 OECD economies, corporate tax is found by Vartia (2008) to reduce 
investment as well as productivity. Using Firm level data in OECD countries, 
corporate tax is also found to have a negative impact on innovation, along with 
investment (Gemmell et al., 2010). Devereux et al. (2016) examining the 
influence of capital allowances, a sub component of effective marginal 
corporate tax rate, conclude that it has a significant impact on investment. 
These numerous studies provide substantial evidence that corporate tax can 
have significant impact on MNC choices of investment and location and profit 
diversion. Yet, an empirical analysis directly between firm growth and corporate 
tax appears absent. This study aims to fill this gap, which could provide a direct 
insight into the supportive impact of corporate tax on making domestic firms 
competitive.  
4.4 Methodology and Data 
As stated earlier, this study’s main contribution is to fill the void of research on 
impact of independence on firm growth. Furthermore, using this understanding 
of the impact of independence to place the value of the current policy tools in 
context, clarifying which policy tools are supportive or perhaps even detrimental 
to growth. To this end, it was imperative to keep firm growth as a point of focus 
– assessing initially general (innovative and non-innovative) firms, thereafter 
both overall (independent and non-independent) innovative firms and 
independent innovative firms, measuring firm growth by revenue growth, one of 
the OECD defined measures of firm growth (OECD, 2005) and specifically, 
distinguishing the impact of independence on innovative firm growth, identifying 
in the process the type of firms which can potentially grow into frontier giants.  
 Data Sources  
This research uses firm level data sourced from Amadeus database from Bureau 
Van Dijk, extracted from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) database. 
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Relevant variables are downloaded both from profit/loss account and balance 
sheets of firms.  
UK Firm-level Panel data is analysed for time period 2006-2016 for all sectors - 
89 in total. The firms are analysed initially incorporating all firm sizes. This is 
followed by separate analysis per firm-size class: large, medium and small firm 
size-classes, as defined by OECD. 
Data separating investments on early stage seed funding, later stage venture 
capital funding (2nd and 3rd round), as well as differentiating management buy-
out & management buy-in funding from replacement capital is only available at 
country level on an annual basis from industry reports by the British Venture 
Capital Association (BVCA).  
Interest rate data for UK is collected from World data bank from IMF database. 
 Methodology 
Using Fixed effects estimation, this analysis seeks to shed light on corporate tax 
and financing incentives and its influence on firm growth.  Firm growth, as 
measured by annual turnover growth as a share of operating revenue, is 
regressed upon by a set of varied variables. The variables of interest are sourced 
from either firm-accounts data or BVCA sector level data, in order to throw light 
of the tax and financing incentives on actual firm growth, which has been 
empirically absent in current literature. It also aims to shed light on the 
differential impact of mergers and impact on firm growth, where differences 
exist either in the qualitative business history literature or there is absence of 
actual firm growth measurement, as in management literature. 
A) Dependent variable:  
As Firm growth, the dependent variable, is measured as annual firm growth. This 
is deduced from the profit/loss account sheet of firms as annual growth in 
Operating revenue/turnover as % age of operating revenue. 
Firm growth (Firm Grth ) = [Operating Revenue – Lagged Operating 
revenue]/Lagged Operating Revenue 
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B) Variables of interest: tax and financing incentives and firm independence 
 As referred to earlier, although corporate tax has drawn substantial valuable 
research, yet it is lacking specific analysis on how it may have shaped firm 
growth. Using firm level data drawn from Amadeus database, based on similar 
measures used in studies reviewed by Devereux et al. (2006), this study 
considers measuring corporate tax either through using EBIT (earnings before 
income tax) or Profits (P/L) before and after tax, from the profit/loss account of 
firms: 
Corporate tax measure (CorpTax) = [P/L before tax – P/L after tax]/Gross profits 
To examine impact of tax relief incentives such as capital gains tax reduction 
through schemes such as enterprise investment schemes (EIS), Seed Enterprise 
Investment Scheme (SEIS) and a mixture of corporation tax and capital gains 
reduction through Venture Capital Trust Scheme (VCT) on firm growth, this study 
assesses them through their impact on venture and seed capital investment. As 
detailed firm data for these aspects is not available, this study uses venture 
capital investment and seed/angel investment data aggregated at country-level 
compiled by British Private Equity & Venture Capital association (BVCA). 
 Capital gains and venture capital tax schemes are differentiated for their 
impact on early stage funding (seed and early stage venture capital aimed at 
initial stage of start-up), from that of later stage funding (2nd and 3rd round of 
funding, usually for expansion of firm) and any other form of later stage funding. 
These are thus measured as: 
• To capture Seed and Enterprise investment schemes:  
(SeedInv) = Investment Amount (measured in unit of million pounds) in early 
stages Seed funding and early (1st round ) Venture capital (sector specific)    
• To capture venture capital investment schemes and impact of capital 
gains tax:  
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(Ven Cap) = Investment Amount (measured in unit of million pounds) in 
later stage (2nd and 3rd round of funding) Venture capital (sector specific)   
• To capture other forms of later funding rounds:  
( Lat Ven Cap) = Investment Amount (venture capital) (measured in unit of 
million pounds)  in further later stages of firms(sector specific) 
Given the debate around different impacts of mergers and acquisitions based on 
type of merger, an attempt is made to differentiate these activities. As private 
equity tax relief measures not only influence seed/venture capital investment, 
but also mergers and acquisitions, this differentiation will be quite crude. Yet it 
may give an indication. While some management theories suggest acquisitions 
can be positive for firm growth if used to acquire new technologies, some 
business historians suggest that these could be negative when distracting from 
organic growth. Furthermore, the debate on reinstatement of national interest 
tests, based on the earlier removal of public interest tests in Enterprise act 
2002, makes this issue a separate concern.  
This study thus tries to separate private equity activity from venture capital and 
aims to measure merger and acquisition activity, using BVCA sector level data. 
Although the measures are only approximate due to lack of detailed data, 
private equity buyouts termed as secondary buyouts are captured in the 
replacement capital term, which is a combined term of secondary buyouts, 
replacement capital (capital repair and depreciation) and bank refinancing.  
• Hence secondary buyouts reflective of private equity are measured by: 
Replacement Capital (Rep Cap) = Capital invested for Secondary buyout + 
Replacement capital + bank refinancing. 
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Furthermore, data allows differentiation between types of management 
buyouts: 
• Firstly, Management Buyouts, while these normally refer to management 
team of the firm buy their own firm, in this data this term has a wider 
classification in the industry reports by BVCA. This is understood as 
follows:  
Management Buyout (MBO) = It includes capital invested by management 
teams to buy own firms (MBOs), but also Institutional Buyouts (IBOs): 
capital used by private equity, venture capital or commercial financial 
institution to acquire a firm, could be in cooperation of target firm or 
hostile takeover, which may include leveraged buyouts (LBOs), which 
incorporates use of highly leveraged or borrowed funds to acquire target 
firm. 
• Secondly, if an external management team buys a controlling stake in the 
firm, replacing the existing management team – usually if a firm is 
undervalued, poorly managed or needing succession:  
Management Buy-in (MBI) = Capital invested (unit millions of pounds) by 
external management team to replace existing team. 
A related measure to mergers and acquisition available in Amadeus database, is 
the independence indicator113based on ownership data: 
• Indep (Firm Ind) = Independence of a firm is indicated by A or A- or A+ 
status. Else it has another ultimate owner 
This defines whether the firm is independent or owned by another ultimate 
ownership, indicative of a buy-out or acquisition of firm by an external firm. It is 
to be noted that firm independence in this aspect primarily checks that the firm 
has no controlling shareholder. This independence indicator mainly assesses 
whether any shareholder (excluding public shareholders for quoted firms), be it 
                                         
13 Definition in appendix  
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an owner, financial firm or industrial firm has controlling shares, with equity 
over 25%. This indicator would capture loss of independence of firms which have 
been acquired by another firm, but would mistakenly also classify some of the 
big Silicon Valley independent firms as dependent. These are exceptions and 
only few, which follow the trend set in Silicon Valley after Steve Jobs experience 
of being ousted from Apple, where founders have sought to retain controlling 
shares, if possible. This is evident in Facebook (Financial Times , 2017) or Tesla 
(Los Angeles Times, 2018) to name a few, but not so in Amazon or Alphabet. 
Thus, although this measure may mistakenly miss some successful UK 
independent firms, which similar to these Silicon Valley icons may have retained 
controlling shares by founders, this indicator in the main may be understood to 
represent independent firms, not acquired by another firm or private investor.  
Another possibly relevant measure, to assess maturity of firm: 
• Firm Age (Firmage) = The time span between year of analysis and firm’s 
year of incorporation 
C) Control Variables  
To examine impact of these tax and relief incentives on firm growth, it is 
necessary to ensure other control variables are in place to capture elements 
from growth theory, globalization and monetary policy.  
The control variables rooted in growth theories, firm-level measures such as 
capital expenditure and human capital can be extracted from the profit/loss 
account and measured for their growth:  
• Gross capital Growth measure (Gross Cap Grth) = [Fixed assets (Tangible) – 
Lagged Fixed assets (Tangible)] / Lagged Fixed assets (Tangible).  
• Human Resource (employees) (Cost Emply Grth ) = [Cost of staff Employees – 
Lagged Cost of staff Employees] / Lagged Cost of staff Employees 
A possible variable to capture both the innovativeness of the firm, as well as an 
aspect of technology considered critical for national innovation systems, is R&D 
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expenses. R&D expenses, as defined in firm data, captures both internal R&D or 
firm costs for R&D alliances, which implies the firm could itself be developing 
that innovation or buying in that research. Yet, in the absence of other 
measures, it is a reasonable measure to serve as a proxy for the innovative level 
of the firm. This is also available through profit/loss accounts: 
• Hence, technology (R&D Grth) = [Research and Development expenses – 
Lagged Research and Development expenses] / Lagged Research and 
Development expenses 
To capture aspects of globalization of firms, firm level data on export revenues 
are also extracted from profit loss account: 
• Export (Exp Rev Grth) = [Export Revenue – Lagged Export Revenue] / Lagged 
Export Revenue 
• To capture impact of monetary policy: 
Interest rates (Int Rates) = Bank of England interest rates set nationally 
D) Summary statistics and correlation matrix of Variables 
Summary statistics of the variables used in this regression are listed in Table 4.1 
below. It is to be noted that not all firms provide data on the variables used in 
our regressions. In particular R&D expenditure is available for a much smaller 
subset of firms, which is used by this study to indicate innovativeness of firm as 
mentioned above. Similarly export data and skilled human resource costs data is 
also less prevalently available in firms, though more so than R&D expenditure.  
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Table 4.1:Summary statistics of variables used in regressions 
 
  Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Firm growth 1,479,257 2587.4 689377.6 -8.7e+07 5.58e+08E+08 
Year 2,073,538 2010.72 2.85 2006 2017 
Gross capital 
growth 1,127,045 1570.12 380611.9 -1754000 3.17e+08 
Skilled 
Human 
Resource 
growth 
583,164 100.04 27969.2 -548.5 2.11e+07 
R&D 
expenditure 
growth 
14,077 337.5 16016.7 -906.73 1291225 
Export 
Growth 120,665 537.6 52750.2 -11766.1 1.06e+07 
Corporate tax 
growth 572,789 67.34 50249.6 -1.78E+07 3.05e+07 
Firm age 2,072,102 14.5 16.32 0 159 
Later stage 
funding 1,463,763 1346.33 345.03 841 1772 
Replacement 
Capital 
(includes 
secondary 
buyouts) 
2,020,054 1160.57 651.7 254 2669  
Management 
Buy-out 
(MBO) capital 
2,020,054 3365.73 1864.665 1051 7373 
Management 
Buy-in (MBI) 
capital 
2,020,054 120.25 92.95 16 348 
Other late 
funding 1,666,580 538.85 533.67 143 1886 
Lending 
interest rate 1,843,457 1.86 2.05 0.5 5.5 
Dummy 
independence 2,073,538 0.08 0.26 0 1 
 
In addition to the summary statistics listed above, the correlation of variables is 
listed below in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. As the variable Early stage funding with 
Later stage funding shows a high correlation, the variable Early stage funding is 
dropped from the final equation used in the regressions in order to reduce 
potential errors arising from multicollinearity. 
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Table 4.2:Correlation Matrix values (observations 56,191 – if R&D excluded) 
 
  Firm growth 
Gross 
Capital 
growth 
Skilled 
Human 
Resource 
Export 
Growth 
Corporate 
tax growth 
Firm 
age 
Early 
stage 
funding 
Later 
stage 
funding 
Replace
ment 
capital 
Firm growth 1                 
Gross capital 
growth  0.007 1               
Skilled 
Human 
Resource 
0.22 0.007 1             
Export 
Growth 0.001 0.0002 0.03 1           
Corporate tax 
growth 0.17 -0.0001 0.003 .0003 1         
Firm age -0.04 -0.0023 -0.03 -0.003 0.0007 1       
Early stage 
funding 0.01 -0.0004 0.006 -0.0004 0.0021 -0.004 1     
Later stage 
funding 0.0013 0.0005 0.007 -0.003 0.0039 -0.002 0.913 1   
Replacement 
Capital 
(includes 
secondary 
buyouts) 
0.013 0.001 0.0036 0.003 -0.004 -0.007 0.763 0.48 1 
Management 
Buy-out 
(MBO) 
0.017 -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.003 -0.002 0 0.443 0.606 0.23 
Management 
Buy-in (MBI) 0.008 0.0034 -0.0007 0.006 -0.01 -0.005 -0.32 -0.51 0.32 
Other late 
funding 0.006 -0.001 0.0008 -0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.005 -0.17 0.37 
Lending 
interest rate -0.02 -0.003 0 -0.003 0.009 0.005 -0.17 -0.12 -0.54 
Dummy 
independence 0.013 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.002 -0.001 0.059 0.0002 
-
0.0003 -0.002 
  
Managm
ent Buy-
out 
(MBO) 
Manage
ment 
Buy-in 
(MBI) 
Other 
late 
funding 
Lending 
interest 
rate 
Dummy 
independe
nce 
  
  
    
Management 
Buy-out 
(MBO) 
1         
        
Management 
Buy-in (MBI) -0.27 1       
        
Other late 
funding 0.74 -0.56 1     
        
Lending 
interest rate -0.545 -0.654 -0.045 1   
        
Dummy 
independence -0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.003 1 
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Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix – for R&D growth (observations 5,736 – if R&D included) 
 
  Firm growth 
Gross 
Capital 
growth 
Skilled 
Human 
Resource 
Export 
Growth 
Corporate 
tax growth 
Firm 
age 
Early 
stage 
funding 
Later 
stage 
funding 
Replace
ment 
capital 
R&D 
growth 0.027 -0.0006 0.017 -0.0007 0.0005 0.028  -0.004 -0.006 0.003 
                    
  
Managment 
Buy-out 
(MBO) 
Management 
Buy-in (MBI) 
Other 
late 
funding 
Lending 
interest 
rate 
Dummy 
independe
nce 
R&D 
growth       
                    
R&D 
growth -0.006 0.009 0.003 -0.003 -0.007 1       
 
4.5 Empirical Analysis  
Going back to the aims, this study seeks to understand why UK has not produced 
the new innovative giants of tomorrow through analysing whether firm 
independence matters and how this may fit in alongside current policy tools 
which drive firm growth: tax & financing incentives and M&A activity.  
As such the first regression assesses what drives frim growth - examining growth 
drivers alongside the tax and financing incentive policy tools as well as M&A 
activity, as these are considered to be policy tools targeting support of firm 
growth. These drivers and policy tools are overall examined for their impact on 
firm growth for overall general (on-innovative and innovative) firms and then 
compared for their impact on innovative firms. Upon shortlisting the drivers that 
matter most for driving innovative firms (the object of this study), then a 
regression is performed examining how these short-listed drivers may differ for 
independent firms, trying to answer whether independence matters for firm 
growth. 
Before listing regressions, the model is explained briefly in next sub-section.  
 Model 
For all the regressions, an initial set of drivers based on the rudiments of growth 
theory and globalization as defined in above section are used as control 
variables, alongside the policy variables of interest to evaluate impact of tax 
and financing incentives on firm growth. The variables used in model are listed 
in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Variables used in Model, source (author) 
Dependent variable Firm growth measured annually  
Control variables  • Gross capital growth;  
• Skilled Human resource, either capturing 
expansion of employees or increasing 
skills level of firms;  
• R&D expenditure growth, capturing 
changing technology level or 
innovativeness of firm – possibly more 
relevant for growing small and medium 
firms, whereas for large firms R&D 
budgets may not increase significantly 
for new innovations and instead may be 
conducted through a shift of resources; 
• Export growth – capturing changing 
global market exposure of firm.  
 
Policy variables of 
interest to evaluate tax 
and financing incentives: 
• Corporate tax growth (annual firm level); 
• Venture capital (annual country level) - - 
the funding available for firms is 
differentiated by seed funding/early 
stage venture capital to later stage 
funding. 
o Seed funding/early stage funding 
(annual country level) - – this to 
an extent captures initiatives 
impact of capital gains tax 
entrepreneur relief and financing 
schemes EIS and SEIS. 
o Later stage venture capital 
funding (2nd and 3rd round) 
(annual country level) - – this 
would to an extent capture impact 
again of capital gains tax relief, as 
well as financing schemes such as 
VCT 
o Other late stage funding – for 
further capital investment in 
further rounds 
• Acquisitions are differentiated for 
Management Buyouts (MBO) activity from 
management Buy-ins (MBI), although the 
data only allows for a limited 
differentiation: 
o MBI - External management 
takeover replacing existing 
management 
o MB) - all types of either external 
hostile/cooperative or internal 
management takeovers. 
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A point to clarify in above Table 4.4, is a limitation in the data while examining 
acquisitions, attempt is made to differentiate Management Buyouts (MBO) 
activity from management Buy-ins (MBI). The motivation behind this 
differentiation is rooted in the debate in business history, which differs from 
management studies – where complementary acquisitions are considered positive 
for firm growth, whilst others could be seen as harming growth. However, as 
available data MBO – merges the cooperative takeovers alongside the hostile 
takeovers in the same figure, this differentiation was not fully possible with this 
data. This data only allows for a limited differentiation - distinguishing between 
an external management takeover replacing existing management (MBI), versus 
all types of either external hostile/cooperative or internal management 
takeovers (MBO). This limitation is important to point out, as the interpretation 
of results is done accordingly. 
Further to above listed variables, in model, a variable to assess whether a firm 
grows at varying rate based on age of age of firm, the analysis also includes: 
• Firm age (annual firm level) – age of firm based on year of incorporation  
Furthermore: 
• Time dummies are removed, as venture capital variables appear to have 
constant time effect and could not otherwise be analysed. 
• Also, early stage funding appears to be closely correlated with later stage 
funding. Hence, two separate regressions are used to assess them. 
This model with variables listed in Table 4.4 is depicted in Diagram 4.1 to enable 
easier oversight of the different drivers and policy tools influencing firm growth. 
Chapter 4  149 
 
Figure 4.1 Model depicting Basic growth drivers and policy tools influencing firm growth 
leading to country productivity and Growth, source (author) 
 
Using Fixed effects method to remove sector specific effects, the equation for 
the model used for this analysis, is thus defined as:  
Firm growth (Firm Grth ) = a + + b1(Gross Cap Grth) + b2(Cost Emply Grth ) + b3(R&D Grth) 
+ b4(Exp Rev Grth ) + b5(Int Rates )  + b6(Firmage ) + b7(CorpTaxGrth)  )+ b8(SeedInv) + 
b9(Ven Cap) + b10(Lat Ven Cap) + b11 (Rep Cap) + b12 (MBO) + b13 (MBI) + b14 (Firm Ind)                                           
Equation (1) 
As mentioned earlier, analysing the correlation matrix for firms in Table 4.2 
indicates that early stage and later stage (2nd & 3rd round) funding are highly 
correlated, indicating they could cause near perfect multicollinearity in 
regressions. Hence, the regressions use only late stage funding, dropping early 
stage (SeedInv), as shown in Equations 2: 
Firm growth (Firm Grth ) = a + b1(Gross Cap Grth) + b2(Cost Emply Grth ) + b3(R&D Grth) + 
b4(Exp Rev Grth ) + b5(Int Rates )  + b6(Firmage ) + b7(CorpTaxGrth)  ) + b9(Ven Cap) + 
b10(Lat Ven Cap) + b11 (Rep Cap) + b12 (MBO) + b13 (MBI) + b14 (Firm Ind)                                           
Equation (2) 
The following regressions are performed using the equation above.  
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 Regression results 
Using Fixed effects method (FEM) to remove sector and firm specific effects, the 
regressions are conducted on panel data over time period 2006-2016, for UK 89 
sectors at firm-level, to examine firm growth.  
Initially the regressions analyse overall general firm growth and then the same 
analysis is conducted only for innovating firms – based on firms which report R&D 
expenses. As mentioned above, early and late stage funding appear to be highly 
correlated, thus only late stage (2nd and 3rd round venture capital) funding is 
used in regressions, using equation (2) for all regressions. Given the UK’s bigger 
challenge lies in upscaling firms, rather than the birth of innovative firms, a 
focus on venture capital funding of 2nd and 3rd round is more pertinent to this 
study than the initial seed funding. 
Furthermore, as lending interest rates as well as late stage funding are omitted 
because of collinearity, these two variables are not listed in the results. Lastly, 
throughout these regressions time dummies are removed, as they caused the 
annual country level data of venture capital and financing incentives to be 
omitted – which are our variables of interest. These results are listed in Table 
4.5 below for aggregate level analysis of overall general (innovative and non-
innovative) in column 1 and innovative firms in column 2. 
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Table 4.5:FEM of tax and financing incentives regressed on Firm growth (measured by 
growth in operating revenue from year before, as a percentage of current operating 
revenue) separately for aggregated general firms and separately for aggregated innovative 
firms 
 
LHS variable: Firm-growth  
(1)  (2) 
All General firms 
(Innov and non-innov 
firms)  
Only Innovative firms  
(Venture capital 2nd 
& 3rd round)  
(Venture Capital 2nd 
& 3rd round)  
Control variables:     
Growth theories     
• Gross capital 
growth 
.00009 (.0001) .00008 (.0002) 
• Human Resource 
growth 
.012*** (.003) .492*** (.01) 
• Technology 
(R&D) growth  
(Not used) .0003 (.0002) 
Globalization    
  
• Export growth -5.99e-06(9.23e-06)   .00009 (.0002) 
       
Tax and Financing policy 
tools:      
• Corporate Tax 
Growth  
  0.03***(.0008)   -.03*** (.002)  
• Later stage 
funding (2nd & 
3rd round) 
.016*** (.004) .01**(.004) 
• Replacement 
capital (incl 
secondary buy-
outs) 
 -.024*** (.009) -.022**(.009) 
• Management 
buyouts  
 .005*** (.001) .004***(.001) 
• Management 
Buy-ins      .439***(.13) .347***(.119)  
Firm Age   -10.37*** (2.8) -9.03***(2.5)  
Constant  217.2***(59.1)                                 231.4***(63.7)  
      
Chapter 4  152 
      
      
Observations 56, 191 5,736 
      
            No. of groups 
16,184 2,127 
    
Obs per group 
min = 1 min = 1 
avg= 3.5 avg= 2.7 
max= 6 max= 6 
R-sq 
 
within= 0.08 
 
within= 0.4182 
between = .0069 between = .0212 
overall = 0.0057 overall = 0.0174 
 
Corr (u_i,Xb) 
 
-0.8897 
 
-0.9862 
      
     
 
Note: The regression equation uses Eq (2) for Firm growth (Firm Grth ) = a + + b1(Gross Cap Grth) + 
b2(Cost Emply Grth ) + b3(R&D Grth) + b4(Exp Rev Grth ) + b5(Int Rates )  + b6(Firmage ) + b7(CorpTaxGrth)  )+ 
b8(SeedInv) + b9(Ven Cap) + b10(Lat Ven Cap) + b11 (Rep Cap) + b12 (MBO) + b13 (MBI) + b14 (Firm Ind) – 
R&D variable excluded in column (1)  to allow observation of general overall firm types, as only 
innovative firms seem to list R&D.                                                       
*** indicates significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. 
These main results for these regressions can be summarised as: 
• Surprisingly, Gross Capital is not a significant driver. At first sight, this 
is surprising, however it could be indicative of the fact that capital 
investments are not reflected in immediate growth but may rather 
have a delayed effect on firm growth. This should be explored in 
future research to understand if indeed this is the case. 
• Human Resource – is significant, and this coefficient x2 for innovative 
firms. Yet there is no significant policy in place to boost increasing 
skilled human resource available to firms.  
Chapter 4  153 
• The impact of Corporate tax growth is very small and surprisingly 
positive for overall (innovative and non-innovative firms) ie. Overall 
firms grow despite increased corporate tax. However, this figure is 
negative for innovative firms, albeit smaller in impact relative to 
Human resource – despite it being considered as one of the key 
attractions for driving growth in UK policy making. As such although 
the current policy focus to reduce corporate tax would appear to help 
innovative firms, its impact is relatively much smaller and brings into 
question as to whether this policy tool should be centre stage for 
attracting or supporting innovative firm growth. More so, the question 
arises whether this policy should be a blanket policy for all types of 
firms, as these findings indicate that overall firms (includes non-
innovative firms) can grow despite increased corporate tax.  
• Later stage funding (2nd & 3rd venture capital round) although 
significant, it appears a relatively smaller impact. Bearing in mind that 
these are not percentage growth figures, rather it measures the 
change in percentage growth for firms for every million pounds 
invested, its interpretation differs from above variables.  
This is a level – not a growth figure of venture capital - and cannot be 
directly compared with earlier growth coefficients.  It can only be 
used to relatively compare other level of invested capital. As such, it 
appears that every million pounds invested in venture capital would 
have 2.5x higher impact on firm growth than MBOs, which include 
capital of either cooperative or hostile takeovers of IBOs and LBOs. 
• Replacement capital including secondary buyouts, appears negative - 
which could be just the cost of replacement capital, but could also 
indicate that secondary buyouts may not be positive for firm growth. 
As these two figures are inter-bound, it is not possible to isolate the 
two impacts. 
• Both Management buyouts (MBO) and Management buy-ins (MBI) are 
positive for firm growth, with Management buy-ins showing higher 
figures. As mentioned earlier, each million invested in MBOs (capturing 
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both management buyouts, but also hostile/cooperative IBO takeovers) 
seem to have 2.5x lower impact than each million invested in venture 
capital. On the other hand, MBI, which captures external management 
using capital to replace existing teams usually for undervalued firms, 
seems to deliver 100x higher firm growth than MBOs. However, MBI’s 
are much less prevalent as much riskier to fund and appear to be less 
than 1% relative to MBO’s in UK (BVCA, 2016). 
Thus, perhaps the main takeaway of these figures is a comparison of 
venture capital with MBO figures - that direct venture capital invested 
into the organic growth of a firm delivers more growth than an 
acquisition/takeover. Thus, while M&A’s seem to be positive on firm 
growth, venture capital investing in organic firm growth seems 
relatively a larger impact, supporting economic historians evaluation 
of importance of organic firm growth over growth through acquisitions. 
As such, greater focus in policy making to support access to finance to 
encourage organic firm growth above M&A’s, seems important for firm 
growth. 
• Firm age is surprisingly negative – i.e. the older or more established a 
firm, then that age works negatively on growth. This would appear to 
indicate that the longer the firms last the distance, then each year of 
incorporation has a negative impact on firm growth. This appears 
contrary to Business historians and is investigated in further detail in 
follow-up regressions to enable understanding of this result. 
• Three variables: lending interest rates; other further later stage of 
lending and independence dummies are omitted due to collinearity  
These results are also further checked for how these drivers may impact firm 
size classes differently, again using equation 2 to assess firm growth.   
The firm growth is differentiated for firm-size classes: micro (employees < 10), 
small (employees < 50), medium (employees < 250) and large (employees 250+). 
In all, a set of further eight regressions are performed. These regressions are 
listed in Table 4.6 for innovative firms and Table 4.7 for general overall firms. 
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Table 4.6 FEM of tax and financing incentives regressed on (Innovative firms) Firm growth, 
differentiated for firm class sizes 
 
LHS variable: Firm-
growth  
        
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Innovative 
firms 
(micro)  
Innovative 
firms (small)  
Innovative 
firms 
(medium)  
Innovative 
firms 
(large)  
        
Control variables:         
Growth theories     
• Gross 
capital 
growth 
-.067 (.203) .005(.005) .0002(.002) .004(.003) 
         
• Human 
Resource 
growth 
-2.45 (2.01) .537***(.08) .48*** (.009) .747*** (.026) 
      
• Technolog
y (R&D) 
growth  
.101 (.105) .0004 (.004) .0003(.0008) 
.0004** 
(.0001) 
         
          
Globalization      
• Export 
growth 
.076 (.062) .049***(.012) .00003(.0001) 
.0001 
(.0003) 
          
Tax and Financing 
policy tools: 
    
• Corporate 
Tax 
Growth  
-1.87 (1.32)  -.028*** (.004) .03**(.01) .003 (.004) 
         
• Later 
stage 
funding 
(2nd & 3rd 
round) 
.598(.39) .013(.023) .009*(.005) .004 (.005) 
     
• Replacem
ent 
capital 
(incl 
secondary 
buy-outs) 
.502 (.441) -.023 (.043) -.022**(.009) 
-.019** 
(.009) 
         
• Managem
ent 
buyouts  
Omitted .006(.007) .003(.002) .005**
 
(.001) 
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• Managem
ent Buy-
ins 
Omitted .47(.63) .266** (.133) .33* (.127) 
             
      
• Firm Age 353.6 (270.97) -9.3(13.7) -7.8*** (2.8) 
-8.9*** 
(2.7) 
• Constant -6905.
 
(5223.6) 163.6(262,6)) 
189.9*** 
(63.7) 
294.07*** 
(86.9) 
          
Observations 51 805 2,873 1,984 
       
No. of groups 36 368 1,167 691 
          
Obs per group min=1 min =1 min =1 min =1 
  avg=1.4 avg =2.2 avg =2.5 avg =2.9 
  max=4 max =6 max =6 max =6 
R-sq within= 0.5175 within= 0.2192 
within= 
0.6483 
within= 
0.4102 
  between = .04888 
between = 
.0162 
between = 
.0288 
between = 
.0346 
  overall = 0.0245 
overall = 
0.0125 
overall = 
0.0376 
overall = 
0.0132 
          
Corr (u_i,Xb) -0.9999 -0.9688 -0.9685 -0.9964 
               
Note: The regression equation uses Eq (2) for (Firm Grth ) = a + b1(Gross Cap Grth) + b2(Cost Emply Grth ) 
+ b3(R&D Grth) + b4(Exp Rev Grth ) + b5(Int Rates )  + b6(Firmage ) + b7(CorpTaxGrth)  ) + b9(Ven Cap) + b10(Lat 
Ven Cap) + b11 (Rep Cap) + b12 (MBO) + b13 (MBI) + b14 (Firm Ind) – with lending interest rates, early stage 
lending, other late stage lending and independence dummy not listed as they are omitted due to 
collinearity  
*** indicates significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. 
Main findings of these regressions on innovative firm sizes: 
• Micro firm-class: no significant drivers below 10% p-values, although 
late stage (2nd and 3rd round) venture capital is significant at 17% p-
value, which is valid enough and indicates access to finance is key for 
these small firms 
• Small firm-class: Skilled human resource is the most influential driver 
on firm growth, with export also significant driver and reduction in 
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corporate tax reductions also significant for small firm growth, though 
half the magnitude of impact of export growth and factor 20x less than 
skilled human resource. 
• Medium firm-class: Skilled human resource yet again the most 
significant, with increase in corporate tax positive on growth and later 
stage venture capital (2nd and 3rd round) also significant for firm 
growth. Though the impact of venture capital on medium firms is 
relatively far smaller on firm growth than for micro firms. MBOs 
(includes external hostile/consensual takeovers as well as internal 
management buyouts) have 11% p-value significance, which indicates 
that M&A are a positive impact for medium firms – though we cannot 
distinguish whether that is driven by management buyouts by internal 
management team or external takeovers. MBI’s are separate and they 
show a significant and positive impact. 
• Large firm class: Yet again, skilled human resource is key – in fact this 
driver is the largest in magnitude when compared across all firm-sizes. 
Export and corporate tax are surprisingly not significant, instead 
replacement capital (including secondary buyouts) is a drag on growth, 
with MBOs (external takeovers, as well as internal management 
buyouts) a positive on frim growth, as well as MBIs. Yet again , 
indicating that M&A’s play a significant role in firm growth of large 
firms, however data not distinguishing whether this is due to external 
acquisitions or internal management buyouts. 
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Table 4.7 FEM of tax and financing incentives regressed on (General firms) Firm growth, 
differentiated for firm class sizes 
 
          
LHS variable: Firm-
growth  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
  General  
firms 
(micro)  
General 
firms 
(small)  
General 
firms 
(medium)  
 General 
firms 
(large)  
          
Control variables:         
Growth theories     
• Gross 
capital 
growth 
.002(.002) .001(.002) .00009 (.00006) 
.0001 
(.0004) 
         
• Human 
Resource 
growth 
.05*** 
(.02) 
1.01*** 
(.018) 
.085*** 
(.002) 
.16*** 
(.004) 
      
• Technolo
gy (R&D) 
growth  
Not used Not used Not used Not used 
          
Globalization      
• Export 
growth 
.002*** 
(.0007) 
-.0002*** 
(.00002) 
6.5e-
7(7.3e-6) 
.00002 
(.00005) 
          
          
Tax and 
Financing 
policy tools: 
    
• Corporat
e Tax 
Growth  
.06***(.000
9)  
-
.0008(.02) 
-.07*** 
(.006) 
.062*** 
(.007) 
         
• Later 
stage 
funding 
(2nd & 3rd 
round) 
.019(.019) .017 (.012) .014***
 
(.003) 
.012** 
(.006) 
         
• Replacem
ent 
capital 
(incl 
secondar
y buy-
outs) 
-.03 (.038) 
-
0.036(.025
) 
-.02*** 
(.007) 
-
0.014(.013) 
         
Chapter 4  159 
• Managem
ent 
buyouts  
.008(.006) .007*
 
(.004) 
.005*** 
(.001) .003(.002) 
     
• Managem
ent Buy-
ins 
.588(.563) .568*
 
(.367) 
.382*** 
(.101) .304(.19) 
• Firm Age -11.8
 
(12.2) 
-
13.01*(7.9
6) 
-
8.6***(2.2
) 
-8.3** (4.1 
          
Constant 157.6(173.9) 
226.2(142.
7) 
180.5(46.
5) 
218.512** 
(104.4) 
          
Observations 2,925 13,731 27,386 11,831 
       
No. of groups 1,327 5,007 8,507 3,452 
          
Obs per group min=1 min =1 min =1 min =1 
  avg=2.2 avg =2.7 avg =3.2 avg =3.4 
  max=6 max =6 max =6 max =6 
R-sq within= 0.6757 
within= 
0.2848 
within= 
0.0919 
within= 
0.1657 
  between = .1195 
between = 
.0129 
between 
= .0066 
between = 
.0085 
  overall = 0.2058 
overall = 
0.0229 
overall = 
0.0058 
overall = 
0.0059 
          
Corr (u_i,Xb) -0.7302 -0.9546 -0.9450 -0.7130 
          
     
     
Note: The regression equation uses Eq (2) for (Firm Grth ) = a + b1(Gross Cap Grth) + b2(Cost Emply Grth ) 
+ b3(R&D Grth) + b4(Exp Rev Grth ) + b5(Int Rates )  + b6(Firmage ) + b7(CorpTaxGrth)  ) + b9(Ven Cap) + b10(Lat 
Ven Cap) + b11 (Rep Cap) + b12 (MBO) + b13 (MBI) + b14 (Firm Ind) – with lending interest rates, early stage 
lending, other late stage lending and independence dummy not listed as they are omitted due to 
collinearity  
*** indicates significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. 
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Main findings from these regressions for general firm sizes: 
• Micro firm class: Skilled human resource, export, as well as increased 
corporate tax are significant drivers for micro firms. Interestingly 
venture capital does not seem to play a part in driving micro firm 
growth of general firms, which underscores literature that venture 
capital is involved mostly in innovative firms. 
• Small firm class: Skilled human resource with a significantly larger 
coefficient relative to micro firms is a key driver, as well as MBIs and 
MBOs, indicating M&A play a part in driving even small firm growth of 
general firms. Yet again, unfortunately the data does not enable 
distinguishing between internal management buyout or external 
takeovers as to which is the key component of MBOs. Exports are 
surprisingly a negative driver. Venture capital is significant , although 
only at 17%. Furthermore, firm age is also a negative driver with a 
quite large coefficient value, indicating the age of a firm seems to 
impose a significant drag on the growth of a general small firm. 
• Medium firm class: Skilled human resource is once again evident as a 
strong driver, with capital growth a very small influence though p-
value of 15%. Surprisingly late venture capital (2nd and 3rd round) is 
positive driver for firm growth, alongside MBOs and MBI indicating M&A 
(be it internal management buyout or external takeover) play a 
positive role in driving firm growth. Increased corporate tax growth 
has a negative impact on medium firm growth, while firm age has yet 
again a large value and imposes a negative drag on frim growth. 
• Large firm class: Yet again, Skilled human resource is highly 
significant, with increased corporate tax as a positive indicating large 
general firms can grow despite increased corporate taxes. Late 
venture capital (2nd and 3rd round) is surprisingly positive, indicating 
venture capital does seem to impact large firm growth. Future 
research should identify how this is -whether this is spin-offs of large 
firms or financing of specific M&As perhaps. MBOs and MBIs are both 
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found positive, though at 14 % p-value and 11% p-value respectively. 
Firm age is yet again a negative significant impact. 
Overall conclusions (both innovative firm-classes and general firm-classes) on 
variables of interest: 
Firstly, corporate tax increase – this is found broadly to be positive for general 
(innovative and non-innovative) firms indicating they can grow despite tax 
increase, while its negative for innovative firms implying that corporate tax 
increase is a drag on innovative firm growth. Exploring this in detail at the 
differing firm-size levels, it appears only micro and large general firms can grow 
despite increased corporate tax, while increased corporate tax would impose a 
drag on small innovative firm growth, yet medium innovative firms appear to be 
able to grow despite increased corporate tax. These are quite important 
variations which sheds doubt on the suitability of the current blanket policy of 
corporate tax reductions, indicating policy could be tailored differently for 
innovative firms, more so also differently for firm size-classes.  
Secondly, Venture capital 2nd and 3rd round funding – this was broadly found 
positive and significant for both general (innovative and non-innovative), as well 
as innovative firms. Upon detailed analysis at firm size levels, venture capital 
(2nd and 3rd rounds) was found significant and positive for growth of only micro 
and medium innovative firms, not small – possibly investment at that stage 
feeding into expansion of firm resources and not growth. In contrast, venture 
capital 2nd and 3rd round funding is significant at 17% p-value for small general 
firms, while fully significant for medium general firms as well as significant for 
large general firms, unlike large innovative firms. While the coefficient values 
cannot be directly compared to growth coefficients given data limitations, these 
findings indicate roughly .01% firm growth for every million pound invested for 
general and innovative firms. While this growth is not large, it is still growth and 
seems to support growth of SMEs (small and medium sized) for both innovative 
and general firms.  As UK appears to have a scale-up problem of its smaller 
firms, as mentioned in the introduction where UK scores 26th in GEI index in 
scaling up despite scoring 4th in the creation of innovative start-ups, and this is 
further combined with reduced venture capital availability relative to US - this 
seems to be an insightful result shedding some light on this problem. It would 
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appear that policy support to further enhance access to venture capital would 
help boost scaling up of firms, though yet again it is not the largest driver of 
firm growth and should be kept in that context. 
Furthermore, venture capitals lack of significance for large innovative firms 
seems to indicate they may be able to utilize other sources for investment, also 
in line with previous literature (OECD, 2015). On the other hand, detailed 
analysis of general (innovative and non-innovative) firm size classes, reveals that 
venture capital is significant for large size-class of general firms. In this case, 
indicating venture capital supports growth of large size-class of general firms. 
This would appear to be in line with previous literature on use of private equity 
in complementary business acquisitions to fund large firm growth (Miskell & 
Jones, 2007). In essence, it appears that venture capital is a relevant and 
positive source of finance which supports growth, particularly for growth of 
micro, small and medium innovative firms – albeit it is not that large an impact 
and as such should be kept in that context 
Thirdly, M&A activity captured by MBOs and MBIs – broadly, both of these were 
found positive and with a similar impact on both general (innovative and non-
innovative) or innovative firms. Interestingly, MBO impact was roughly half the 
impact of venture capital on firm growth, whereas MBI had 20x the impact of 
venture capital on firm growth. Yet, MBI makeup a very small part of M&A 
activity as they are seen as a riskier venture (Wright & Wilson, 2013). Further 
analysis at detailed firm size level indicates that both MBO and MBI are 
significant drivers for small and medium general firms, with MBI nearly 100x 
higher impact on firm growth. While for innovative firms, they are both 
significant for medium and large firms. This would appear to support the 
literature that mergers which are related to either technology acquisition or 
complementary growth could be beneficial. However, this data does appear to 
show that while M&As promote growth, their impact is much lower relative to 
venture capital which promotes organic growth. This to an extent seems to 
support business historians’ claims that organic growth is a greater driver of firm 
growth relative to acquisitions. If these conclusions are correct, then policies to 
support organic growth should be given a higher precedence over M&A activity – 
which would involve retaining firm independence. 
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 Unfortunately, firm independence cannot be evaluated from these regressions, 
listed as a collinearity problem in the regression. As this indicator shows low 
variation of status over the period of analysis, it is also possible that firm 
independence could also be removed as a consequence of using fixed effects 
method (FEM). Given the importance of this debate and the possible conclusions 
on policies to support firm growth, the next sub-section tries to explore an 
alternative regression to evaluate impact of firm independence on firm growth.  
 Independence of firms  
As mentioned above, business historians’ claims that acquisitions can be a 
distraction and negatively impact longer term organic growth is an important 
concern and if true, has considerable policy implications – specifically as it 
would appear to require policies if not to protect, at least to support firm 
independence. More so, the data analysis above indicated that venture capital 
which supports organic firm growth has at least 2x the impact on form growth 
relative to MBO’s, which includes both external acquisitions and internal 
management buyouts, appearing to support importance of organic growth. 
However, firm independence itself could not be evaluated in above regressions. 
Given the importance of this characteristic, as it encapsulates organic firm 
growth, an alternative set of regressions are performed in this section to try to 
examine this effect on firm growth. 
To find a way to analyse independence and whether this matters for firm 
growth, a regression is undertaken which compares the growth response of 
overall innovative firms (independent and dependent firms) relative to 
independent innovative firm growth. Equation (2) is used for FEM analysis for 
both these regressions, with independent firm growth being examined by 
restricting database to independent firms only, using the firm independence 
indicator as provided by Amadeus data and described in data section. 
These results of impact of drivers on firm growth for overall (independent and 
dependent) innovative firms is listed in column 1, versus growth for independent 
innovative firms in column 2, Table 4.7.   
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Table 4.7 FEM of Innovative independent firm’s growth, compared with FEM for Innovative 
overall firms (dependent and independent) growth 
 
  (1)   (2)  
LHS variable: Firm-
growth  Dep & Indep firms 
Independent firms 
only 
  All sizes Innovative 
firms (Venture 
Capital 2nd & 3rd 
round) 
All sizes Innovative 
firms (Venture 
Capital 2nd & 3rd 
round) 
Control variables:     
Growth theories   
• Gross capital 
growth 
.00008(.0002)  -.022(.021) 
     
• Human 
Resource 
growth 
.493*** (.01) .913***(.1) 
    
• Technology 
(R&D) growth  .0003(.0002) -.0007(.003)  
      
Globalization    
• Export growth .00009(.0002) .239***(.024) 
      
      
Tax and Financing policy 
tools: 
  
• Corporate Tax 
Growth  
-.026 ***(.002)   -.119*** (.02)  
     
• Later stage 
funding (2nd & 
3rd round) 
.01**(.004) -0.019(.016) 
   
• Replacement 
capital (incl 
secondary 
buy-outs) 
-.022*** (.008) .047(.033) 
   
• Management 
buyouts  
.004*** (.001) -.005(.005) 
    
• Management 
Buy-ins 
.347***(.12) -.722(.49) 
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• Firm Age -9.03***(2.5)   15.05(10.45) 
      
Constant 231.43***(63.7) -463.89***(322.22) 
      
Observations 5,736 703 
     
No. of groups 2,127 210 
      
Obs per group min = 1 min = 1 
  avg= 2.7 avg= 3.3 
  max= 6 max= 6 
R-sq within= 0.4182 within= 0.4625 
  between = .0212 between = .0004 
  overall = 0.0174 overall = 0.0004 
Corr (u_i,Xb) -0.9862 -0.9897 
         
   
Note: The regression equation uses Eq (2) for (Firm Grth ) = a + b1(Gross Cap Grth) + b2(Cost Emply Grth ) 
+ b3(R&D Grth) + b4(Exp Rev Grth ) + b5(Int Rates )  + b6(Firmage ) + b7(CorpTaxGrth)  ) + b9(Ven Cap) + b10(Lat 
Ven Cap) + b11 (Rep Cap) + b12 (MBO) + b13 (MBI) + b14 (Firm Ind) – with lending interest rates and other 
late stage lending not listed as they are omitted due to collinearity  
*** indicates significance at 1% p-value, ** indicates significance at 5% p-value and * indicates 
significance at 10% p-value. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. 
The findings can be summarised as follows: 
• Skilled human resource is significant, but approximately 2x higher 
impact for independent firms 
• The fact that capital and R&D growth coefficient are negative and not 
significant, could be consequent of these drivers exerting a delayed 
impact on firm growth. This appears to be in line with previous 
studies, which have found that there is a lagged impact of R&D 
investment on firm profits (Coad & Rao, 2010; Chan et al., 2001)  
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• Export growth is significant for independent innovative firms, which is 
insignificant and very small influence for overall innovative firms. 
• Corporate tax growth remains a negative for both types of innovative 
firms – overall and independent 
• Surprisingly, venture capital (2nd and 3rd round) is negative and is less 
significant, as that driver has a p-value of 25%. This finding opposes 
the premise from earlier regressions that as venture capital supports 
organic growth, it should also thus support firm independence. These 
findings appear to show that while venture capital supports organic 
growth for overall innovative firm, it does not essentially support 
growth of independent firms. Whether this is due to independent firms 
seeking debt-finance rather than equity for growth, this regression 
cannot answer that.  It only indicates that equity financing through 
venture capital is a negative impact on growth. Alternatively, this 
negative impact of venture capital on independent firm growth could 
also reflect the de facto lack of access to internal corporate capital 
for independent firms. Given that these further rounds of venture 
capital financing could be accompanied by debt or interest paybacks, 
which could dilute short-term growth as independent firms lack the 
larger corporate financial structure to buffer against debt repayments. 
Nonetheless, for independent firms venture capital is not a growth 
driver – at least in the short term.  
• Similarly, as opposed to overall firms, M&A are not significant as driver 
for independent innovative firms, as both MBOs and MBIs are negative 
and not significant.  
This is an interesting result as it seems to signify that M&A is not the 
path of growth for independent firms - supportive of business 
historians’ suggestions that those firms which rely on organic growth, 
rather than M&A which can be a distraction, have higher long term 
growth. This long-term growth for independent firms at least seems 
indeed not to come from M&As – but surprisingly another characteristic 
which captures the years of independence itself – firm age.  
Chapter 4  167 
• The biggest surprise is firm age – for independent innovative firms, 
firm age has a large positive impact at 15% significance, which is valid 
enough to be considered, opposed to negative impact of firm age for 
overall innovative firms. Firm age appears to be the largest effect on 
growth for firms, with each year since incorporation yielding a 15% 
impact on firm growth. 
Key findings and policy consequences from regressions on innovative 
independent firms are listed below:  
• Corporate Tax growth is a negative and thus appears to be a drag on 
growth for independent innovative firms – supporting earlier conclusion 
that corporate tax should not be a blanket policy, rather tailored 
differently for innovative firms and differing firm-sizes. 
• Neither venture capital, nor M&A activity appear to drive growth of 
independent firms – instead seeming to rely on organic growth, as 
suggested by business historians. Providing a much-needed perspective for 
the role of venture capital and M&A activity in the policy tool-kit. These 
two drivers, venture capital and M&A, while helping overall and 
innovative firm growth are not key for innovative independent firms. 
Exactly the type of firms - the independent innovative firms that could 
become the next UK Googles or ARM, whose absence in UK is the 
motivation for this study. So what policy is needed for them? That appears 
to get answered in the next observation.  
• In terms of firm growth, the largest influence on growth appears to be 
interconnected – the age of a firm, when the firm stays independent. Firm 
age, which is the years the firm has survived since incorporation, appears 
to have a high impact on firm growth – but only for independent firms. 
More so, firm independence seems to have a significant multiplier effect 
on key growth drivers: skilled human resource and export. It would appear 
given the significantly large effect of these three combined aspects, that 
independent innovative firms would be expected to grow at a much higher 
rate relative to overall innovative firms. 
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 As such, policies to either protect or at least support firm independence, 
currently absent in policies – appears to be of critical importance for 
boosting firm growth in the UK. 
In essence, it would appear that ensuring firms stay independent and age while 
retaining independence – could be the single most important contributor to firm 
growth, given the multiplier effect of independence. If this is indeed correct, 
then the sale of UK’s successful innovative firms before they reach full potential 
appears to explain why the UK cannot produce the new frontier giants of the 
future – the loss of independence seems to lead to significantly reduced growth 
and moreover, these innovative firms do not grow into giants in their own right 
as they have become part of another firm.  
 Overall key findings from Regressions  
A) Variables of interest: 
Corporate tax: 
A surprising finding of this study was the revelation of how corporate tax can 
have differing impacts on growth. Corporate tax growth was positive for general 
(innovative and non-innovative) firms, indicating firms could seemingly grow 
despite increase in corporate taxes – opposite to current emphasis in UK policy 
with lowered corporate tax rates as one of the headline policies for firm growth. 
However, upon isolating innovative firms, corporate tax was found to be 
negative, indicating that a blanket policy for all types of firms may not be 
advisable. Indeed, when isolating impact of corporate tax for differing firm size 
classes, it appears that micro and large general firms as well as medium 
innovative can grow despite increased corporate tax, while medium general and 
small innovative firms need reduced corporate taxes to grow. 
Furthermore, corporate tax growth has an even larger negative influence on 
independent innovative firms, indicating that corporate tax growth is not an 
advisable route if UK is wanting its innovative small firms to stay independent 
and grow into the next UK ARM or Google. However, it seems that general large 
firms could grow despite increased corporate tax, indicting a tailored approach 
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on this policy may be more advisable relative to current blanket policy 
approach. 
Perhaps the main takeaway on this is that the magnitude of the impact of this 
driver is low relative to other drivers and as such may explain why despite 
reduction in UK corporate tax rates over the last decade -UK has not succeeded 
in getting UK innovative small firms to upscale. It appears not to deserve the 
headline policy status it has been given over the last decade. 
Later stage -Venture capital 2nd and 3rd round: 
The findings appear to corroborate the importance of venture capital on firm 
growth – albeit, its impact on growth is not huge. It appears to be positive and 
significant driver for both overall and innovative firms, delivering roughly .01% 
firm growth for every million pound invested for overall (innovative and non-
innovative) and innovative firms. Detailed analysis at firm size levels for overall 
firms reveals that it’s a significant and positive driver for medium and large 
overall firms. In contrast innovative firm size class analysis reveals that this 
driver is only significant for micro and medium innovative firms. 
In contrast, it appears that venture capital is not significant (indeed negative) 
for independent innovative firm growth. If the policy objective would be to 
create the future UK Google/ARM, then policy support for venture capital 
appears not to be the appropriate choice.  
Nonetheless, overall these results would affirm venture capitals position as a 
positive driver for SME growth and given that UK’s venture capital is 
approximately factor 7~8 lower availability of venture capital ratio to GDP 
relative to US (OECD, 2016) – policy effort to enhance venture capital access 
seems the correct policy stance. However, the relatively low impact on firm 
growth and non-significance for independent innovative firms explains why it 
could not in itself be the central policy to scale up innovative firms to become 
the future UK googles/ARM of UK. For that yet again, it appears we have to look 
if possible for a driver with greater impact. 
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A): 
The findings suggest that M&As, based on MBO and MBI, seem to be positive and 
significant, with a similar impact for both general (innovative and non-
innovative) and innovative firms. Although MBO’s, which include external 
hostile/consensual takeovers as well as management buyouts, have a lower 
impact than venture capital, approximately half. In contrast MBIs seems to have 
a much higher impact than venture capital, yet MBI’s make up a very small 
fraction of M&A activity (Wright & Wilson, 2013). Given the lower composition of 
MBI in M&A activity, it would appear that overall M&A impact on firm growth is 
lower than venture capital and its role as a central tool of firm growth does not 
seem to be justified. 
Based on MBOs, which appear to be the predominant component of M&A 
activity, detailed firm size analysis suggests that M&As drive growth of small and 
medium size class for general firms and only large size class for innovative firms.  
So, it appears not to be the key driver for scaling up innovative small firms to 
become the UK Google/ARM. 
In term of independent innovative firms, M&As have absolutely no significance. 
Yet again, if the policy objective is to create the next UK Google/ARM, this 
would not appear to be a driver at all. 
Thus, it would appear that although mergers and acquisitions are much lauded 
as a tool of growth, the data in contrast supports the claim by business 
historians that M&A activity appears to distract firms from organic growth, which 
is the longer-term growth.  Specifically, it is not the driver for scaling up 
innovative small firms nor specially for independent innovative small firms to 
scale up to become the next UK Google/ARM. 
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B) Control variables, which are basic growth drivers: 
Gross capital growth 
This was a surprising result when assessing general (innovative and non-
innovative) firms and innovative firms – both regressions found gross capital 
growth to be an insignificant driver for firm growth, contrary to expectation. 
This also held true for all firm size classes in the detailed analysis. More so, it 
continued to be insignificant, although negative, also for independent innovative 
firms. It is possible that this is consequent of the fact that capital investment 
growth has a lagged effect on growth, which should be explored in future 
research. Notwithstanding, at least for the short term capital growth appears to 
be insignificant on firm growth. 
Human resource growth 
This is the most consistently significant and positive driver for all types of firms – 
significant for general (innovative and non-innovative) firms and innovative 
firms. However, interestingly this driver is 40x higher for innovative firms. 
Detailed analysis shows it is a significant and positive driver for all firm size 
classes, except intriguingly for micro innovative firm sizes. It appears that 
skilled human resource impact on firm growth is positive and immediate, also 
comparatively the largest influence for all growth variables.   
Reviewing independent innovative firms, independence seems to deliver a 
further higher response – in this case, human resource growth delivers x2 higher 
than overall innovative firms. It appears that independence has a marked 
increase in the impact of human resource on growth, a consistently key 
significant basic growth driver. 
Technology (R&D) growth 
The effect of this driver is only analysed for innovative firms, as non-innovative 
firms do not list R&D expenditures. Reviewing overall (independent and 
dependent) innovative firms, technology growth is found to be insignificant 
although positive driver. Detailed size-class analysis showing it to be a 
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significant and positive albeit small influence only for large firms, staying 
insignificant for rest of size-classes.  
For independent firms, technology growth continues to be insignificant although 
negative. This requires further review, as it could perhaps be related to 
independent firms needing to source external funds for R&D, which are 
associated with higher interest rates (Giebel & Kraft, 2015). Further research in 
this would appear to be important, as it could indicate that the costs of R&D 
could be one of the bottlenecks that may persuade independent firms to sell 
out. However, this is only speculation and needs further research for forming a 
correct understanding. 
Export growth 
This was yet again a surprising result – export growth was not significant for 
general (innovative and non-innovative) firms nor was it significant for 
innovative firms. Exploring firm size classes, it was found to be a positive and 
significant driver for micro general firms as well as for small innovative firms, 
albeit negative and significant for small general firms. Suggesting it has a 
positive growth impact for some types of SME’s, but overall it is not significant 
for either innovative or general firms. This is a puzzling result, as it implies that 
these firms source their growth mainly from domestic markets, or if they export 
then it does not benefit their growth immediately, which should definitely be 
examined in future research.  
This however totally reverses for independent innovative firms, with export 
growth highly significant and a relatively large impact – 5000x that of the 
insignificant though positive figure for overall innovative firms. This seems to 
suggest that independent innovative firms design their product, be it 
manufacturing or services within the UK and exporting that overseas seems one 
of the key growth drivers.  Once again, it appears that independence has a 
marked influence on the ability to generate growth from a basic growth driver. 
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C) Firm characteristics: 
Firm age: 
The findings on this firm characteristic were yet again surprising and 
unexpected. Firm age is significant and a large negative impact for general 
(innovative and non-innovative firms) firms, as well significant and similarly 
large negative impact for innovative firms - implying the older the firm, there is 
roughly a drag of 10% on growth for each year of existence. This remains true 
(with variation of magnitude) for small, medium and large general firms, as well 
as true for medium and large innovative firms. Its yet again puzzling, as one 
would expect firms at least expanding from their early stages of micro to SME to 
show a positive impact of age on firm growth. 
Interestingly, this figure yet again totally reverses for independent innovative 
firms. The variable albeit significant at 15% p-value, shows an even larger 
positive impact on firm growth, suggesting a 15% growth boost for every year of 
existence – if firm stays independent. This figure appears to dwarf impacts of 
other variables. Given the extent of this impact, it would appear that the longer 
firms remain independent, the greater would be the cumulative impact of age 
on firm growth. On the other hand, the reverse is also true, non-independent 
firms face a cumulative drag of age on growth. This finding would appear to be 
in line with the new US behemoths of today. Initially Google (Entrepreneur, 
2008) and Facebook (Tech Crunch, 2012) were only small successful disruptors, 
but with the passage of time their growth has seemed to accelerate, in 
accordance with their age of independence (BBC News, 2016; Bellis, 2017).  
This result is quite significant, as it underscores the importance of firm 
independence in firm growth – offering a partial explanation why UK’s innovative 
firms may not scale up to become the next UK ARM/Google, if they lose 
independence underway on their growth path.  
Firm independence:  
This was perhaps the most critical finding of the study – firm independence itself 
appears to be the most vital contributor to firm growth. Independent innovative 
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firms reap more from basic growth drivers and more so, there is a growth boost 
for each year of independent firm existence – impact of firm age on firm growth. 
 Indeed, the difference in impact for basic growth drivers is quite striking, with 
human resource growth x2 higher for independent innovative firms relative to 
overall innovative firms and export revenue growth x5000 higher. More so, firm 
age would deliver a boost of 15% a year. Such a significant difference in firm 
growth for independent firms causes pause for thought.  
Out of the policy tools, only reduced corporate tax is beneficial for independent 
firm growth. Venture capital is not significant and negative, similarly M&A 
activity is not significant and negative.  There is currently no policy specifically 
to support firm independence nor protect firms from takeovers in the UK, unlike 
US or European economies which have varied mechanisms such as Dual shares, 
staggered boards, poison pills (Mayer, 2018). 
If these findings are indeed correct and it is difficult to assess the counterfactual 
given data limitations, then the sale of successful UK innovative firms before 
they reach potential, could significantly reduce their growth path – possibly 
offering a partial answer to why UK does not have its own new frontier 
behemoths. 
Thus, in the main, it would appear that perhaps the most vital contributor to 
firm growth is independence - more so than the other variables of interest. 
However, there is currently no policy in place to either support or protect firm 
independence.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to seek to understand why UK has not produced the 
new innovative giants of tomorrow and whether firm independence matters – 
through examining the sufficiency and effectiveness of current policy tools 
promoting firm growth put in context of the growth drivers. 
The question, put in other words, is whether these various policy initiatives over 
the last few decades in UK could have inadvertently shaped the current UK 
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economy – perhaps boosting the creation of innovative start-ups like DeepMind 
(Shead, 2016), but not sufficient to support firms to last the distance to scale up 
to create the Googles itself? Furthermore, as the sale of potential successful 
innovative UK firms before reaching their potential, which is a part of M&A 
activity, appeared to be of relevance to this issue - it became important to 
identify the impact of independence on firm growth. As firm independence is 
currently absent in policy, its influence on firm growth is examined to gauge 
either its relevance or importance towards this problem.   
To enable this examination, initially the basic drivers of firm growth are 
examined alongside the current policy tools which drive firm growth: tax & 
financing incentives and M&A activity. These are examined first for general 
(innovative and non-innovative) firms and then innovative firms separately, 
thereafter being compared to innovative independent firms. To identify the 
influence of independence, the growth reaped from basic growth drivers was 
examined and compared to the influence of current policy tools promoting firm 
growth. 
The main contribution of this study was to understand the influence of 
independence on firm growth in context of the current policy tools - as research 
seems currently virtually absent on the influence of firm independence on firm 
growth. Moreover, this appears to be important, as independence is currently 
neither protected nor specifically supported in growth policy. Furthermore, this 
study aimed to place the value of the various growth policy tools into the 
context of actual firm growth and thus to reassess either insufficiencies or 
shortcomings in the current policy toolkit.  
The extent of impact of firm independence on growth was striking and 
unexpected, with evidence in fact indicating it to be a vital factor for firm 
growth. Contrary to expectation, the difference reaped in basic growth drivers 
by independent firms was striking. The difference in impact for basic growth 
drivers for independent innovative firms relative to overall innovative firms can 
be summarised as follows: human resource growth x2 higher; and export revenue 
growth x5000 higher. Moreover, each year of firm independence delivers a bonus 
independence dividend - a remarkable 15% increase in firm growth per year, 
though this had 15% significance. Given these quite striking differences in growth 
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that independent firms reap from skilled human resource, a key growth driver, 
and from globalisation, coupled with the bonus dividend for each year of 
independence - raises firm independence as an important consideration for firm 
growth. 
Notwithstanding the importance of independence for firm growth, tax and 
financing incentives, as well as merger and acquisition (M&A) activity are also 
critical drivers influenced by policy impacting firm growth. While firm 
independence results are persuasive in suggesting there should be some policy 
space to protect or support it, nonetheless the other policy incentives are 
important as they work to support different types of growth, offering firms’ 
choices to create a diversified firm landscape for a successful economy. So, how 
did the tax and financing incentives and M&A activity stand up to evaluation? 
Firstly, the much-publicized claim that corporate tax cuts are needed for firm 
growth, appears not to be the case for all types of firms. It appears that general 
(innovative and non-innovative) firms can seemingly grow despite increase in 
corporate taxes. However, it is true that for innovative firms specifically, 
corporate tax growth was found to be negative impact on firm growth, indicating 
that a blanket policy for all types of firms may not be advisable. Furthermore, 
corporate tax growth has an even larger negative influence on independent 
innovative firms, indicating that corporate tax reduction for innovative firms 
does appear to be the correct policy stance. Nonetheless, given the variation of 
impact for general firms, a tailored approach on corporate tax reduction policy 
may be more advisable rather than the current blanket policy approach. 
Perhaps the main takeaway on corporate tax reduction is that the magnitude of 
the impact of this driver on firm growth is low relative to other drivers, 
appearing not to deserve the headline policy status it has been given over the 
last decade. 
Secondly, are the tax and financing incentives aimed at increasing seed and 
venture capital, helping firm growth? The findings appear to corroborate the 
importance of venture capital on firm growth – albeit its impact on growth is not 
large, it is a positive and significant driver for both general and innovative firms. 
In contrast, it appears that venture capital is not significant (indeed negative) 
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for independent innovative firm growth. Nonetheless, incorporating detailed 
analysis, the results affirm venture capitals position as a positive driver for SME 
growth. Given that UK’s venture capital is approximately factor 7~8 lower 
availability of venture capital ratio to GDP relative to US (OECD, 2016) and is 
considered to be one of the alternatives for longer term funding for firms, then 
increasing availability of this type of capital should partially address the scaling-
up difficulties of current UK innovative start-ups. 
However, the relatively low impact on firm growth and non-significance for 
independent innovative firms suggests it could not in itself be the central policy 
to scale up innovative firms to become the future UK googles/ARM of UK. For 
that yet again, it appears we have to look if possible for a driver with greater 
impact. 
Thirdly, how does merger and acquisition activity influence firm growth? The 
findings suggest that M&As, based on MBO and MBI, seem to be positive and 
significant, with a similar impact for both general (innovative and non-
innovative) and innovative firms. To be noted though that MBO’s, which include 
external hostile/consensual takeovers as well as management buyouts, have a 
lower impact than venture capital, approximately half. In contrast MBIs seems to 
have a much higher impact than venture capital, though MBI’s make up a very 
small fraction of M&A activity (Wright & Wilson, 2013). More so, detailed 
analysis revealed that M&As do not drive firm growth for innovative SME’s, only 
large innovative firms and general SME’s.  
Furthermore, in term of independent innovative firms, M&As have absolutely no 
significance. As firm independence seems to have a considerable impact in 
driving firm growth, these findings place this driver in context for its impact on 
firm growth. Thus, while merger & acquisition are an important option for firms, 
whether as a choice of exit of firm owners or as a means of improving a failing 
business or means of growth through technology acquisition – it appears not to 
be the option for delivering growth for either innovative SME’s or independent 
successful innovative firm. 
Thus, it would appear that although mergers and acquisitions are much lauded 
as a tool of growth, the data in contrast suggests it is not a driver for scaling up 
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innovative SME’s nor specially for independent innovative small firms to scale up 
to become the next UK Google/ARM. 
In summation, it appears that the impact of these policy tools pales relative to 
firm independence – for which there is currently no policy support or protection 
in place. Thus, although corporate tax reduction and venture capital 
enhancement are policies that do support innovative firm growth, in contrast to 
M&A’s which have no impact on scaling up innovative SMEs – the most important 
policy for firm growth could be support of firm independence. Currently absent 
in policy. 
This brings the study back to its earlier concerns – that the sale of successful 
innovative firms before reaching their potential be one of the underlying reasons 
that UK does not have the successful new innovative behemoths of the future. 
This concern appears to be validated by data, given the quite large impact of 
firm independence. What then can explain the sale of these firms before 
potential?  
Given the relatively large impact of firm independence on firm growth, the lack 
of policies to support or protect firm independence could be crucial. Perhaps 
reconsideration of the Enterprise Act (2002) would enable some protection for 
firm independence through assessing whether and how firms may be protected 
from hostile takeovers. This study’s findings underline that merger and 
acquisitions can be an option for some firms, be it as an exit route or to bring in 
best practices to improve growth – but that option, as it involves losing 
independence, comes at the potential sacrifice of growth for successful firms. 
Hence a firm should retain choice for this path, an option a hostile takeover 
seems to remove from the firm. A possible option is the ‘poison pill’option 
available to firms in the Netherlands (Harvard Law School Forum, 2015) or dual 
class shares, staggered boards as in US (Mayer, 2018). The recent decision by 
Unilever to relocate its HQ to the Netherlands (FT, 2018), as well as GKN’s loss 
to Melrose in a hostile takeover that went to the wire (FT, 2018) , both seem to 
underscore the need for re-evaluation.  
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More so, lack of significant long-term financing could be another critical 
problems, as venture capital provides one channel through which firms secure 
longer term financing, enabling SME firm growth. Though it is not significant in 
this study for innovative independent firms. Given that venture capital as a ratio 
of GDP is a factor of 7~8 times lower in UK relative to US (OECD, 2016), it is 
perhaps not coincidental that UK has a factor of 6-7 times lower large firm share 
presence in the economy compared to US (SBA , 2016). This dearth in availability 
of venture capital, could conceivably encourage firms to sell in UK, rather than 
face the battles of uphill struggle to secure finance (Economist, 2017). 
Increasing the size of available venture capital for firms in the UK would thus 
seem a policy priority, providing one option of long-term finance for innovative 
firms wishing to scale-up and last the distance. Perhaps, UK could pursue an 
initiative similar to Israel’s successful venture capital investment programme as 
YOZMA (OECD, 2015). Started in 1993, with 0.1 percent of its GDP in public funds 
to leverage foreign financing, it was so effective at encouraging privately 
financed venture capital growth that the government could begin to phase out 
within 7 years. Alternatively, UK could consider introducing measures to enhance 
pension fund expansion in venture capital. Maybe, in the vein of the US 1979 
Employment Retirement Income Stabilization Act, which appeared to propel 
venture capital expansion in Silicon Valley (Bottazi & Da Rin, 2002). It would 
appear that this latter direction is supported by UK government in current white 
paper on Industrial strategy (Financial Times, 2017).   
In summary, it would appear that the key growth policies for UK to support its 
innovative start-ups to have the chance to become a future Tesla or Google are 
two-fold. Firstly, the government might bring in some policy measures to protect 
or enhance firm independence – currently absent in policy. Secondly, as the 
availability of venture capital in the UK is far lower than in the US, policies to 
further enhance availability of venture capital are much needed, as longer-term 
finance enables firms the choice of staying independent. Specially, as firm 
independence appears to have such a paramount impact on firm growth and UK’s 
potential giants appear to get sold before reaching potential -  these two policy 
shortcomings could perhaps partially explain UK’s current lack of new tech 
giants. Yet, it would appear that potential UK behemoths, not short of funding, 
nor targets of hostile takeovers – did indeed decide to sell (Sawyers, 2016; BBC 
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News, 2016). The above policy suggestions would not have had any influence in 
such a situation. 
Moreover, it is puzzling that not a single UK innovative firm created in the last 
30 years, except ARM, lasted the distance to become a valuable tech firm. Given 
the successful start-up intensity in UK, the fact that except for ARM holdings not 
a single tech frontier firm appears to have lasted the distance to become a UK 
giant is truly perplexing. It is not as if there is a total absence of venture 
capital, nor do all firms face hostile takeovers. Perchance, there is something 
else, something deeper – embedded in the mind-set perhaps?   
To find answers that delve deeper is beyond the scope of this study, but perhaps 
some clues to the answer may be found in historical analysis of innovative 
societies (Mokyr, 1990). While the historical discussion cannot be addressed in 
this study, Mokyr offers some insights to explain how innovative societies such as 
the Arab or Ottoman Empire or China were left behind by European industrial 
revolutions despite their innovative lead. According to Moykr (1990), the role of 
an innovator is central to grow innovative societies in the long run and the lack 
of flow of financial rewards to innovators in Arab or Ottoman empire and the 
lack of status of Entrepreneurs relative to Mandarins in China hindered the 
innovator from acquiring that central role in those economies. Whether that 
historical parallel would offer any clues to the situation in the UK is unclear, 
however further combined economic and historical research into this area could 
yield insights into deeper underlying issues not answered in this study. Such as 
whether rewards currently flow to innovators in the UK and/or is there a need to 
raise the status of innovators presently in the UK?  Or do innovators prefer low-
risk and liquidate gains earlier, rather than lasting the distance to reap higher 
gains, but with higher risk? Future research to assess the role of innovator in UK 
society today, could perhaps yield some clues to this puzzle. As UK needs the 
visionary entrepreneurs, seeking to change the world as we know it today - 
looking beyond initial financial gains - to successfully create the Googles of 
tomorrow.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and key insights drawn from research  
This research aspired to widen current concepts of innovation and growth 
through uniting neoclassical stream of thought with evolutionary economics, 
while further sourcing understandings relevant to innovation from development 
economics, economic history, industrial organization and entrepreneurial 
management & finance literature. Through merging of not only these two 
paradigms of thought but also these other inter-related fields, this research 
seems to contribute by widening the field of economics of innovation. Not only 
does this research widen some of the concepts, it goes a step further by 
connecting innovation to the field of productivity and growth. Analysing 
productivity through incorporating innovation structures into economic growth 
development economics models. It concludes by introducing a new concept, the 
characteristic of firm independence, into the study of growth. 
The central theme of this research is that neoclassical factors of production do 
not perhaps operate in a vacuum in an economy. Rather they are interconnected 
through linkages and structures, the exposure of which emphasises the 
importance of supporting these underlying connections as much as the factors of 
production, when devising policies. Notably in the field of growth and 
productivity, given the interaction of innovation with both these aspects of an 
economy.  
In particular, this research sought to broaden the current understanding of 
innovation and its interlinkages with productivity and growth. To widen the 
analysis of innovation combining formal innovation drivers alongside informal 
drivers, whilst at the same time exploring the structural aspects governing 
innovations relationship with productivity and growth. Essentially trying to 
discern how both the wider set of drivers and the deeper structural 
determinants of innovation, shape productivity and growth.  
In line with these goals, this research assessed three problems in particular: 
identifying a wider spectrum of innovation drivers explaining firm growth and 
how these differ across firm structures; revealing the deeper firm and sectoral 
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structures that define productivity adapting development economics models; 
and, exposing the role of firm independence in shaping firm growth and how this 
effect compares with current policy tools aimed at shaping firm growth. 
To build the wider concepts at the outset, this research used aggregated firm 
level data to form understandings across EU economies at country and sector 
level. Building upon these insights, the last chapter focussed on UK, using firm-
level data to shed light upon key aspects which support firm growth . 
The main empirical findings of this research support the central theme that 
neoclassical factors do not operate in isolation and that linkages and structures 
emphasize the intricate relationship of innovation with productivity and growth.  
Using panel innovation, skills statistics and IMF data of 27 EU economies from 
1996-2010, the second chapter of this research broadened the analysis of 
innovation in firms by adopting a wider concept, one encompassing drivers 
sourced across growth theory, evolutionary economics, industrial organization 
theory and globalization. In fact, combining innovation drivers sourced from 
formal R&D processes promoted by growth theories alongside informal R&D 
linkages emphasized by national innovation systems (NSI).  Although both R&D 
aspects are well researched for their importance towards innovation, this study 
researched whether there is an order to this contribution. In effect, 
distinguishing influences shaping revenue levels as primary drivers and those 
shaping revenue growth as secondary. The study revealed that industry linkages 
with academia, public funding of industry, linkages with suppliers and skilled 
human capital are found significant as primary drivers of innovative firms across 
all firm sizes. Although R&D investment is not found significant as a primary 
driver, it is significant as a secondary driver delivering growth of innovative 
firms. Thus, informal R&D processes such as linkages and tacit knowledge were 
found to constitute the primary driver, while formal R&D processes such as R&D 
investment acts as a secondary driver. The key insight that a broader set of 
policy tools could be used to encourage innovation, which is an important finding 
for shaping future innovation policies. Significantly, there is an order to this 
broader set of tools: the initial foundation of innovation driven through primary 
drivers of informal R&D linkages and tacit know-how, followed by formal R&D 
investment as secondary driver spurring growth. 
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Building upon this groundwork of importance of firm structures in the arena of 
innovation, the third chapter of research draws structures into an understanding 
of productivity– based on economic development theoretical frameworks. In 
particular, this chapter explores the structural compositions of the economy that 
may influence productivity. Not discarding the importance of factors of 
production, the chapter instead seeks to understand the structures beneath, 
channelling those factors of production. Using an adaptation of the economic 
development framework, the Lewis model, this study proposes that country level 
labour productivity may be driven structurally by the movement of resources 
across from smaller firm sizes to larger firm-size structures. To enable this 
analysis, a new database is built up at sector level for the 32 European 
economies between 2000-2012. The contribution of firm-sizes to country 
productivity is measured through isolating classifications of small, medium and 
large firms, alongside control variables capturing growth theory drivers, 
globalization, credit conditions and monetary lending policies. Large firms are 
indeed found to be the significant most structure for country labour 
productivity. These findings underscore that focus on factors of production 
alone, be it firm investment or skills shortage, may not be sufficient to improve 
productivity – understanding the firm-landscape composition may be as 
essential. 
Additionally, this chapter examines whether sectoral composition of an economy 
can shape country labour productivity levels. The chapter investigates both 
aspects, sector size and sector productivity, and how they influence in shaping 
country labour productivity. The findings from this sector composition analysis 
seem less clear. Some sector productivities were found significant for country 
productivity, while sector revenue-size was found significant for some sectors. 
These results suggest that firm structures may not be an equally sensitive issue 
over all sectors. 
Nonetheless, these results offer two insights. Firstly, those sectors which 
influence country productivity through both sector size as well as sector 
productivity, require policy makers to tailor policy accordingly to both aspects. 
Secondly, this finding has possible implications for firm-structures most suited to 
sectors depending upon their mode of influence. Though needing further 
corroborations, the implication is that sectors influencing through size would 
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benefit most from presence of turnover contributions of all three firm-size 
structures. In contrast, sectors contributing through sector productivity may 
benefit from a higher intensity of large firms in that sector. These implications 
were outside the scope of the current study due to limitations of firm-structure 
classification at detailed sector level data. Should that data become available in 
the future, these implications could be corroborated allowing future policy 
support of firm-structures to be shaped in accordance to mode of influence of 
sectors.  
Lastly, chapter three also examined whether sector share, the proportion of 
sector turnover to total core innovative sectors turnover, as distinguished from 
sheer size of sector also exerts an influence on country productivity. The results 
indicate that for some sectors, sector share of turnover is significant as a mode 
of influence, although comparatively less sectors than those found significant for 
size of turnover. More so, of those sectors found significant in terms of share, 
quite a large number appeared to have a negative influence on country 
productivity. Although isolating the cause for this result is outside the scope of 
the study, this could be indicative of a negative impact through either 
dominance or conversely weakness of sectors proportional to the total 
innovative sectors. Further in-depth research would be needed to assess whether 
this is or is not an issue for country productivity. 
The fourth chapter of research, building upon the knowledge and insights gained 
from foundational chapter, tackles one of the very concrete current problems in 
the UK economy – the weakness of UK firms to scale up. This chapter examines 
whether firm independence, not known to be driver for firm growth itself, is an 
important criterion to enable scale up of innovative firms into successful frontier 
large firms. To shed light on the role of independence brought to the fore in 
business history and financial enterprise literature, the study examines 
neoclassical drivers of firm growth alongside key policy tools used to support 
firm growth – with innovative independent firms separately assessed from overall 
innovative firms. Using firm level dataset for all UK sectors between 2006-2016, 
policy tax and financing tools supporting start-up, growth and merger activity 
are examined alongside growth theory drivers, globalization and monetary 
lending policy. The empirical analysis reveals that independent firms reap much 
higher growth, with age of independence delivering a bonus growth-dividend 
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based solely on the years that a firm can manage to stay independent. Contrary 
to expectation, the growth from the traditional policy tools, though valuable, 
seems outweighed by the impact of firm independence on growth. It appears 
that firm independence itself is a vital aspect for growth – an aspect neither 
enhanced nor specifically protected in current UK policy. Policy tools, currently 
used in US or Europe such as staggered boards, poison pills or Dual class shares 
or reshaping of UK Enterprise act 2002 could perhaps be considered to form 
policy support for firm independence in UK. 
Notwithstanding this, current policy tools remain a critical component to aid 
growth. In particular, two findings stand out. Firstly, although relatively smaller 
in impact, both corporate tax reduction and access to seed and venture capital 
appears important to support long-term growth for innovative firms. Though 
general firms can grow despite increases in corporate tax, suggesting a tailored 
policy approach is advisable. Secondly, M&A activity appears to enhance growth 
of general SME’s, not innovative SME’s only large innovative firms, suggesting 
M&A’s have a role for growth overall – but not for helping scale up the innovative 
small firms of today to become the frontier giants of tomorrow. These findings 
invite a rethink of current UK M&A regulation, balancing encouraging M&A 
activity for overall firms and for large innovative firms, with some protection for 
innovative SMEs desiring to scale up into possible frontier firms like ARM/UK 
Googles of tomorrow.  
5.2 Future Areas of Research 
This research has built on a legacy of research and literature, drawing 
understandings and insights not only from neoclassical and evolutionary 
economics, but also from disparate fields of business history, industrial 
organization and financial and management enterprise literature. The insights 
were used to guide this research, but despite enormous efforts to draw the 
maximum insight into this research, one of the challenges lay in the limitations 
of data. While the increased availability of panel data shed light on many 
insights, some of the puzzles could not be clarified within the current databases 
and leave avenues open for future research. I would like to point a few, which I 
think would continue to develop our understanding of innovation and its 
intricate relationship with growth. 
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One of the puzzles only alluded but not resolved in the second chapter on 
innovation drivers lies in assessing the consequences of short-term versus long-
term ownership and governance structures on firm growth. Given current data 
limitations, this could not be assessed directly, yet it is an important issue. The 
focus in EU since 2008 to build demographic firm data, which would over time 
gain sufficient increase in longitudinal time, could in future be linked to 
financial databases with ownership data. Such an option, might not only enable 
consequences of ownership structure to be explored, it may also provide further 
insights on how diffusion or maturing of technology (Tunzelmann G. V., 2000) 
may change innovation drivers shaping policy makers insights accordingly. 
Similarly, the third chapters’ research on assessment of firm structures influence 
on productivity within sectors was limited by data availability to 10 aggregated 
sector levels. Should detailed firm structure of each sector be made available, 
that would develop deeper understanding on the interaction of structures and 
productivity at sector level. Furthermore, it could expose sectoral variations, 
allowing identification of sectors differing from the norm, and even revealing 
perhaps sectors where SME’s could have higher productivity relative to larger 
firms, thus allowing in turn fine-tuning of policies to the needs of sectors. Lastly, 
if data was made available not only on firm structures at sector level, but also of 
firm-type, innovative versus non-innovative firm – that could shed light on the 
intriguing puzzle how and why sector shares could negatively impact an 
economy. These queries, should data be made available, could help further 
develop our understanding on how structures influence productivity of 
economies.  
Another critical aspect for advancing insights of innovation in the future, hinted 
but essentially left unanswered in chapter 4, is perhaps as much a challenge in 
capturing values, as perhaps regulations or policy to support independence to 
boost firm growth. This pertains to the puzzle of the role of an innovator in 
lasting the distance and enabling a small firm to become a behemoth of 
tomorrow. Indeed, queries seeking answers as to why potential UK behemoths 
like Skyscanner or ARM, not short of funding, nor targets of hostile takeovers – 
did indeed decide to sell (Sawyers, 2016; BBC, 2016), are not easily addressed. 
Yet, they need to be understood. Historical analysis seems to offer some 
possible clues. According to Mokyr (1990), historically innovative societies that 
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failed to develop in the long run, missed allocating innovators a central role in 
the innovation process: captured either by lack of status of innovators in some 
societies; or a lack of flow of financial rewards to innovators in others. Should 
future research perhaps combining historical business studies with demographic 
data offer possible insights into the aspirations of innovators, these would be 
very revealing. In fact, not only revealing, they could help shape policies dealing 
with the unit at the very crux of innovation – the innovator. 
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Appendix 
Chapter 1 appendix 
Apendix A: Statistics of data variables representing drivers  
Table A1 provides the descriptive statistics for the drivers listed in table 2. 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for variables used in regression analysis 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Innovative Turnover  3.76e+08 6.92e+08 2573667 4.20e+09  
Number of Scientists and 
Engineers (Skilled human 
capital) 
332.1915 478.5706 4  2281  
Total innovation expenditure 
(R&D investment) 
9533784 1.99e+07 20934  1.07e+08  
Enterprises using external 
R&D 
2167.616 3060.054 4  16242  
Enterprises using internal 
R&D  
5110.252 8195. 296 61  40753  
Enterprises with access to 
public funding _ 
 2420.488 3926.076 14  18573.14  
Enterprises with any type of 
cooperation  
2638.093 3529.394 36  20949  
Enterprises collaborating with 
universities  
980.0557 1503.702 6  11305  
Enterprises collaborating with 
govt. institutions  
647.2313 869.0159 3  4805  
Enterprises collaborating with 
suppliers 
1599.733 1951.613 26  13886  
Enterprises focusing on 
National markets 
5642.08 8543.078 65.248  45821  
Enterprises focusing on 
International markets  
4195.015 6092.886 28  33153  
Small firm Innovative 
turnover (less than 50 
emplyees) 
4.43e+07 7.26e+07 243162  4.43e+08  
Medium firms Innovative 
turnover (less than 250 
employees) 
7.34e+07 1.22e+08 179474.8  8.09e+08  
     
CIS and HRST database, Eurostat  
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Appendix B: Correlation table of drivers  
Table A2 provides the correlation values the drivers listed in table 2. 
Table A2: Correlation values for drivers used in regression analysis 
 Innova
tive 
turnov
er 
Num
ber of 
Scien
tists 
and 
Engin
eers  
(Skill
ed 
huma
n 
capita
l) 
Tot
al 
inn
ovat
ion 
exp
endi
ture 
(R
&D 
inve
stm
ent) 
Ent. 
usin
g 
exte
rnal 
R&
D 
Ent. 
usin
g 
inte
rnal 
R&
D 
Ent. 
wit
h 
acc
ess 
to 
pub
lic 
fun
din
g _ 
Ent.
wit
h 
any 
type 
of 
coo
pera
tion  
Ent. 
coll
abo
rati
ng 
wit
h 
uni
vers
ities 
Ent. 
coll
abo
rati
ng 
wit
h 
gov
t. 
insti
tuti
ons 
Ent. 
coll
abo
rati
ng 
wit
h 
sup
plie
rs 
Ent. 
foc
usin
g on 
Nati
onal 
mar
kets 
Ent. 
foc
usin
g on 
Inte
rnat
iona
l 
mar
kets 
Innovative Turnover  1            
Number of Scientists and 
Engineers  (Skilled human 
capital) 
.927 1           
Total innovation expenditure 
(R&D investment) 
.937 .91 1          
Enterprises using external 
R&D 
.917 .906 .921 1         
Enterprises using internal 
R&D  
.916 .892 .937 .986 1        
Enterprises with access to 
public funding _ 
 .79 .758 .727 .88 .893 1       
Enterprises with any type of 
cooperation  
.93 .937 .905 .922 .92 .783 1      
Enterprises collaborating with 
universities  
.933 .877 .919 .888 .903 .734 .945 1     
Enterprises collaborating with 
govt. institutions  
.932 .941 .88 .87 .85 .701 .954 .931 1    
Enterprises collaborating with 
suppliers 
.843 .869 .91 .833 .822 .70 .953 .845 .889 1   
Enterprises focusing on 
National markets 
.862 .856 .857 .951 .955 .892 .824 .849 .823 .795 1  
Enterprises focusing on 
International markets  
.876 .859 .873 .959 .964 .863 .834 .881 .833 .823 .984 1 
Small firm Innovative 
turnover (less than 50 
emplyees) 
.844 .769 .734 .810 .822 .81 .826 .814 .80 ,771 .821 .827 
Medium firms Innovative 
turnover (less than 250 
employees) 
.952 .903 .906 .923 .934 .836 .836 .96 .928 .862 .908 .923 
             
CIS and HRST database, Eurostat  
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C: Overview of proportional ratios for R&D, for top 10 Economies 
according to R&D investments 
Table A3: Top 10 EU economies ranked in order for proportional ratio of R&D driver 
(innovation output per R&D input, measured in billion Euros output per million Euro R&D 
investment), covering the period 1996-2010 
Countries Proportional Ratio R&D 
(innovation output per 
R&D input, measured in 
billion euros output per 
million euro R&D 
investment)  
R&D investment 
(comprises total  R&D 
costs, including capital 
and knowledge 
acquisition,  measured 
in millions of Euros) 
Mean Innovative turnover 
(all firms) – main 
innovation measure 
(measured in billions of 
Euros) 
Spain  0.06 10.5 0.63 
Poland 0.043 5.57 0.24 
Netherlands 0.042 8.9 0.38 
Italy 0.04 21.6 0.92 
France 0.036 35.7 1.33 
UK 0.036 27.8 1.00 
Belgium 0.034 8.5 0.29 
Germany 0.032 94.9 2.99 
Finland 0.028 5.6 0.16 
Sweden 0.02 13 0.26 
CIS database, Eurostat  
D: Overview of R&D figures for advanced economies  
A brief overview of mean R&D figures14,over the period 2000-2010 of advanced 
economies, as listed in table A4, contrasts with the performance mean 
innovation measure over period 1996-2010 of EU economies under review in this 
study in Table A5.  Table A4 appears to highlight the variation in delivery of 
innovation in economies based on R&D investment alone, Table A4 also including 
figures on US as a benchmark for comparison. It is noteworthy to see how much 
of GERD is financed by governments and how much by businesses. It seems that 
quite a few of the higher performing innovative economies amongst top 20 have 
a government financed GERD around 0.7%. More remarkable to note perhaps is 
that the difference for the relative much higher GERD appears to be driven by 
business’s financing, as evident for Sweden, Finland, Germany, Denmark and US. 
Comparing figures within Table A4, it is noticeable that despite a considerable 
global innovative lead by US along with Japan over EU economies (PRO INNO 
Europe, 2007) (Pro Inno Europe, 2011), Sweden appears to have a higher 
expenditure on R&D, both in GERD and BERD. Though Sweden in its own right is 
                                         
14 As R&D expenditure is often listed both in terms of gross domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) and 
business expenditure on R&D(BERD), the mean values for both are provided in table 1, covering the 
period of 1996-2010. 
Chapter 5  191 
 191 
ranked as one of the leading European innovative powers, it still trails behind US 
(European Commission, 2013), yet its R&D expenditure is substantially higher 
than US.  In contrast, Germany and Denmark seem to have relatively similar 
levels of GERD to US, with Finland though again higher comparatively. Thus, 
underscoring the variation in R&D investment in order to deliver similar levels of 
innovation performance, as measured by EIS. These R&D investments of Table A4 
contrast with innovation measure performances in Table A5, illustrating the 
complexities of an innovation system indicating importance of drivers beyond 
R&D as a means to explain the resulting level of innovation in an economy. To 
enable a comparative comparison of GERD as share of GDP with the innovative 
measure, the innovative measure as a share of GDP is listed in Table A6. 
Although this realigns the top 20 EU economies, Germany still outperforms the 
other European G7 economies, with UK surprisingly at the bottom of the table.  
It seems that the delivery of a high innovation measure may be possible with a 
wide variation of R&D investment values, with Germany appearing to score the 
highest innovation measure in Table A5 despite listing a lower R&D investment 
than some other economies in Table A4. The next section lists the top 20 
economies in the innovation measure in Table A5 and then lists the top 10 
economies according to performance of the various drivers in Tables A7 and A8. 
Table A4: Mean R&D and BERD expenditure between 1996-2010, as %age of GDP 
Countries (Gross 
Domestic 
expenditure 
on R&D) 
15GERD as 
%age of GDP 
 GERD 
financed 
by govt. as 
a %age of 
GDP 
GERD 
financed 
by 
Business 
as %age 
of GDP 
(Business 
Enterprise 
expenditure 
on R&D) 
16BERD as 
%age of GDP 
%age of 
BERD 
financed 
by govt. 
Austria 2.14 0.78 0.97 1.60 8.07 
Belgium 1.87 0.44 1.18 1.31 5.92 
Czech 
Republic 
1.15 0.49 0.58 0.68 12.85 
Canada 1.87 0.59 0.91 1.07 3.07 
                                         
15 Definition of Gross domestic spending on R&D (GERD) as defined by OECD: The total 
expenditure (current and capital) on R&D carried out by all resident companies, research 
institutes, university and government laboratories, etc., in a country. It includes R&D funded 
from abroad, but excludes domestic funds for R&D performed outside the domestic economy 
16 Definition of Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as defined by OECD:  Represents 
the component of GERD incurred by units belonging to the Business enterprise sector. It is the 
measure of intramural ( ie within the sector) R&D expenditures within the Business enterprise 
sector during a specific reference period.  
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Denmark 2.40 0.70 1.42 1.62 3.40 
Finland 3.22 0.85 2.22 2.26 3.45 
France 2.12 0.81 1.10 1.33 10.25 
Germany 2.42 0.75 1.59 1.67 6.26 
Hungary 0.88 0.43 0.35 0.40 8.89 
Ireland 1.24 0.35 0.73 0.85 4.33 
Italy 1.07 0.51 0.48 0.54 10.65 
Luxembourg 1.60 0.30 1.17 1.33 3.31 
Netherlands 1.77 0.70 0.85 0.94 4.47 
Poland 0.61 0.37 0.20 0.20 20.13 
Portugal 0.90 0.49 0.33 0.35 5.20 
Romania 0.48 0.24 0.18 0.26 35.37 
Spain 1.04 0.44 0.48 0.55 11.84 
Sweden 3.45 0.87 2.28 2.54 6.00 
Turkey 0.54 0.25 0.23 0.19 5.76 
UK 1.61 0.50 0.73 1.02 8.60 
US 2.59 0.78 1.65 1.83 11.05 
Mean Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) and Businesss enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) 
for period 2000-2010  (OECD Main science and technology indicators  -MSTI- database) 
E:  European economies performance in the Innovation measure 
and drivers 
EU economies based on performance in Innovation measure As the innovation 
measure is the key criterion for establishing level of innovation in economies for 
this research, bearing in mind the definitions as outlined in the data section, the 
top 20 economies are listed in table A3, based on a mean value of innovation 
measure from CIS data over the period 1996-2010. It is a different ranking of 
economies17,then that indicated by the level of R&D expenditure as listed in table 
3. The ranking based on the main innovation measure in the second column, 
shows Germany, France and UK as the top 3 innovative economies out of the 27 
EU economies included in this research, based on innovative firm performance. 
The spread between UK, France and Germany is quite large, with Germany 
nearly a factor 3 higher than UK in the main innovation measure. Germany 
maintains this lead for small firms and medium firm innovation measure, though 
Italy and UK jump upwards to second place for these two variables respectively. 
Again, though worth noting is the remarkably large difference between Germany 
and any economy coming up in second place. 
                                         
17 US is not included in this ranking, as its economy is not covered by CIS data 
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However, the economies realign when reviewing innovative measure as share of 
GDP as listed in Table A6. Despite realignment Germany still outperforms the 
European G7 economies substantially, with UK surprisingly at the bottom of the 
table. This seems to reaffirm the complexity of innovation systems. Not only 
confirming the importance of the wider set of innovation drivers but also as 
summarized in conclusion, the importance of structural aspects – such as firm 
structures in an economy.   
 
Table A5: Top 20 EU economies ranked in order for mean innovative turnover in absolute 
value (in billion euros) for all firm-sizes, covering the period 1996-2010 
Countries Mean Innovative 
turnover (all firms) – 
main innovation 
measure (measured in 
billion euros) 
Mean innovative 
turnover (as share 
of avg GDP for 
same time period) 
x 1000  
Mean 
innovative 
turnover 
(for only 
small 
firms)  
Mean 
innovative 
turnover (for 
only medium 
firms) 
Germany 2.99 1.33 0.23 0.48 
France 1.33 0.81 0.11 0.19 
UK 1.00 0.56 0.13 0.23 
Italy 0.92 0.67 0.16 0.21 
Spain 0.63 0.77 0.08 0.12 
Turkey 0.62 1.7 0.27 0.14 
Netherlands 0.38 0.74 0.05 0.092 
Belgium 0.29 1.0 0.048 0.067 
Sweden 0.26 0.88 0.04 0.048 
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Poland 0.24 1.04 0.019 0.046 
Austria 0.23 0.96 0.029 0.057 
Ireland 0.18 1.32 0.02 0.055 
Finland 0.16 1.05 0.015 0.025 
Czech 
Republic 
0.15 1.52 0.015 0.032 
Norway 0.14 0.62 0.019 0.03 
Denmark 0.13 0.66 0.023 0.031 
Portugal 0.12 0.83 0.023 0.032 
Hungary 0.08 1.09 0.006 0.013 
Romania 0.062 0.86 0.006 0.011 
Luxembourg 0.057 2.06 0.008 0.013 
CIS database, Eurostat  
Table A6: Top 20 EU economies realigned in performance for mean innovative turnover (in 
billion euros) as share of GDP (in trillion euros) for all firm-sizes, covering the period 1996-
2010 
Countries Mean 
innovative 
turnover (as 
share of avg 
GDP for same 
time period)  
Mean Innovative 
turnover (all firms) – 
main innovation 
measure 
Luxembourg 2.06 0.057 
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Turkey 1.7 0.62 
Czech Republic 1.52 0.15 
Germany 1.33 2.99 
Ireland 1.32 0.18 
Hungary 1.09 0.08 
Finland 1.05 0.16 
Poland 1.04 0.24 
Belgium 1.0 0.29 
Austria 0.96 0.23 
Sweden 0.88 0.26 
Romania 0.86 0.062 
Portugal 0.83 0.12 
France 0.81 1.33 
Spain 0.77 0.63 
Netherlands 0.74 0.38 
Italy 0.67 0.92 
Denmark 0.66 0.13 
Norway 0.62 0.14 
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UK 0.56 1.00 
National accounts, Eurostat 
Innovation drivers Keeping in mind the quite large deviation between Germany 
and the other G7 economies in the innovation measure, we now move to 
assessing other drivers listed in table 2. They cover respectively drivers of skilled 
human capital, R&D investment, external sourcing of R&D, public funding for 
enterprises, firm linkages with academia, firm linkages with governmental 
organizations, firm linkages with suppliers, national market focus for enterprises 
and Enterprises focused on International markets. The top 10 ranked economies 
for each of these drivers is displayed in table A4 and A518.  Despite the 
considerable variation of aspects measured by each driver, Germany’s strength 
of performance across the spectrum is quite remarkable.  
Table A7: Top 10 ranking of economies of five of the nine (mean value of) drivers, over the 
period 1996-2010 
Rating of 
economies per 
Drivers: 
(1) skilled 
human 
capital 
(2) R&D 
investment 
(3) External 
R&D 
 (4) Publicly 
funded firms 
(5) Firms 
linked with 
academia 
 2066 - 
Germany 
94.9 - 
Germany 
14.6 - 
Germany 
14.1 - Italy 7.3 - 
Germany 
 1455 - UK 35.7 - France 7.9 - Italy 12.6 - 
Germany 
2.8 - UK 
 1265 - 
France 
27.8 - UK 6.1 - France 5.7 - Spain 2.3 - France 
 841 - Spain 21.6 - Italy 4.6 - Spain 5.5 - France 1.7 - Italy 
 721- Italy 13 - Sweden 3.01 - 
Netherlands 
4.96 - Turkey 1.4 - Turkey 
                                         
18 The statistics of these drivers is provided earlier in the appendix 
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 614 - 
Poland 
10.5 - Spain 2.45 - 
Portugal 
3.4 - 
Netherlands 
1.3 - Spain  
 463 - 
Netherlands 
8.9 - 
Netherlands 
2.21 – 
Czech 
republic 
2.89 - UK 1.08 - 
Finland 
 392 - 
Romania 
8.5 - Belgium 2.18 - 
Turkey 
2.4 - Austria 1.07- Sweden 
 345- 
Turkey 
5.6 - Finland 2.14 - 
Sweden 
1.58 - 
Portugal 
1.01- Czech 
Republic 
 331- 
Romania 
5.57 - Poland 2.12 - 
Belgium 
1.5 - Poland 0.97 - Austria 
HRST database, Eurostat  
Mean skilled human capita, scientists and engineers (expressed in 1000’s)  driver 
Mean total innovation expenditure: Covers Internal and external R&D cost, including knowledge 
and capital acquisitions (expressed in millions of Euro’s) 
Enterprises sourcing R&D externally (expressed in 1000’s)  
Public funding of enterprises (expressed in 1000’s) 
Firm linkages with academia (expressed in 1000’s) 
 
Table A8: Top 10 ranking of economies of the remaining four (mean value of) drivers, over 
the period 1996-2010 
Rating of 
economies per 
Drivers: 
(6) Firms 
linkages 
with govt. 
Institutions 
(7) Firm 
linkages with 
Suppliers 
(8) Firms 
with home 
market 
focus 
 (9) Firms 
with Intl. 
market focus 
 3.6 - 
Germany 
6.7 - UK 35.6 - 
Germany 
27.5 - 
Germany 
 2.5 - UK 5.7 - Germany 23.2 - Italy 17.3 - Italy 
 1.8 - France 4.7 - France 14 - Spain 11.3 - UK 
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 1.3 - Spain 3.06 - Poland 12.9 - 
France 
10.3 - France 
 1.2- Turkey 2.9 - Italy 10.7 - UK 8.08 - Spain 
 0.86 - 
Poland 
2.6 - Turkey 10.5 - 
Turkey 
5.06 - Turkey 
 0.856 - 
Finland 
2.3 - 
Netherlands 
6 – 
Netherlands 
4.65 - 
Netherlands  
 0.79 - 
Netherlands 
2.2 – Czech 
Republic 
5.5 - 
Portugal 
3.86 - Austria  
 0.68 - Italy 1.98 - Sweden 4.6 - Poland 3.8 - Portugal 
 0.55- 
Belgium 
1.79 - Spain 4.5– Czech 
Republic 
3.77 - 
Belgium 
HRST database, Eurostat  
Firm linkages with governmental Institutions (expressed in 1000’s) 
Firm linkages with suppliers (expressed in 1000’s) 
Enterprises with Home market focus, firms focused in this market does not preclude them from 
focusing in International markets (expressed in 1000’s) 
Enterprises with Intl market focus (expressed in 1000’s) 
  
Chapter 5  199 
 199 
Chapter 4 Appendix 
Corporate tax measurement at national level: 
UK corporate tax, in 2009 at 28% stood was the second lowest statutory rate 
amongst the G7 (Griffeth & Miller, 2010), which at 26% in 2012 reached lowest in 
G7 by 2012, though it was ranked 18th when viewed amongst OECD countries 
(Bilicka & Devereux, 2012). Reviewing UK’s ranking again in 2015, Devereux et 
al. (2016) found UK at 20% reached the lowest statutory corporate tax rate 
amongst the G20 countries. However, Devereux et al. caution at the use of 
statutory corporate tax and advocate the use of either effective average tax 
rate EATR or effective marginal tax rate EMTR, as it captures capital allowances. 
Thus, instead using EATR and EMTR to assess corporate tax ranking, even by 
those measures UK was ranked 5th and 10th respectively amongst the G20 
countries by 2015 (ibid).  Thus, as of late at least, UK has a policy initiative that 
seems to be supportive of medium and large firms. 
OECD firm-structure classification: 
•Micro firms: Less than 10 employees and/or less than 2 million euro turnover 
•Small firms: Between 0-49 employees and/or less than 10 million euro turnover  
•Medium firms: 50-249 employees and/or less than 50 million euro turnover 
•Large firms: 250+ employees and/or turnover greater than 50 million euros. 
Independence Indicator as defined in Amadeus database (BvDEP, 
2006):  
The independence indicator, developed by Bureau Van Dijk (BvDEP) accessible in 
Amadeus database, assigns firms an independence value, based on shareholder 
ownership share, in line with prescriptions from International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). This excludes public share-holders of quoted firms 
and any unnamed or private unnamed shareholders. Accordingly, the firm is 
acknowledged independent, if none of the known shareholders have more than 
25% of direct or total ownership. This variable may be assigned value of A+/A/A-
, based on whether the firm has 6 or more identified shareholders/4 or 5 
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identified shareholders/or 1to 3 identified shareholders. In all three cases, it is 
considered independent. These variations do not measure higher or lower degree 
of independence, only a degree of reliability of the indicator ( BvDEP, 2006, 
page 13) 
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